Introduction
Russia's
military aircraft manufacturing industry is riding high at this time,
with massive and ongoing orders for hundreds of modern fighter
aircraft since the end of the Cold War, primarily delivered to
clients in Asia. India is acquiring what is likely to be in excess of
200 Su-30MKI Flanker H, China has cumulative orders for more than 400
Su-27SK/J-11A Flanker B, Su-30MKK/MK2 Flanker G, Su-33 Flanker D, and
Su-27SKM Flanker B+, Malaysia is receiving its first Su-30MKM Flanker
H+, Vietnam and Indonesia now operating mixes of Su-27SK/Su-30MK
Flanker B/G, Venezuela has ordered the Su-30MK, as has Algeria.
Speculation continues over Iran's claimed intent to buy 250 Su-30MKM,
while India assesses the new AESA equipped MiG-35 Fulcrum F.
Rosoboronexport is diligently marketing the new Su-35 Flanker E+,
recently unveiled at the MAKS2007 air show.
Western
analysts remain divided over the explosive growth of Russian fighter
sales. Some still see these aircraft to be in the class of Cold War
designs, lagging behind Western equivalents, others are often
uncritically enthusiastic about these aircraft. Where does the truth
lie?
Su-35 Flanker E (KnAAPO Image)
Twenty
First Century Aerial Combat
Aerial
combat in the coming decades will be dominated by players who have
command of information over their opponents, and are able to exploit
that advantage offensively. Information has become the new high
ground in the game of aerial combat. Globally, and especially in
Asia, this has been reflected by sustained high levels of investment
in capabilities historically operated only the US and NATO nations,
such as AWACS/AEW&C and networking of combat aircraft,
AWACS/AEW&C, and ground based surveillance systems.
Concurrently
we have observed strong investment in counter-ISR systems, intended
to render AWACS/AEW&C impotent. Such systems include very long
range air to air missiles such as the Russian R-37/AA-13 Arrow and
R-172/K-100 intended to destroy AWACS/AEW&C, but also capable
ground based jamming systems like the SPN-2/4/30 series, Pelena 1,
Topol E and supporting ELINT systems like the Orion/Vega 85V6 series.
There
are two fundamentally different views currently espoused in assessing
the future of aerial combat.
One
view, popular in some Western defence bureaucracies is the
'asymmetrical model' of aerial warfare, which makes the assumption
that Western nations will have a one-sided advantage in combat
conferred by the possession of AWACS/AEW&C and networking, which
is uniformly assumed not to be a future capability operated by any
potential opponents. On this basis, it is then assumed that fighter
aircraft can have low performance as their role in aerial combat will
be primarily as stand-off missile trucks, shooting at opposing combat
aircraft in long range beyond visual combat. As the opponent is
assumed to always be dumb, and neither operate AWACS/AEW&C and
networking, nor be capable of understanding the situational picture,
the low capability fighter is assumed to prevail most of the time.
The best regional example of this philosophy in practice is the
Canberra DoD which has elevated the low performance F/A-18F and JSF
above the F-22A Raptor using the 'asymmetrical model' as a
justification.
The
much more conservative view of future aerial combat is the
'symmetrical model', which assumes that all substantial players will
own and competently operate AWACS/AEW&C and networking, and will
deploy ground based jammers and long range counter-ISR missiles to
threaten all airborne ISR capabilities. The most visible proponents
of the 'symmetrical model' are the US Air Force, who have invested
heavily in the very stealthy supercruising F-22A Raptor precisely to
be able to penetrate deeply into hostile airspace and kill off an
opponent's AWACS/AEW&C, and other ISR and counter-ISR assets. In
practice, we can expect the 'symmetrical model' to play out across
the battlespace, with both sides jamming each other's ISR and
networks, and aiming to shoot down each other's ISR platforms.
Whether an AWACS/AEW&C platform is killed by a 200 nautical mile
range R-172 missile or an F-22A armed with an AIM-9X or AIM-120D is
an entirely academic argument. It is entirely possible that in some
conflicts the attrition or high risk of attrition of ISR platforms
may force both sides to withdraw them rather than lose them, leaving
fighters to fend for themselves, creating an environment not unlike
the air battles of the 1940s.
The
US Air Force are seeking around 400 F-22A Raptors for precisely these
reasons, but have been repeatedly frustrated by the Washington DoD
bureaucracy who are unwilling to release the necessary funds. While
we have seen little in the way of rational argument to support this
conduct to date, what little argument is visible tends to be
manifestations of 'symmetrical model', i.e. “advanced F-15Cs
are good enough since we have AWACS and networking ....”.
Analysts
who have studied Russian technology exports and counted the ongoing
sales of fighters, missiles, AWACS/AEW&C aircraft, networking,
ELINT and jamming equipment, uniformly share the view that the
reality of future air combat will be much closer to the 'symmetrical
model' than the 'asymmetrical model' seen over Iraq in 1991 and 2003,
and over the Bekaa Valley in 1982. Nevertheless defence bureaucrats
in many Western nations remain firmly wedded to the 'asymmetrical
model', with its implicit assumptions of Russian inferiority in all
basic technologies used for air combat.
In
sizing up Russian combat aircraft against their Western rivals, the
nature of future air combat is critical, since it determines what
priorities should be applied to specific capabilities and performance
parameters in fighter aircraft, their systems and weapons.
Comparing
Basic Technologies
Basic
technologies determine what kind of airframes, propulsion, systems
and weapons can be employed by either side in a conflict. The side
with a significant lead in basic technology will prevail, all else
being equal, due to the performance and capability gains that lead
confers.
Perhaps
the most foolish of the popular misconceptions of Russian basic
technology is that which assumes that the US and EU maintain the
technological lead of 1-2 decades held at the end of the Cold War.
Alas, nearly two decades later, in a globalised, digitised and
networked world, the US retains a decisive lead only in top end
stealth technologies, and some aspects of networking and highly
integrated systems software. The Russians have closed the gap in most
other areas, but importantly, have mastered the difficult embedded
software technology so critical for radar and electronic warfare
systems, as well as sensor fusion, networking and engine and flight
controls. The Russians are working very hard at closing the remaing
gap, with the planned PAK-FA fighter to be properly shaped for low
observable and very low observable stealth capability.
The
latest Russian MiG-35 Fulcrum F and Su-35-1 Flanker E+ both
illustrate this in a very convincing manner.
NIIP
Irbis E Prototype (Tikhomirov NIIP).
Radar
– the MiG-35 Fulcrum F is equipped with a Phazotron Active
Electronically Steered Array (AESA) which is the same basic
technology used in the F-22A's APG-77, the F/A-18E/F's APG-79, the
F-16E's APG-80 and the Eurofighter's AMSAR. The Su-35-1 Flanker E+ is
currently intended to carry a 20 kW hybrid ESA Irbis E radar, which
is comparable to the technology in the Rafale, but boasts the largest
antenna in any agile fighter, and peak power and range performance
claimed to be competitive against the F-22A's APG-77. The Russians
have also invested considerable effort into modern radar pseudo-noise
waveform coding techniques, a key feature in recent US radars. In
terms of technology the US now has only an incremental lead in active
TR module technology and software, and EU little if none. Given the
larger size of Russian radars compared to their US peers, in terms of
raw range performance the Russians equal or better all except the
F-22A's APG-77.
The Zhuk MSF/MSFE
(above) is a
passive ESA
design
intended to compete against the NIIP N011M BARS. It uses a Phazotron
unique radial distribution arrangement in the backplane waveguide feed,
and proprietary radiating element placement. The Zhuk MSFE has a .98
meter diameter aperture with 1662 radiating elements, and was developed
for the Su-30MK3 Flanker G
avionic suite intended for the PLA-AF.
Radio
Frequency Threat Warning – RF threat warning systems,
comprising radar warning receivers, Radar Homing and Warning Systems,
and Electronic Support Measures, have seen aggressive growth over the
last decade with the advent of high density Gallium Arsenide or GaAs
chips, commercially used in TV and mobile telephony. The most capable
Western system is the F-22A's ALR-94 which is a channelised receiver,
while the latest Russian Khibiny M system intended for Su-35-1
Flanker E+ is also a channelised receiver. What incremental lead the
US and EU retain is primarily in GaAs chip packaging and software.
Russian manufactured GaAs 4-bit
phase shifter MMIC
die.
Radio
Frequency Jammers – the most important developments over
the last decade have been the advent of Digital Radio Frequency
Memory (DRFM) and towed decoy technologies. The Russians have
mastered the former and have offered it for export (MSP-418K) some
years ago, and are now offering the Lobushka towed decoy, claimed to
be comparable to the US ALE-50. Some Russian jamming equipment is
much more refined than Western equivalents, the KNIRTI Sorbstiya jam
pod carried by numerous Flanker subtypes boasts a wideband phased
array RF stage, much more effective against monopulse emitters, and
more sophisticated than the wideband horn or lens emitters in Western
equivalents.
Monolithic
Thermal Imagers – the EU holds the lead in this technology
with production dual band Quantum Well Imaging Photodetector (QWIP)
technology, unlike the US and Russia still in the latter development
stages. In deployed systems, the US generally still retains a lead
with midwave InSb technology. Given the commercial accessibility of
such devices, Russia is likely to be integrating them into systems
within 3-4 years.
Al-41FU
supercruise powerplant.
Supercooled
Engine Blades – the Russians announced over a year ago low
rate Initial Production (LRIP) of the AL-41F engine, designed
originally as a supersonic cruise equivalent to the F-22A's P&W
F119-PW-100. The hot end technology used in the AL-41F core has since
migrated also into the AL-31F-117C variant for the Su-35-1. Cited
performance figures for these engines indicate the Russian industry
has closed much of the gap the US opened with the F119/F135 family of
the engines.
Engine
FADEC – Full Authority Digital Engine Control systems are
now available for a range of more recent Russian engines, including
the AL-31F-117C. Whatever lead US and EU manufacturers may have is
now only incremental, and mostly in maturity of software.
Thrust
Vectoring Nozzles – to date the only full production
Western air combat fighter with TVC capability is the F-22A, while
the Russians have exported 2D TVC in the Su-30MKI, and offered 3D TVC
for other types. Russian TVC is integrated with the flight controls,
not unlike the F-22A arrangement.
Digital
Flight Control Systems – the Russians demonstrated their
first quadruply redundant DFCS in the Su-37 during the 1990s and now
offer it as an option for the Su-30MK series, Su-35 and likely as an
MLU option for Su-27SKM rebuilds. The only incremental advantage held
by US and EU manufacturers is in greater maturity of embedded
software, an advantage which will not last.
Radar
Absorbent Materials and Structures – the US still retains a
lead in this technology, but the Russians continue to make robust
advances in coatings, laminates, and other controlled impedance
technologies. Much of the Russian effort to date has been focussed on
reducing the signature of conventional aircraft, rather than the US
focus on fully shaped new designs. Russian Kazantsev laminates have
demonstrated 100 fold signature reduction in the X-band, and recent
citations indicate that robotically applied inlet tunnel coatings
(Flanker) have achieved a 30 fold reduction in X-band signature.
These are significant performance achievements, insofar as they
challenge existing reduced signature US designs like the F/A-18E/F.
While the US still leads at the top end of this technology, the
Russians have closed much of the gap in 'commodity' technologies for
treating conventional and legacy fighters.
Airborne
Datalinks and Networks –
the Russians have long been users of digital datalinks, primarily for
GCI and AWACS support of interceptors. During the 1990s they invested
heavily in intraflight datalink technology intended to network
flights of fighters, and the TKS-2 system currently exported on
Flankers provides the capability to share sensor data between
multiple aircraft. The Russians are now offering an equivalent to the
JTIDS/Link-16 system on their latest fighters. What advantage the US
and EU retain in this technology is primarily in the maturity of
software and protocol designs, another gap which will not last.
Inertial
and Satellite Navigation Equipment –
the advantage held by the US over Russia at the end of the Cold War
has largely evaporated in this area, in part due to the wide
availability of RLG and GPS technology in the global market. The US
still retains a strong lead in wide area differential GPS technology.
Su-35BM/Su-35-1
cockpit.
Glass
Cockpit Technology – the
US introduced Active Matrix LCD panel displays during the early
1990s, with the Russians closing this gap using commodity technology
some years ago. All current production Russian fighters use glass
cockpits, and the Su-35-1 will employ two large area panels emulating
in AMLCD technology the projector screen arrangement in the Joint
Strike Fighter.
Agat AAM seekers. Left to right: 9B-1101K
dual plane monopulse semi-active homing seeker used in R-27R1/ER1, 9B-1348E active
radar homing seeker used in R-77 variants, and 9B-1103K active radar homing seeker for
R-27EA (Agat).
Active
Radar Guided Missile Seekers – At the end of the Cold War
the US led globally with the digital AIM-120A/B AMRAAM and AIM-54C
Phoenix missiles. Since then the Russians have closed much of this
gap with the R-77 Adder's Agat 9B1348, and its derivative 9B1103M for
the R-27 missile. The most recently reported subtype of this seeker
uses the same Texas Instruments TMS320 digital processor as is used
in most Western radars and seekers. What technology gap remains is in
the maturity of embedded software and packaging.
ElectroOptical
Guided Missile Seekers –
the latest scanning digital seekers used in the R-73/R-74 Archer
series of heatseeking missiles are a generation behind the seekers in
the AIM-9X, Python 4 and ASRAAM, but given the ease with which Rafael
produced the EO guided Python 5, this gap could close very quickly.
The lack of Russian investment in this area suggests that the
capability of the late model R-73/R-74 is regarded to be adequate.
KAB-1500L
Laser Guided Bomb. This Russian weapon is a 3,000 lb class equivalent
to
the US Paveway II/III series weapons (GNPP image).
KAB-1500Kr
Electro-Optically Guided Bomb training round.
KAB-500SE
satellite aided inertially guided bomb.
Guided
Bomb Technology – since
the end of the Cold War the Russians have widely expanded the
technology they employ in smart bombs. The KAB-500/1500 series is a
hybrid of aerodynamic features from the US HOBOS and Paveway series,
available with Lock On Before Launch Electro-Optical Correlator
guidance comparable to the EGBU-15 series, semi-active laser homing
guidance comparable to the Paveway series, and most recently
satellite/inertial guidance comparable to the JDAM series. The only
decisive technology lead the US holds is in the GBU-39/B Small
Diameter Bomb. All of the mature US, EU and Israeli guided bomb types
are now matched by a range of Russian equivalents.
What this
excruciating
survey of basic technology tells us is that there is little to
differentiate the basic technology which goes into a current MiG-35
or Su-30MK/35 and that being put into a current production F-15SG or
F/A-18E/F Block II Super Hornet. In most technologies the Russians
have matched and in some instances even outperformed US and EU
manufacturers. The main advantages still held in most categories by
the US and EU are in maturity, and this is only a short term
advantage.
In turn, what
this
tells us is that in most of the sensor, systems and weapons
technologies which go into a conventional fighter, the Russians have
caught up with and in some areas exceeded the capabilities of the US
and EU. Comparing then fighters type by type, accounting for
comparable systems and weapons, the determinant of superiority will
lie in conventional metrics such as sustained top speed,
acceleration, climb rate, specific excess power, and instantaneous
and sustained turn rate.
Type
vs Type Comparisons
In terms of type
vs
type comparisons, the most problematic issue is the vast range of
variants, subtypes and unique configurations across the US, EU and
Russian made fighter fleets. Asking whether a Flanker is better than
an F-15 raises the question of which Flanker and which F-15? Su-27S,
Su-27SK, Su-27SKM, Su-33, Su-30, Su-30M, Su-30MKK, Su-30MKI,
Su-30MKM, Su-35, Su-35BM or Su35-1 vs F-15A/B, F-15C/D, F-15E, F-15I,
F-15J, F-15K, F-15SG, and all of the specific blocks and
configurations thereof?
If
we compare a late model AESA equipped F-15K/SG
subtype against the late model Su-35BM/Su-35-1,
both likely to be rolled off a production line at the same time,
these Flankers will outperform these F-15s in much of the flight
envelope, especially at transonic speeds. With the AL-41F engine the
Flanker will be able to sustain decent supersonic speed on dry
thrust, giving it an energy advantage throughout the envelope. How
much supercruise capability the hybrid AL-31F-117 series engine will
provide remains to be seen. With conformal fuel tanks the F-15 will
have comparable range to the Flanker with external PTB-2000 drop
tanks. Equipped with the Irbis E the Sukhoi will achieve a first look
/ shot capability over the F-15 with an APG-63(V)2 AESA radar. In
terms of EWSP capability, the Sorbstiya jammers will deliver better
EIRP than the legacy ALQ-135 series, and the Khibiny-M will be
comparable to the ALR-56M series. An area of uncertainty is how much
of their newer radar signature suppression technology the Russians
will incorporate in export Flankers.
In performing an
overall summary, the Flanker will outperform or match the F-15 in
most cardinal parameters and capabilities.
The
other production Boeing fighter is the F/A-18E/F Block II Super
Hornet with its much vaunted APG-79 AESA radar. The Su-35BM/Su-35-1
outperforms it on
all cardinal parameters, including radar range, but excluding the
somewhat academic measure of clean radar signature – academic
since in combat external stores must be carried by both fighters.
Lockheed's
F-16E / Block 60
subtype with AESA and conformal fuel tanks is not competitive against
the Su-35BM/Su-35-1 on any parameters, the Sukhoi cleanly outclasses
it across the board.
The
Lockheed-Martin F-35 JSF
will be outclassed in all cardinal performance parameters, with the
exception of radar signature when the JSF is flown clean with
internal stores only. That advantage may also be entirely academic if
the Flanker is networked with low frequency band radar to cue it to
the JSF. It is also not entirely clear whether the radar signature of
the export variants of the JSF will be low enough to deny lock-on by
the powerful Irbis E at useful missile ranges.
The
Eurofighter Typhoon with AMSAR
will compete with the Su-35BM/Su-35-1 in terms of close combat
agility and dash speed, but it does not have a decisive advantage in
systems and sensors and cannot match the radar range of the Irbis E,
and will not match a supercruise engine equipped Flanker.
The Dassault
Rafale share many qualities with the Typhoon, but
is
smaller, and much the same comparisons apply to the Su-35BM/Su-35-1.
A key advantage
the
Flanker will possess against all but the conformal tank equipped F-15
is combat persistence, which provides far more flexibility in
choosing engagements and the opportunity to run an opponent out of
gas.
The
smaller MiG-35 shares
the high agility of the Su-35BM/Su-35-1, but lacks its brute force
in raw performance, combat persistence, radar range, and internal
volume for mission avionics. All of the Western fighters will compare
more favourably against the MiG-35 series, but this may be another
entirely academic comparison given that none have been ordered as
yet.
F-22A Raptor (U.S. Air Force photo)
The
only Western fighter which offers a decisive advantage in all
cardinal parameters over the Su-35BM/Su-35-1 is the Lockheed-Martin
F-22A Raptor. On internal fuel
and subsonic profiles the Flanker will outrange the F-22A slightly,
and it is likely that in high alpha low speed manoeuvre the Flanker
may perform better. However, in the classical high altitude high
speed long range missile combat regime the Raptor will beat the
Flanker every time due to the generational advantages of all aspect
wideband stealth and supersonic cruise.
In conclusion,
the
notion that contemporary production Russian fighters are inferior in
technology, performance and overall capability to their US/EU peers
is largely not correct, and predicated on assumptions about Russian
technological capabilities which ceased to be true a decade or more
ago. The disdain toward the Flanker shown by many senior bureacrats
in Western defence establishments reflects, sadly, nothing more than
their lack of insight and understanding as to how far the Russians
have progressed since 1991 in a globalised high technology economy.
|
![Australia's First Online Journal Covering Air Power Issues [ISSN 1832-2433]](APA-Title-Analyses.png "Australia's First Online Journal Covering Air Power Issues [ISSN 1832-2433]")
