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Updated: Sun Aug 29 16:43:38 UTC 2010
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The
Never Ending Story of Airworthiness
versus
Murphy's Law
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Introduction.
Before the
structural changes that swept through the Services during the 1980s,
the RAAF had, at its highest organisational level, a Chief of Air
Force Technical Services (CAFTS) whose major responsibility was to
ensure that the aircraft operated by his Service were, amongst other
major requirements, safe to operate; that is, they were technically
airworthy. The CAFTS Branch was most successful in establishing and
maintaining the policies, systems, and procedures that ensured that
all of the elements that combine to ensure technical airworthiness
visibility and control were in place and functioning properly. The
RAN, through its Chief of Naval Technical Services (CNTS) had similar
responsibilities for the management of naval technical equipment. Army,
the least technological of the Services, placed Technical
Services at a lower level of importance than Navy and Air Force.
From 1989, the
Service Technical Chiefs and their staffs were disbanded, and the
coherent policies, systems, and procedures, built up over decades of
experience, were dissipated and largely lost. Since then, we have
seen several avoidable disasters that can be traced to the loss of
sound technical management within the Services, the latest being that
covered by the Board of Inquiry report into the Sea King Tragedy.
While the Inquiry
into the Sea King Tragedy uncovered much evidence, the required
technical expertise and experience was not available within the Board
or in the Services for it to identify the root cause - the structural
deficiencies that have been embedded within the Services, largely by
Government and bureaucratic decree. As a result, the Inquiry was not
able to come to a properly-defined root cause or a properly-defined
set of recommendations, which also points to inherent shortcomings in
the use of such boards for this purpose. In the end, the promise by
the Chief of Defence Force to implement all the recommendations of
the Inquiry, and so cure the ADF's problems, will be proven,
inevitably, to be hollow.
The overview that
follows will, hopefully, give those not familiar with the chain of
technical airworthiness some awareness of what is involved in
ensuring that disasters such as the Sea King Tragedy do not, within
human limits, occur in military aircraft operations.
Airworthiness
Airworthiness
in its widest sense is a condition of flight safety measured by the
combined effectiveness of the policies, systems and procedures in
place and managed by operational and technical staffs working
together closely.
Maintaining aircraft
in a condition safe to fly has, since the beginning of flight, been a
constant battle of wits between those responsible for the management
of technical airworthiness and Murphy [1], who is
ever alert to take
advantage of the slightest relaxation in technical airworthiness
policies, systems, and procedures. When he penetrates the defences
of technical airworthiness management, the results are often fatal
for those involved.
The meaning of
technical airworthiness is recognised by few people, particularly in
terms of how it is achieved and maintained over time within a
military environment. In simple terms, technical airworthiness
comprises a number of closely linked activities that must be in place
and adhered to if the technical safety of aircraft operations is to
be assured. Should any activity be missing, or be weak, then
airworthiness management will be prone to failure and Murphy doesn't
usually let such occurrences pass him by unnoticed or unpunished.
The technical
policies, systems and procedures required to be in place to assure
the safety of flight of military aircraft also apply generically to
the RAN in ensuring that its ships and submarines are seaworthy. The
'Westralia' disaster brought home the penalties of default in
seaworthiness management dramatically, in this case a simple
breakdown in the technical management of the configuration control of
high pressure fuel hoses. Unfortunately, for all the words written,
the real cause, that is the root cause, was not identified - the
disbandment of the Navy's Engineer Branch and with it the loss of the
Navy's policies, systems and procedures for managing technical
seaworthiness. However, this paper will concentrate on the RAAF and
its responsibility for the technical airworthiness of ADF aircraft.
An
ABC of RAAF Airworthiness Management, Pre-1988/89.
Before the
structural changes of 1988/89, the technical airworthiness
responsibility for RAAF, and some Army and Navy, aircraft rested with
CAFTS, an Air Vice Marshal who reported directly to the Chief of Air
Force. CAFTS' staff were organised broadly into Engineering,
Maintenance, and Quality Assurance directorates, with close
interfaces forged with the Supply function to ensure that only
technically approved parts entered the RAAF's inventory, an important
element in airworthiness control as Murphy prefers to use small and
inexpensive items to cause havoc.
Regrettably,
government-driven changes led to the disbandment of the Engineer
Branch in the RAAF which, with the sweeping organisational changes
that followed, resulted in a wide range of highly successful
policies, systems, and procedures, built up over some 70 years of
experience, being largely lost. In short, the CAF had lost
visibility and control not only of his technical resources, but also
the airworthiness state of his fleet and that of the other Services.
As a result of
growing disquiet over maintenance standards in the RAAF, the CAF
directed a detailed review be undertaken in 2006. The
recommendations of that review were accepted recently in toto. As a
first step in regaining visibility and control, CAF has established
the post of Director, Maintenance Policy and Planning-Air Force with
a wide-ranging set of responsibilities. This move, given adequate
priority, manning and support, should go some a significant way
towards regaining visibility and control of some technical functions.
The position of Director-General: Maintenance was one of those
disbanded in the deconstruction of the Engineering Branch in the late
1980s/early 1990s. However, maintenance is but one function
impacting technical airworthiness. There are others that must also
be gathered in if a strong chain of technical airworthiness control
is to be re-established within the RAAF.
Airworthiness is
usually re-defined as each generation of 'nuveau management salesmen'
emerge, with each new definition being more obscure and verbose than
the preceding one, indicating a loss of depth of understanding on the
part of each new generation of managers. A simple definition of
technical airworthiness used by the RAAF was:
- The condition of an aircraft which
determines
the legality of its suitability for flight, in that:
- It has been designed, constructed, and
maintained to approved standards,
- By competent and approved individuals,
acting as members of
- An approved organisation, and
whose
work is
- Certified as correct and accepted
on behalf of the Air Force.
This definition
highlighted recognition of the legal implications of the activities
that make up the airworthiness chain, and in turn the broad
responsibilities that rested with the CAFTS appointment. Without
direct control of those technical activities that go to make up
flight safety, he could hardly control airworthiness, and so could
not be held responsible for it.
In practice,
technical airworthiness is the sum of well-integrated and focussed
engineering, maintenance, and supply functions which form an unbroken
chain to provide the visibility, monitoring, control, direction, and
development of technical airworthiness standards. Unfortunately, the
current organisation of the ADF, and particularly that of the RAAF,
makes it impossible for the RAAF to assure the airworthiness of its
own aircraft, let alone all ADF aircraft, without significant
structural change.
The
Technical Services Function.
Broadly, the
responsibilities of CAFTS related to the specification of engineering
standards and technical airworthiness control of all RAAF technical
equipment, excluding civil works. These activities were directed at
ensuring that RAAF aircraft and their weapon and support systems,
including some Army and Navy equipments, were capable of performing
their operational role safely. However, the RAAF knew from hard-won
experience that its weapon systems must not only be operationally
capable, that is, that their structure, flight controls, navigation
systems, weapons, etc, functioned properly, but:
- they must operate at a high level of
flight
safety; otherwise attrition of both aircraft and crews would be
unacceptably high, and
- they must operate at a high level of
reliability; that is, they must be dependable -– capable of
operating effectively time after time, at the required level of flight
safety.
In short, the
Technical Services' function specified, planned, organised, directed,
and controlled the standards that effected operational availability
and capability, reliability, and technical airworthiness.
These functions were
managed in turn through three main directorates – Engineering,
Maintenance, and Quality Assurance.
The
Engineering Function.
Engineering
standards were established and varied as necessary through a chain of
activities, mainly:
Technical
Requirements Specifications (TRS). These ensured that aircraft
and other technical equipment were designed and manufactured to
approved standards before being accepted into the RAAF. Sections of
the TRS related to reliability and maintainability requirements which
drove maintenance policies and support requirements. The
Specification was an important baseline document that defined the
need for many subsequent technical management activities.
Configuration
Control. This is the most important link in the airworthiness
chain. An aircraft's configuration baseline must be established as
part of the procurement process and amended to reflect all changes
introduced over its Service life. If an aircraft's configuration,
down to every item classified as a configuration managed item, is not
recorded correctly and kept current, then Murphy is free to act at
will. The configuration of each aircraft was recorded in a Technical
Management Plan (TMP), which was also the baseline document to which
all maintenance policies and support requirements were keyed through
a Technical Management Code (TMC). This code identified each
configuration item in terms of the aircraft, system, and sub-system
to which it was fitted. It was also the data base identifier against
which defects and failures were reported, recorded, collated, and
analysed. In the absence of an accurate and current configuration
record, technical management and hence airworthiness visibility and
control are not possible.
Technical Support
Policy and Requirements. The aircraft's TMP was also the
repository for the maintenance policy and support requirements for
each configuration item, by stating:
- What work will be done (scope of work).
- Where the work will be done (venue).
- When it will be done (period).
- With what skills it will be done
(specialist
trade category, standards, and responsibilities).
- How it will be done (in accordance with
what
approved publications, maintenance manuals, etc).
- How and when work will be checked,
supervised,
and certified (check inspections and technical documentation
requirements).
Management
Feed-Back Loops. Feed-back loops were used to monitor and control
aircraft technical airworthiness, equipment reliability, and
maintenance performance through the analysis of data from reports and
returns covering defects and failures, defect investigations,
modification action, air incident reports and, most importantly,
through visits to units. Corrective action was managed through the
issue of Technical Instructions and Modifications, changes to the
TMP, technical documentation amendments, and through other technical
administrative channels.
The
engineering function not only established the standards needed to
assure effective operational support, but monitored the chain of
technical airworthiness activities to ensure that they were
appropriate, in place, and functioning correctly.
The
Maintenance Function.
While Engineering
was concerned with establishing policies and monitoring and varying
technical standards, Maintenance was involved mainly with the
continuing management of the activities associated with getting
operational aircraft (and their supporting systems) on line and
keeping them there. The Maintenance function was conducted:
- To meet the operational requirement,
- In accordance with specified engineering
standards, and
- Within the constraints imposed mainly by:
- Time and space,
- Manpower and skills,
- Equipment,
- Facilities, and
- Information.
However, Maintenance
has not only an active (operational support) function, but performs a
vital feedback role. Engineering management depends heavily upon
Maintenance management forecasting and analysing situations and
advising Engineering management so that engineering standards and
maintenance policy can be varied appropriately and timely. Without
this feedback, both engineering and maintenance can be caught flat
footed, maintenance delays can occur, and operational capabilities
impacted.
At the flying units,
the point at which operational and technical requirements interface,
conflicting demands can arise during periods of high operational
tasking, and particularly when operating away-Base. Resolution of
these conflicts requires a sound and mature understanding on the part
of the operator of the role and importance of scheduling aircraft for
flying and maintenance so as to keep a well-controlled aircraft
maintenance stagger. The maintenance element, for its part, needs to
be able to respond flexibly to periodic, high operational tempo,
while ensuring that maintenance work does not come under unsafe
pressures, and any work backlogs do not give rise to rushed and
unsafe catch-up maintenance. The Unit Maintenance Control Section
was designed to resolve planned flying and maintenance matters in a
well-coordinated manner, but it requires sound operational and
maintenance management skills for it to be successful. The
operational/maintenance interface, when under pressure, will always
carry the greatest potential for Murphy to wreak havoc.
The
maintenance function not only focussed on operational support, but
provided a critical feed-back loop so that problems and changes that
may distract the maintenance element from its prime focus could be
analysed and corrected 'off line' by engineering. It also forms the
interface for the proper and safe planning of flying and maintenance
within constrained resources.
The Quality
Assurance (QA) Function.
During the 1990s,
the aviation quality assurance function was removed from the CAFTS
Branch to a central QA bureaucracy together with similar functions
from the other Services. Here, the function was totally run down and
de-skilled, destroying the quality defences that had been built up to
constrain Murphy.
Technical
Services Functional Interfaces.
Engineering and
Maintenance functions required close and continuing interfaces with a
number of other areas, mainly:
- Operations, through Air Incidents
Reports, accidents, investigations, urgent (safety/airworthiness)
modifications, operational problems, and the development of new or
enhanced capabilities.
- Maintenance Units, ensuring through
feed-back that engineering standards were being maintained or needed
review.
- Technical Training, by setting,
monitoring, and varying the technical trade and engineer officer
standards required to handle current and future technologies.
- Technical Publications, by acting
as the
approval, distribution, and amendment authority.
- Supply, by controlling the
approval,
exemption, and qualification of technical spares used in specific
applications, and monitoring the movement of configuration items
through the repair pipeline (turn-around times).
- Information Systems, by specifying
technical management system requirements and their related data
elements.
- Finance, in compiling bids to cover
technical activities and managing expenditure.
- New Projects, by taking a lead
role
which identified and managed all new/modified support requirements so
that new systems were fully supported and operational on entry into the
RAAF.
Technical
Management Effectiveness.
The management
approaches described not only provided sound technical airworthiness
control, but provided a very good capability to identify departures
from required standards, and hence provided the ability to correct
them before they impacted technical airworthiness. The most damaging
foray by Murphy post-WW11 occurred during the Vietnam period when the
RAAF had to expand its operational effort under serious resource
constraints. That story, which resembles the Sea King Tragedy in
many respects, is given at Attachment 1. Of importance, is the
manner in which the Chief of Air Force Technical Services at the time
was able to marshal his resources, manage the problem, and solve it
promptly and effectively, a far cry from the 21 month long Sea King
Inquiry!
It is not proposed
that the CAFTS organisation be re-introduced into the RAAF, as
structural changes preclude that. There is an urgent requirement,
however, to re-establish a strong Technical Services organisation
within the RAAF, and the other Services as appropriate to their
operational roles and technology base, if proper control of the
technology operated and supported is to be regained.
What Happened?
The loss of the
policies, systems and procedures that assured sound technical
management and hence technical airworthiness control were dissipated
and largely lost as a result of waves of structural changes, internal
and external, that have swept through the RAAF. Some of the most
important were:
The RAAF
Reorganisation of the 1980s. The RAAF, as a result of the
protracted inability of the Defence bureaucracy to obtain the
resources needed to maintain even minimum Service capabilities, was
forced to reorganise its support functions. Essentially, this
involved the delegation of many of its Support Command functions down
to Unit level. The planning for this was based on the assumptions
that the Command would retain an oversight function and that the
Engineer Branch would remain at Air Force Office. Unfortunately,
both of these assumptions were overturned by subsequent
Government-driven changes that resulted in the focus of the Air Force
reorganisation being lost.
The
'Sanderson' Review of 1989. This review led to the
disbandment of the Engineer Branch in the RAAF, and in turn a
widespread technical de-skilling. It also resulted in the creation
of a wholly inappropriate organisational structure at Air Force
Office. About the same time, the RAAF introduced a 'General List'
for senior officers which resulted in 'generalists' taking decisions
in areas where they lacked the necessary technical knowledge and
experience. The General List also contributed to a drastic reduction
in the depth of the RAAF's knowledge and experience base in all areas
and at all levels.
The Commercial
Support Programme, Defence Efficiency and the Defence Reform
Programmes. The changes
introduced by these programmes, and the interminable reviews that
followed during the years that followed, not only completed the
technical gutting and de-skilling of the RAAF, but introduced
structural, organisational, functional, financial, and language
barriers that made it impossible for the CAF to manage the RAAF as a
force, or able to guarantee the RAAF's own, let alone the ADF's,
technical airworthiness standards. Limiting the establishment of the
Service Offices to an arbitrary 100, without regard for the marked
differences between them in operational, technology, and support
areas reflected gross ignorance at best. Some examples of the impact
of these changes on the RAAF's technical competence follow:
1992-94.
Support
funding for in-Service aircraft was curtailed severely. Mandated
reductions in military and civilian numbers occurred using the CSP as
the target saving mechanism. Recruiting and training of the
technical workforce was reduced from 1,100 to 400 per year, which
created a 'black hole' in technical capabilities that persisted for a
decade and left the Service with a much less competent technical
workforce than existed before.
1991-97. The
CSP also saw the RAAF's three aircraft depots commercialised, wholly
or partly, resulting in some technical trades becoming non-viable.
Engineering, Logistics, Administration, and Training establishments
were reduced to meet mandatory savings of 20% for technical
activities and 40% for the others (which also supported the technical
function). Savings were reaped from the RAAF budget annually by
Defence Central Finance, without reconciliation with the impacts on
capabilities, including airworthiness management.
1998 to
Today. This period saw, amongst many other changes, the Services'
Support Commands taken over by Defence and absorbed finally into the
DMO, an ever-growing bureaucracy, remote from the needs of the
Services and responsive to other than Service needs. Many reviews
and reforms have taken place with the aim of improving equipment
procurement processes, but none has proven to be the panacea
promised. Major mistakes that impact Australia's force structure and
Service capabilities are still being made and highlighted, but the
organisation seems incapable of improvement. No change seems to stem
from what is best for the Services, including their capability to
assure airworthiness.
The
disbandment of the Engineer Branch, the imposition of an
inappropriate structure for the management of the RAAF, the
introduction of the General Branch and the continuing impacts of the
CSP and DRP all lie at the very heart of the problems being faced by
the RAAF and, in turn, ADF technical airworthiness management. It
follows that those changes must be reviewed and discarded or severely
modified where they have caused unacceptable damage.
In short, the
technical airworthiness chain was seriously weakened, then broken up.
Visibility and control of the chain was lost and has remained
largely lost to the Chief of Air Force.
What
Resulted?
The seeds were
sown for the problems now entrenched throughout the RAAF, and, in
general, for military flying throughout the ADF. in general.
Not
surprisingly, the outcome of these changes led to a fragmented
engineering and maintenance organisation with limited strategic
guidance, a poor sense of direction, inadequate visibility of
technical workforce matters, failing performance management, and
little ability to plan for the future. (A RAAF assessment of
2006.)
The
Perceived Airworthiness Solution.
During 1990, and
largely in response to a series of aircraft accidents, a regulated
system of airworthiness management was instituted which led to the
development of the ADF airworthiness arrangements in place today. At
the top, the Charter for the Chief of Air Force states: 'act as
the Australian Defence Force airworthiness authority'. The
system adopted was based on the CASA/FAA approach, modified
substantially to meet the particular needs of Defence Force aircraft,
but considered to be sound.
However, while
a regulatory system may be sound, its effectiveness depends entirely
upon how it is managed, the degree to which it is understood
throughout the ADF, and the manner in which each Service implements
the regulatory requirements.
Under the CAF, as
the Airworthiness Authority, a Director General of Technical
Airworthiness-ADF (DGTA-ADF) was formed in 1998 with a tri-Service
focus on technical airworthiness matters. However, it must be
understood that he is not responsible for the efficiency or
preparedness aspects of Air Force aviation maintenance, or a wide
range of ground-based Air Force technical equipment, or for similar
areas in Navy and Army. The DGTA role is solely that of a regulatory
authority of technical airworthiness.
Unfortunately,
the lack of an agency in either AFHQ or HQAC with responsibility for
RAAF maintenance has led to the placement of some technical workforce
management functions with DGTA-ADF, even though they do not and
should not fall within his responsibilities. (A RAAF
assessment of 2006.) The same situation has, unfortunately,
also developed in Navy, as evidenced by the Sea King Inquiry, and in
Army.
In effect, the
DGTA-ADF organisation is seen by many to be both a regulatory
authority and an implementing authority. In fact, his activity
represents only part of the total management activity associated with
technical airworthiness. The fault and consequences for this
situation can not be sheeted home wholly to the organisation. They
have to be sheeted home primarily to the chain of ill-considered
structural and resource changes that created the present situation
and the appointments within those Defence and Service organisations
that allowed them to happen and to continue unchecked.
The core of
the problem lies in the absence of a coherent technical organisation
within Army, Navy, and Air Force with responsibility for the
establishment and maintenance of the policies, systems, and
procedures necessary for the proper management of all technical
support activities, including technical airworthiness.
The US Navy (USN) Tarawa Class Amphibious Assault Ship USS TARAWA
(LHA-1) pulls alongside the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) Durance Class
(Underway Replenishment Tanker) (AORH) Her Majestys Australian Ship
(HMAS) SUCCESS (OR 304) to prepare for a replenishment at sea (RAS) in
support of exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2004. A Westland Sea
King HAS 50/50A sits on the rear deck of the SUCCESS (US Navy Image).
THE SEA KING
DISASTER AND AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT
The Defence Media
Unit advised in mid-June of this year that the Board of Inquiry into
the Sea King Accident of 2nd April 2005 had been submitted
to the Fleet Commander as the Convening Authority on 18th
December 2006, some 21 months after the event. The media release
goes on to say, somewhat proudly, that:
- The Board considered 44 Terms of Reference,
- Took evidence from over 160 witnesses,
- Reviewed 560 exhibits,
- Conducted hearings over 111 days,
- Produced about 10, 000 pages of transcript,
- Changed its Term of Reference to exclude any
scrutiny of crashworthiness,
- Drafted a report 1,700 pages long,
- Made 759 findings, and
- Made 256 Recommendations.
The Report was then
subjected to lengthy legal review, including the resolution of some
jurisdictional unease raised by Senior Counsel. Many of the
Inquiry's findings were amended as a result. However, though there
was a legal review, there was no technical review. In effect, the
Inquiry was wholly legal-centric rather than
operational/technical-centric as it should have been. In the end,
the Navy, one of several innocent victims in this whole affair and
whose officers are sworn not to put into disrepute, took full
responsibility for the tragedy and the Chief of Defence Force assured
all that every Recommendation would be implemented, in full –
all good PR, but not very helpful.
On receipt of the
Report, a Board of Inquiry Implementation Team distributed the
Findings and Recommendations to 27 Implementing Authorities to assess
how the Recommendations could be implemented, identify the resources
required, and establish the estimated completion date. It seems that
30% of the Recommendations have reportedly been completed and another
60% will be implemented by December 2007.
The Media Release
ended up by assuring all that:
"By
improving aviation safety, Navy and Defence demonstrate that it has
learnt from this tragedy".
Unfortunately for
our military aviators and all those who fly with them nothing could
be further from the truth. We now await Murphy to select the next
tragedy and await the next judicial Board of Inquiry, as the root
causes of the Sea King Tragedy have yet to be identified and
acknowledged, let alone accepted and corrected by the Defence
Organisation.
Root
Cause Analysis.
When performing a
formal Root Cause Analysis, it is generally found that there are
several levels of 'causes' between the 'Primary or Initiating Cause'
and the 'Root Cause'. In practice, these can vary from four to ten
levels, depending upon such variables as the number of levels of
management involved with the failed item (or incident), the type of
failure, and the extant risks that, because they had not been retired
or mitigated, led to the failure. In the case of the Sea King
Tragedy, the Primary Cause was a technical failure of the bell crank
assembly, induced by the absence or failure of the split pin required
to secure the nut. As in most cases, the Root Cause continues to
exist well beyond the Primary Cause and has done so for some
time.
The 256
Recommendations.
The simple fact that
the inquiry saw 256 Recommendations as being necessary to 'fix' the
problems impacting but one accident, the primary cause of which was
readily identifiable, should have raised loud alarm bells. How could
so many things be found to be so bad in so many different areas and
require so many corrective actions? Surely the Board was telling
itself that effective technical management within the Services, not
only technical airworthiness management, was missing, and that this
was the problem that should have been scrutinised. A technical Root
Cause Analysis (RCA) was plainly required to get to the bottom of
the problem. However, this obvious conclusion escaped the Board and,
so, it merely prescribed the application of 256 Band Aids to cover
those symptoms that the Board saw as 'relevant'.
Here, it should be
noted that the Board dealt with only one aircraft and one accident. Had
accidents over the past decade been reviewed, as suggested by the
original Terms of Reference, the findings and recommendations would
probably have totalled several hundreds more. This would have given
a better idea of the scale of the core problem. However, even then
the scope of the problem would not have been fully in focus, as we
would need to add those systems and equipments that support aircraft
operations - these also have to come under firm technical management
within each Service if we are to assure proper technical safety of
air and other operations.
The 27
Implementing Authorities.
Similarly, in
identifying that 27 different authorities were involved with the
'management' of the technical airworthiness of the Sea King, the
Board should have paused to ask if such an arrangement was an
efficient and effective way of managing such a critical aspect of
Australia's military airpower. How can safety of flight be assured
when those involved have to manage across 27 organisational,
functional, cultural, and financial interfaces? This situation again
drives home the absence of any coherent technical management
organisation within the three Services, a situation which seems to
have slipped past the Board's notice.
The table following
identifies the areas that have been called upon to take 'corrective'
action. In many cases, the authority responsible for taking action
has been called upon to liaise with several other areas involved,
adding further levels of complexity in coordination. Prima-facie,
the number of Recommendations that fell across the interface between
the Maritime Commander and COMAUSTNAVAIRGRP should have been seen as
particularly important red flag.
|
Authority
|
Recommendations
Requiring Action
|
Authority
|
Recommendations
Requiring Action
|
|
Maritime Commander Australia
|
49
|
Sea Training Group
|
2
|
|
COMAUSTNAVAIRGRP
|
53
|
Air
Worthiness Coordination and
Policy Agency
|
4
|
|
No Body in Particular
|
21
|
Senior NCOs
|
1
|
|
Maritime HQs
|
3
|
Navy Aviation FEG
|
14
|
|
No. 817 Sqn
|
1
|
RAAF School Tech Trg
|
4
|
|
Dir Av Safety ADF
|
4
|
Chief of Navy
|
4
|
|
DGTA-ADF
|
20
|
ASSWG
|
1
|
|
ADF Airworthiness Authority
|
9
|
CANAG
|
2
|
|
TA-AVN
|
8
|
Miscellaneous
|
38
(19.1 to 19.38)
|
|
Def Trg
|
1
|
Miscellaneous
|
3
(20.1 to 20.3)
|
None of the
Recommendations demonstrate any understanding of the technical
airworthiness chain discussed earlier, which in turn indicates a lack
of appropriate operational and technical knowledge and focus on the
Board. In the end, the Board was unable to see how much of the chain
was missing or broken, and so in turn was unable to realise that its
Recommendations could not result in fundamental or lasting
improvements in establishing and maintaining an effective technical
airworthiness chain. This calls into serious question the usefulness
of a legal-centric process to investigate wholly operational and
technical matters. Disciplinary considerations should always follow
the results of an operational/technical inquiry.
The Role of
DGTA-ADF.
In some of its
Recommendations, the Board drew close to the nub of the problem, when
it voiced a general unease with the higher management of
airworthiness, but then it shied away and simply called for someone
to conduct some wider reviews, mostly the DGTA-ADF. Some examples
are contained at Recommendations 14.1, 14.4, 14.6, 14.7, 14.12,
14.16, 14.17, 14.21, 14.26, 14.28, and 14.29.
More importantly, in
other Recommendations, (such as 7.2, 7.4, 7.7, 8.8, and 10.7) we see
DGTA-ADF being called upon to provide such services as engineering
and maintenance advice to units, become involved with the amendment
of technical publications, conduct maintenance performance audits,
become involved in maintenance management, and also with training and
maintenance regulations – all technical management functions
that reside within Navy. However, these have flowed into the serious
observations contained in Chapter 4 – Annex B – Summary
of Findings, B14.1 to B14.5.
Recommendations
such as these highlight a very serious problem with the Inquiry,
which is the Board's assumption or interpretation of the nature and
scope of the responsibilities of DGTA-ADF. The report and its
Recommendations assume, quite wrongly, that all these functions fall
within the responsibilities of DGTA-ADF. They do not, and it is
quite wrong to saddle him with them. To do so would place him in a
position of gross conflict of interest and task him with
responsibility for Service management activities over which he has,
rightly, absolutely no authority.
DGTA-ADF is a
regulatory body and is thus responsible for the proper regulation of
ADF technical airworthiness. He is not responsible for engineering
or maintenance management. These are a user Service responsibility.
DGTA-ADF must
not be seen as a panacea for the Services' fundamental technical
management deficiencies that were imposed largely by Government and
bureaucratic decree.
The problem is
that none of the Services has any technical management organisation
able to take up technical airworthiness matters, apart from the
RAAF's embryonic Director of Maintenance Policy and Planning.
In short, the Board
demonstrated an inability to get to grips with the technical
airworthiness management chain and to allocate management
responsibilities to the correct authority.
The
RAAF's Court of Inquiry Methodology.
The
RAAF's traditional way of handling accidents, such as the Iroquois
problems outlined at Attachment 1, was characterised by:
A
Court of Inquiry process, with the President and Members drawn
from across the Service (and from outside when necessary) to ensure
that the inquiry had the span and depth of experience and expertise
needed.
Terms
of Reference that focussed sharply upon what happened and the
root cause(s).
A
Clear identification of any corrective action required, by
operational, technical, and other staffs.
Prompt
action, as any unwarranted delay could well result in a
continuing risk.
The
Court of Inquiry process also formed a vital feed-back loop for
operational and technical managers, especially in the area of
airworthiness management.
In
short, the RAAF dealt with Category 5 and/or fatal accidents quickly
and expertly.
The
Board of Inquiry Methodology.
The
current Board of Inquiry approach resulted from the Defence Inquiry
into the Effectiveness of Australia's Military Justice System of
2005, which was prompted largely by a number of high-profile
personnel management problems. The death of any ADF person now needs
to be investigated by an independent and legally constituted Board of
Inquiry, a generalisation that does not recognise the peculiar
operational and technical complexities that must be resolved before
the root cause of any military accident, and hence the means of
preventing recurrences, can be determined.
For
the Sea King inquiry, there was a preponderance of legal people over
operational and technical expertise. With 13 potentially affected
persons, all legally represented, the inquiry had 16 barristers all
arguing legalities, rather than hard operational/technical evidence,
possibly to justify their high fees. The inquiry could hardly become
other than the usual legalistic squabble, totally dominating a board
led, not inappropriately, by a legally-unversed Navy officer.
The
Board of Inquiry's, legal-centric approach as mandated by Defence
will never get to the facts or the root cause of any ADF accident,
fatal or otherwise. The result will be a highly skewed, confused,
and contrived result that will certainly not address real
airworthiness or other important Military concerns.
The
Measurement of Flight Safety Standards.
Towards
the end of the Sea King Board of Inquiry, Defence released an
overview of the ADF’s Airworthiness Management System which
included a chart showing a marked reduction in ADF Aviation Fatal
Accidents from 1970 to 2006, especially following the introduction of
Technical and Operational Regulation.
However,
fatal accident statistics are hardly a comforting measure of the
technical (or operational) standards being maintained within the
three Services. Fatal accident statistics only serve to remind us
that we were too late, that all our safeguards, both technical and
operational, have been breached. When looking at how airworthy ADF
aircraft are, it is necessary to drop down a level and look at those
incidents that had the potential to be fatal accidents, but escaped
through good luck, but good luck must never be mistaken for or be
represented as good management.
Unfortunately,
these ‘near misses’ are not usually open to public
scrutiny but sufficient have arisen lately to give cause for concern
that the de-skilling and down-sizing of the Services, particularly
the disbandment of Air Force and Navy Engineering branches, have
impacted adversely on technical management, and hence technical
airworthiness standards. For example:
The
F-111 Incident of 2006.
At
about 2-10pm, on 18th July 2006, an F-111 made a wheels-up
emergency landing at RAAF Amberley following the loss of one of its
main landing wheels on take-off. Fortunately, the loss of its port
main wheel was noticed by the Control Tower and the pilot notified. The
aircraft was also ‘clean’ (no external stores), and
had several hours of fuel which allowed an unrushed emergency landing
plan to be put in place. Congratulations all round followed the
successful wheels-up landing.
Apparently,
the problem arose from a 12cm long pin being installederted
incorrectly in the main wheel assembly-a maintenance error seemingly
affecting about half the F-111 fleet (10 or more aircraft).
However,
the circumstances of the emergency could easily have been much more
hazardous and so may well have graduated to the Fatal Accidents
Chart, for example:
- What if the tower had not seen the wheel
fall off
and so the pilot not warned?
- What if the aircraft had lost its wheel on
landing
rather than take-off?
- What if the wheel had been lost on landing
at
night, especially under bad weather conditions?
- What if the aircraft had carried external
fuel or
weapons?
- What if the aircraft had been outside the
crew
module safe ejection envelope when a decision to eject was taken? And
so on.
The
potential for a major/fatal accident was also increased considerably
by the number of aircraft carrying the maintenance error. Good luck
or good management?
Sea
King Incident 1, 2005.
During
the sitting of the Board of Inquiry into the Sea King Tragedy that
claimed nine lives and injured two at Nias Island on 2nd
April 2005, evidence came forward of similar maintenance errors with
a Sea King at Darwin on 3rd and 4th October
2005, some eighteen months later.
Despite
the considerable attention given to Navy maintenance, training and
documentation standards as a result of the Nias Island accident, a
series of maintenance, supervision, and technical documentation
errors resulted in the split pins in the tail pylon hinge bolts of a
Sea King being removed and not replaced, giving rise to a flight
safety hazard. Their absence was not detected by the maintenance
technicians, the pilot who conducted his pre-flight inspection before
the ground run, the technician who performed the next (turn-around)
inspection, or the pilot who conducted the pre-flight inspection.
Finally:
“The
aircraft captain for the maintenance test pilot walked to the
aircraft and conducted his pre-flight inspection. He had noticed
that there was – the aircrew had been looking at the tarpaulin
hinge, the tarpaulin latch, which is on the starboard side of the
aircraft. While moving down to see what those aircrew had been
looking at he noticed that the split pins were in fact missing from
the bolts and castellated nuts on the tarpaulin hinge attachment
bolts on the starboard side.”(Transcript, page 4719 ).
The
episode was managed as an incident on the basis that the defences in
fact worked, albeit it was the very last defence. (Transcript,
page 4719).
However,
just how close was this ‘incident’ to being a tragedy
transcending even the Nias Island crash? In response to a question
as to how serious the incident really was, the Responsible
Engineering Officer (REO) stated:
“---Not
to trivialize the accident (the Nias Id accident), but I see that
(the Darwin incident) as worse than the accident, and I described
that to them, to my people up there because, of all the human factors
training, and all the maintenance stand downs and everything else
that has happened since the (Nias) accident, it should never have
happened up in Darwin. So, clearly, where we were going with our
education process and our maintenance standards and practices some of
it is being missed by some people, and that concerned me greatly,
because that day there were going to be three aircrew and 10
maintainers were getting in that aircraft for that Flight because
they were flying from RAAF Darwin to Robertson Barracks, and it
really hit home to the maintainers that (they) were getting in that
aircraft when it was picked up , but it shouldn’t have taken
that, to do it. And I’ll tell you now that – and I then
went and spoke to the aircrew an hour after that to stand in front of
two full crews because we were launching a second aircraft at the
same time , and to try to explain to two of the pilots that were
there flying the other aircraft at Nias, that I still have
confidence in flying in the aircraft, I was at a loss to describe it.
And, to be honest, I was ready to chuck it in and go home, because
if the education process had been put in place so far hasn’t
worked, I clearly don’t know what we can do”. (Transcript, page 4194).
The
impacts upon both aircrew and ground crew of these continuing
maintenance errors are covered well in the transcripts of evidence.
The
President of the Board was certainly aware of the Board’s
objectives, for example when he questioned WOff Chinello over the
Darwin ‘incident’:
“-----The
fact that we’re still getting people doing walk-arounds and
implementing bad practices I guess is a an example or I guess
demonstrates the fact we’re just nibbling around the edges. All those
measures that I have seen so far to me appear to be soft
measures, which is why I ask: What have you put in place to try to
stop this from happening again rather than just briefing and some
education down the track? It is important to us because that’s
what we are meant to do as a Board and that’s why I am asking
the question: What hard measures do you think you can put in place?
Because ultimately the Board has to make recommendations about hard
measures?” (Transcript, pages 4735 and 4736).
Only
further nibbling followed because the WOff had done all that he could
and had no coherent technical management organization to support him,
just disparate groups scattered throughout the organization. However,
the WOff had hit the mark in passing when he said:
“-----I
don’t believe that there is any process that you could really
put in place here that is going to prevent this action short of
completely reorganizing the way we do management within naval
aviation. I think we still need to have faith in our maintenance
staff, because nearly every single maintainer I’ve met has
acted in good faith. Indeed, the two Leading Seamen here have acted
in good faith, albeit they’ve committed what is essential a
pretty nasty violation“. (Transcript, page 4735).
The
WOff was correct – good people trying to do their best within a
dysfunctional, non-technical, management organization.
Sea
King Incident 2, 2007.
On
18th May 2007, all six Sea Kings were again grounded over
safety concerns when two split pins were found to be missing during a
pre- flight inspection. Although Navy stated that the missing pins
were “not critical to flight safety”, it was another
serious maintenance error, and good luck seems to be again the
saviour rather than good management.
Black
Hawk Incidents 1, 2, and 3.
Given
that an aircraft is technically safe to fly, it must be flown safely
if accidents are to be avoided. In looking at airmanship standards
within the ADF, the Black Hawk Board of Inquiry provides a warning as
to what will inevitably happen when:
- Poor airmanship is allowed to creep in,
especially
habits that are contrary to the Flight Manual.
- Such divergences are allowed to continue and
develop unchecked until they are accepted as being ‘normal’.
- The feed-back loop needed to identify such
occurrences is made ineffective through failures to report flying
incidents promptly and fully.
- The audit/supervisory function is
ineffective.
Much
like the Sea King Board of Inquiry, the deficiencies identified by
the Black Hawk Board persisted during the inquiry:
“Finally
then, in some sort of summary, you have this audit system in place
and 171 Squadron was the subject of audit a number of times recently.
But also recently, in the past six months, we’ve had three
significant aircraft incidents – 29 November when the aircraft
was lost; there was an incident of ASOR 002, where an aircraft struck
a building while doing a special operations approach; and, finally,
there was an incident just recently in East Timor where we had a Cat
4 accident. All of these incidents were Black Hawks conducting
special operations approaches and downwind. Do we need to improve
the audit process?” (Transcript, pages 1771 and 1772).
Clearly,
neither Navy nor Army was organizationally capable of responding to
the need for urgent corrective action, thereby allowing the potential
for further fatal accidents to persist. Fortunately, good luck again
replaced good management and only major aircraft damage resulted.
In
summary, it is not adequate that ADF flight safety standards be
measured by its fatal accident statistics. The ‘near misses’
given as examples provide a more realistic measure and, more
importantly, carry a much better chance of identifying the root
cause of the problem –the inappropriate organizations forced
upon the Services, particularly the disbandment of their engineering
branches which has resulted in an unacceptable loss of technology
management skills and experience.
What
to do?
- The Inquiry aimed to establish
responsibility
for the accident and its consequences. However, there may be
considerable difficulty in it achieving this objective in good
conscience and with justice. All involved may be found to have been
doing their best within Service structures having organisations that
are wholly inadequate and inappropriate for the proper management of
the technology they operate and support.
- In particular, the misconception that
DGTA-ADF
has an implementation role in any of the three Services must be
acknowledged, and the consequential distortions that flow into the
Recommendations must be corrected. That is, the line between regulation
and implementation needs to be recognised clearly.
- Having done that, the Convening Authority
should
call for a serious review of the impacts of the many structural changes
on the three Services, both in terms of their ability to provide sound
technical management and to ensure that they can deliver their
respective force capabilities as they are so charged.
Defence,
in turn, must:
- Restructure and re-skill the RAAF (and the
other
Services) to regain visibility and control of the technology upon which
it is dependent in providing the force capabilities required of it and
its safety of operation.
- Abandon or seriously modify seriously the
'General
List' to provide the span and depth of technical and management
expertise required to run modern technology-based Services. This will
also go far towards avoiding the ill-informed and often ill-advised
input coming from some Service Chiefs and senior officers, a trend
symptomatic of the de-skilling and 'generalist' management approach
that has developed since 1989.
- Ensure that all reviews and inquiries
proceed from
what is best for the Services and their capabilities rather than from
ill-defined, external objectives. Furthermore, those called upon to
conduct reviews and inquiries must be selected solely on the basis of
their operational/technical/management expertise in the area being
reviewed.
- Abandon immediately the legalistic Board of
Inquiry approach to ADF accidents involving death and replace it with
the Service Court of Inquiry approach that has been demonstrably far
more effective in terms of time, cost, and results. This need is not
new. It was raised professionally by Col John A. Harvey in his
submission of 2004 to the Senate Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade
Inquiry into The Effectiveness of Australia's Military Justice System (http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/FADT
CTTE/miljustice/submissions/sub64.pdf). Two aspects
stand out particularly:
- In recent years, Board of Inquiry hearings
have
taken far longer than in the past, and greater emphasis seems to have
been given to 'defending' the actions of persons who may be affected by
the inquiry rather than in establishing what action needs to be taken
to avoid a recurrence. The proceedings have become adversarial when
this practice is clearly not envisaged by the Defence (Inquiry)
Regulations where the rules of evidence do not apply.
- While the tax-free nature of the sessional
fee of
$1,200 per day paid to reserve legal officers representing persons
affected by a Board of Inquiry is no incentive to conclude proceedings
quickly, another reason for Board of Inquiry hearings lasting far
longer than in the past is because the ADF has failed to focus
attention upon establishing the action(s) needed to be taken to avoid a
recurrence.
The
Sea King Tragedy in particular stands as a stark illustration and a
reminder of the fatal consequences that can arise from a series of
technical management errors coming together at a point in time.
If
the central question of the proper management of technology in each
of the Services is not faced and resolved, then Murphy will not be
restrained and, as a result, we simply await the next accident and
the next fatality.
Finally,
with Defence now looking at laying serious charges in regard to the
Sea King Tragedy against those considered to warrant such action, it
is important that such action be directed at those who imposed the
current dysfunctional organisation upon the Services rather than
those who have tried to do their best within that organisation.
|
|
END PIECE
The
Language Barrier
The RAAF, since its
formation,
developed a very high level of administrative competence based on
high quality staff work. The reason was simple - messages, written or
verbal, had to be clear, concise, and complete if mistakes, and their
usually inevitable consequences, were to be avoided. It was often a
case of life or death, a very mind focussing concept. The importance
of clear and well-reasoned argument and unambiguous written
expression were emphasised at every level of the RAAF and were
organic to all promotion examinations and courses. From reading
current Service staff work, and especially that emanating from
Defence in Canberra, it is clear that the high standards that existed
prior to Sanderson and the DRP have not survived. Largely, they have
been
replaced by the jargon of the bureaucracy where the objectives of
communication are far too often quite opposite to those of the
Services.
Today, truth and
precision in
language have succumbed to vague, often incomprehensible waffle that
uses meaningless terms created by the 'nouveau
management philosophy movement'. Even the author cannot
understand it, let alone the recipient. What
should take but half a page now takes several pages of rambling
clichés, the message buried beyond recovery. In almost every
case, the basic principles underlying effective management are
ignored, replaced if at all by strange references to 'good
governance', a term seemingly introduced to replace sound management,
which is no longer understood.
The
importance of high
quality staff work cannot be overestimated. If Defence and the
Services are to improve anything, all should start with the
principles of management and the importance of clear and concise
English expression. Should an example of current failures be needed,
then it is only a matter of reading the Charter for the Chief of Air
Force, at Attachment 2. There can be
little wonder why management is
in such a muddled state from the top down.
Those who wish to
see how
responsibilities should be expressed should refer to the Minister's
delegations to the Service Board members, pre-Tange.
Finally, management
and
administration of the RAAF, was based upon a filing system that
identified Service policy and recorded the management of each
activity arising from that policy, Files were kept for an indefinite
period, providing a chronological history that was referred to often
as a tool of management. It produced, in effect, an audit trail. The
imposition of the Public Service filing system is totally inimical to
Military requirements and should be discarded throughout the Services
and the Department of Defence. It appears to avoid recording policy,
records no useful history, and ensures that there is no audit trail.
Its management objectives are thus quite questionable.
|
RAAF
Iroquois helicopters (US DoD Image).
|
THE
VIETNAM WAR AND THE IROQUOIS SAGA
Operating at extremely high
Rates
Of Effort (ROE), the RAAF's achievements in the seven years of the
Vietnam conflict were an amazing tribute to the pilot/maintenance
team. The mission achievements by three different aircraft types,
Canberras of No 2 Sqn at Phan-Rang (April 1967), Caribous of No 35 Sqn
at Vung Tau (July 1964), and Iroquois of No. 9 Sqn at Vung Tau / Phuoc
Tuy Province (June 1966), were not attributed solely to the skill and
application of aircrews, but also to the dedicated expertise of the
maintenance personnel who were working under extremely primitive and
arduous conditions. The American services were to pay several visits
to RAAF units to determine how such high serviceability rates could
be maintained together with high operational utilisation and low
losses. The 'secret' was essentially the span and depth of training,
and the initiative characteristic of RAAF technical staff since the
formation of the Service.
Invariably, the aircraft
would
incur battle damage, but the pilot would recover to safe areas. Battle
damage repairs often required innovative engineering. Many
times the maintenance technician was called upon to develop field
repair processes, many of which were beyond the comprehension of the
aircraft designer, but it would be true to say that the skill was in
many cases supplemented by common sense and a fair degree of good
fortune. This combination enabled the RAAF to emerge from Vietnam
with comparatively low aircraft losses in relation to the number of
operational missions flown.
During the seven year period
of the
conflict up until November 1971, the RAAF’s aircraft losses
totalled 12 from the three squadrons based at Phan Rang and Vung Tau. A
further 17 aircraft incurred major battle damage and there were 78
incidents of minor damage. The latter were mostly attributed to
small arms ground fire.
However, during the late
1960s, the
sustained demands of Vietnam and the higher ROE demanded from the
local pilot training units were starting to take toll on the
performance standards being achieved by the RAAF Iroquois fleet. Stark
evidence was seen in the difference in performance between No 5
and No 9 Squadrons, the former operating out of RAAF Base Fairbairn
in the ACT and the latter out of Vietnam. It was not surprising to
find attention being focused on the maintenance standards and
procedures at No 5 Squadron.
A fatal accident involving
A2-710
led to Headquarters Operational Command, (Senior Technical Staff
Officer, Gp Capt Jim Rowland, later to become Air Marshal Sir James)
initiating a major study of No 5 Squadron maintenance practices. The
HQOC Working Group involved considerable engineering and helicopter
maintenance expertise in the form of Sqn Ldrs Ray Meredith and Jim
Beer, Major Joe Davis (USAF), and Wg Cdr 'Bowser' Bill Greenham.
High ROE and the dilution of
technical skills caused by the high manpower turn-over rates needed
to support 9 Squadron Vietnam operations were found to be reflecting
adversely on No 5 Squadron’s Planned Flying Maintenance. The
HQOC group concluded that the task of retrieving the
flying-maintenance stagger would require some four months of
dedicated effort, but before this could be achieved No 5 Squadron was
to experience a second fatal accident.
The loss of A2-386 at
Canberra on
2nd April 1969 through separation of the semi-rigid main
rotor led to the grounding of the 5 Squadron Iroquois fleet and
raised serious concern as to the airworthiness of the whole RAAF
Iroquois fleet. The Air member for Technical Services, Air Vice
Marshal Ernie Hey, reacted in an unprecedented way. He convened a
Technical Investigation Committee to examine the engineering
integrity of the Iroquois fleet. Working separately, but in harmony
with the Director of Flying Safety’s Court of Inquiry, the
Technical Committee was to examine all facets of Iroquois engineering
standards, operating, and maintenance practices.
As the Iroquois aircraft was
operating world wide without problem, the basic design was not
considered to be in question. Again, attention was to focus sharply
on maintenance. To establish a base-line for the study, the
Committee undertook a special inspection of A2-1025, a veteran of
Vietnam. This inspection was supervised directly by senior engineer
officers from the then Department of Air and Headquarters Support
Command.
During the special
inspection, close attention was given to the non-destructive
inspection of the transmission and rotor assemblies. Maintenance
practices of both the highly sensitive hydraulic and transmission
systems also came under particular scrutiny. Other critical review
areas included technical documentation. These were seen as vital
elements in configuration management and engineering standards
forming the airworthiness chain.
After some weeks of close
association with No 5 Squadron’s operating level maintenance,
the Committee concluded that the autorotation landing practice
techniques being used were contributing to long-term aircraft
structural damage and needed to be changed. Perhaps of greater
significance was the clear relationship between high and sustained
ROE, spares supply, maintenance resources, and the dilution of
technical skills and maintenance standards. The problems were best
expressed by Gp Capt Roy Ayre in the Committee’s report to
AMTS. The valedictory read:
“Make do and thin butter
Put Squadrons in the gutter
Badly blunts sharp end
Costs more in the end.”
The initial findings of the
Technical Committee were to lead to a major rehabilitation programme
involving the entire 5 Squadron fleet. AMTS saw it as being
necessary to re-assume responsibility for the programme which was
implemented on the 5th May 1969 under the control of Sqn
Ldr Ron Tucker. The programme extended over 16 weeks and was
concluded on 25th August 1969. During this time, three
maintenance teams made up of 19 personnel drawn from the various
technical trades provided a concentrated maintenance effort. In the
16 week period, they provided some 3,851 manhours of overtime, of
which 1,240 manhours were achieved during the first four weeks. The
teams processed 26 aircraft and undertook one 'E', 10 'D', and 14 'C'
servicings.
The Committee had
demonstrated a basic lesson in engineering resource management that
is equally as valid today, that is that any force expansion involving
high and sustained ROE with resource limitations will inevitably
produce the same results as the Iroquois experience of 1969. Today’s
defence planners and resource managers could well benefit from the
Committee’s lesson, as well as the demonstrated effectiveness
of the RAAF's Technical Services Branch [2].
CHARTER
OF THE CHIEF OF AIR
FORCE
CHARTER
Air Marshal Geoffrey
Shepherd, AO
Chief of Air Force
Preamble
- Through us, the
Portfolio Minister provides strategic direction that contributes to
achievement of the Government’s Defence mission “To defend Australia
and its national interests”.
Accountability
- Through us, you are
directed to achieve the results outlined in this Charter within the
guidance principles set out below. You are accountable to us for your
performance and for the performance of those you authorise, or to whom
you delegate authority, having regard to the statutory responsibilities
of all parties. Your priorities will be reviewed and set annually by
us, in the form of an Organisational Performance Agreement (OPA). We
will measure your performance and provide feedback against these
priorities.
3. In the event of the CDF’s
temporary absence, you will be accountable for carrying out any of
his responsibilities that are delegated or authorised to you in
writing, or otherwise.
Results
- You are to command the
Royal Australian Air Force.
5. We expect you to set the
standard in everything you do, and to:
a. deliver Air Force
capability for
the defence of Australia and its interests, including the delivery of
aerospace capability, enhancing the Air Force’s reputation and
positioning the Air Force for the future;
b. raise, train and sustain
Air
Force forces by proper stewardship of people and of financial and
other resources, in particular through:
i. developing leadership and
behaviours that advance and embed the Results through People
leadership philosophy,
ii. developing and
maintaining Air
Force workforce skills, career structures and promotions up to and
including Group Captain,
iii. building and maintaining
the
reputations of the Air Force and Defence as a whole, and
iv. achieving or bettering
budgeted
operating results;
c. coordinate and manage
strategic
aspects of Australian Defence Force aviation;
d. act as the Australian
Defence
Force airworthiness authority;
e. provide timely, accurate
and
considered advice, in particular:
i. via input to intelligence
and
policy advice that enables the Government to assess its strategic
direction continuously,
ii. on Air Force and military
capabilities for the force in being and the future force, and
iii. through your membership
of the
Defence Committee, the Chiefs of Service Committee, the Defence
Capability and Investment Committee and other committees in support
of whole-of-Defence results;
f. contribute to Defence and
Government security by supporting strategies to raise security
awareness, establish a strong security culture and improve security
management.
Guidance
6. You should pursue these
results
through effective leadership and management; and should ensure that:
a. your actions are prudent,
lawful
and ethical;
b. your actions are
consistent
with:
i. Government policy,
including
Government-approved options for current and future capabilities,
ii. Air Force, APS and
Defence
values,
iii. the CDF’s authority as
commander of the Defence Force under the Defence Act 1903, his
statutory responsibilities and his role as principal military
adviser,
iv. the Air Force Act 1923,
v. the Secretary’s statutory
responsibilities and authority, particularly under the Public Service
Act 1999 and the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997,
and his role as principal civilian adviser, and
vi. Defence departmental
frameworks, policies and standards;
c. your decisions and advice
consider the impact on others, (including the leadership of foreign
forces), and you:
i. consult and collaborate as
appropriate,
ii. properly manage risk,
iii. meet explicit and
implicit
mutual obligations to other Service Chiefs, Group Heads, Australian
Defence Headquarters (ADHQ) Executives and the CEO DMO, including
supporting Defence Committee decisions, and
iv. inform the Secretary and
CDF
(and other Defence Committee members as appropriate) of advice you
offer to the Ministers and the Parliamentary Secretary; and
d. your decisions and advice
take
into account the impact on sustainable delivery of Defence’s
outputs.
ACM
A.G. HOUSTON R.C. SMITH
Chief
of the Defence Force Secretary
13
September 2006 13 September 2006
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Endnotes:
[1] Murphy's Law - "Whatever can go
wrong, will go wrong". For a detailed discussion of the origins of Murphy's Law, refer Murphy's Law; a formal engineering statement of
Murphy's Law
amounts to 'unconstrained degrees of freedom in a system can and will
result in unwanted consequences'. In reliability engineering terms Murphy's Law is a manifestation of Lusser's Product Law
which states that 'the probability of survival in a serial system is
the product of the probabilities of survival of all critical system
components'. For a formal mathematical treatment refer Igor Bazovsky - Reliability Theory And Practice,
Dover Publications, 10/2004, ISBN-13: 9780486438672.
[2] Editor's note - the RAAF's
experience with the Iroquois parallels the long running historical
experience of many air forces, especially under combat conditions where
materiel resources and technical personnel numbers were stretched. A
well documented case study is the US Army Air Corps 8th Air Force in
1943, operating from the United Kingdom. Significant losses in aircraft
and aircrew, especially scarce escort fighters and qualified pilots,
were suffered until the proper organisational structures and practices
were introduced, and properly skilled personnel made available. In the
contemporary RAAF context, a good case study lies in the servicability
of the F-111 fleet prior to the 2002 transition from organic depot
level deep maintenance, to contractor supplied deep maintenance. The
large disparity in technical personnel skills and experience between
RAAF personnel, and the contractor personnel (mostly former RAAF
personnel) resulted in an unprecedented improvement in aircraft
availability and reliability, to levels better than 1974, after many
years of poor servicability. The lesson here is not that 'contractor
maintenance is better than service maintenance', but rather that
'maintenance by skilled personnel with proper supporting engineering
and engineering management is better than maintenance without such'. In
the longer term, increasingly complex technology and the increasing
need to support complex embedded software will drive up demands for
engineering and technical personnel skills. Issues raised by Air
Commodore Bushell in this analysis, such as configuration control,
become literally 'life and death' issues from an airworthiness
perspective. An aircraft with millions of lines of embedded software in
its systems, and tens of thousands of hardware components, cannot be
maintained in an airworthy, let alone combat effective, state without a
very robust supporting engineering capability - one which has no
conflicts of interest such as those seen with many contractors
providing maintenance.
RAAF
F-111C aircraft (US DoD Image).
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Air Power Australia
Analyses ISSN 1832-2433
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