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Updated: Fri Jul 30 14:32:11 UTC 2010
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The RAAF's
Professional Mastery Problem:
Symptoms, Causes and Measures to
Reskill the RAAF
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The
technological and analytical skill levels in the current RAAF officer
corps have fallen well below the standards seen during the 1960s, 1970s
and 1980s (US DoD image circa 1980).
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Abstract
The
RAAF has suffered a critical loss of professional mastery, especially
in the areas of basic military science and military technology. The
consequences of this problem have been reflected in public statements
containing errors of logic and fact and in poor decisions in
capability development, and equipment procurement. These errors have
led to incorrect advice being given to Government and Parliament in
operational, strategic, technical, and force structure planning
areas.
The
root cause of the problem can be traced to the structural changes,
particularly the disestablishment of the RAAF’s Engineer
Branch, imposed by the Defence Efficiency Review (DER), Defence
Reform Programme (DRP), and Commercial Support Programme (CSP),
coupled with a failure to recognise the need to maintain the critical
skills sets in engineering, science, operational analysis and
strategy required for the management of a modern Air Force.
Redressing
this problem will require a well-planned series of short, medium and
long-term actions, starting with the staffing of the Minister’s
Office with highly competent and independent expertise in defence
matters capable of analysing and determining the soundness of current
air power planning. This should be followed by the development and
implementation of the robust and disciplined analysis and management
systems needed to ensure that future decisions are both based soundly
and verifiable.
The
longer term sees a technological re-skilling of the RAAF through the
re-establishment of the Engineer Branch and a sharper training and
education focus for both Air Staff members and Engineers as the
management and application of technology in a modern Air Force will
always depend upon the closest collaboration between highly
professional airmen and highly professional engineers.
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Introduction
The
Royal Australian Air Force is today facing the single greatest
challenge it has confronted in its 86 year history. That challenge is
recovering the professional mastery which has been lost over the last
two decades due to downsizing, outsourcing, restructuring, deskilling
and
the inevitable management difficulties that followed.
The
severity of the problem cannot be understated. Air forces are
inherently technologically centred military services. Every aspect of
tactics, operations, strategy, planning and support is permeated with
technological issues, be they in the employment and support of
systems, or in the skills sets of personnel. An air force which
cannot effectively master its technology is, simply, unable
to perform its basic role.
The
reality of the RAAF's progressive deskilling and consequent loss of
professional mastery is disturbing, but no less disturbing than
the
reluctance
to acknowledge the problem, both within Defence as an organisation,
and within much of the parliamentary community. It amounts to a
national embarrassment, but embarrassments are only fixed
if the problem is properly acknowledged, analysed, quantified, and
corrected.
The
problem of RAAF deskilling is not isolated within the
Australian
Defence Organisation. The long series of poor choices made in
strategy definition, capability development and procurement points to
a deeper and broader problem, encompassing the two sister services,
the capability development bureaucracy, the acquisition bureaucracy,
and key Defence areas such as Strategy Branch. However, the RAAF, due
to its nature, is the Service most sensitive to loss of professional
mastery, making it the most appropriate case study of this problem.
This
analysis will follow a systematic approach to identify the scale of
the problem, with the aim of producing hard metrics to define
remedial measures.
Observing
the Symptoms of the Professional Mastery Problem
There
is much anecdotal evidence of the deskilling problem, but a far
larger and more concerning collection of evidence is to be found in
formal public documents.
Perhaps
the most illustrative of the anecdotal items includes an observation,
in 2004, made by a serving senior RAAF officer to one of the authors,
specifically that the Russell Offices bureaucracy was characterised by
’institutionalised mediocrity’. No less illustrative is a
more recent observation circulating in the Australian analytical
community, that “Within Russell Offices, Defence have repealed
the laws of physics”.
Formal
public statements and documents are however much more useful as a
tool for the forensic analysis of problems with professional mastery.
This is for several good and practical reasons:
- Statements and
documents on the public record are traceable, and so constitute sound
evidence which cannot be dismissed as fabrications, fantasies or
opinion, or altered arbitrarily to misrepresent a situation.
- Public statements and
documents will have been subjected to one or more internal reviews
within the Defence organisation before being briefed to the parties
delivering the material in public, illustrating that more than one
party was unable to differentiate fact from error.
- Senior officers and
senior civilian personnel making such statements were also unable to
differentiate fact from error in their briefings, as rational
individuals would not subject themselves to public embarrassment by
making erroneous statements in the full knowledge that they are in
error and being carefully scrutinised.
The
first illustrative case study involves evidence provided by the then
Chief of Air Force and Chief of Defence Force in late 2003 to the
Federal parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade. A forensic analysis co-authored by one of the
authors of this analysis established at least fourteen instances of
basic domain knowledge not being understood, several instances of
inappropriate cost inflation, and eleven key items of evidence being
omittedi.
The
second illustrative case study is a public briefing document entitled
’Consideration of Defence Input to Defence Annual Report for
FY02/03’, produced in response to the above cited forensic analysis,
after
considerable delay by Defence. Forensic analysis of the latter
document yielded even more disturbing results than the preceding
evidence, as the document was produced in response to a series of
specific criticisms.
No
less than 49 errors of fact, misunderstandings of basic domain
knowledge, and non-sequitur conclusions were found. The summary
conclusions of the forensic analysis foundii:
“ The
document displays an intellectually incoherent rationale for current
force structure planning. Much of this rationale is centred in
assumptions and premises about regional capabilities, technological
capabilities and the viability of networking which have little or no
basis in observable facts. The reasoning presented for the decision
to retire the F-111 is centred in beliefs and opinions, rather than
intellectually rigorous analysis. Similar problems abound in the
cases presented for networking and for the choice of the JSF over the
F-111.”
The
third illustrative case study can be found within the evidence
provided by Defence to the Federal parliamentary Joint Standing
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade inquiry into
Regional Air Superiority in 2006. A forensic analysis of this
evidence yielded no less disturbing conclusions, summarised thusiii:
“ The
evidence presented by senior Defence officials to this Inquiry
demonstrates a much higher frequency in errors of fact, non sequitur
conclusions and lack of rigour, compared to the evidence presented in
2004 in relation to these matters. There is a remarkable consistency
of misunderstanding, non sequitur conclusions and errors of fact, a
rejection of alternatives and risks, selective bias in analysis,
absence of contingency plans, and poor definition of objectives. This
is no different from that observed in recent and well documented
overseas decision failures”.
The
fourth illustrative case study is a 29th October, 2007, document
posted, without attribution, on the Defence website, entitled ’THE
ADF AIR COMBAT CAPABILITY’. Forensic analysis of this document
yielded a total of 42 errors of fact, 17 non-sequitur conclusions,
and 32 instances of ’spin doctoring’ where the author(s)
attempted to alter the manner in which a typical reader would assess
a statementiv.
Two
observations can be made from these case studies:
- The frequency with which
errors of fact, misunderstandings of basic domain knowledge, and
logical fallacies appear in these formal documents has increased
considerably since 2003. Given that Defence will have expected public
scrutiny and criticism, this shows that the professional mastery
required to produce a robust document is clearly not available.
- Basic domain knowledge is
either absent, or misunderstood, or is present but ignored, or even
deliberately suppressed. Errors in logical
reasoning processes are also common. Valid conclusions require that
valid
logical reasoning techniques be applied to robust domain knowledge. The
application of invalid reasoning methods to valid data, and the
application of valid reasoning methods to invalid data, both result in
failure. It follows that Defence are in genuine difficulty with both
prerequisites, as a result of which resulting conclusions
are morely likely to be in error than correct.
However,
most remarkable is the sheer breadth and depth of the fallacies which
are accepted internally within the Defence organisation as fact, and
put to Government, Parliament and the public as being true. These
encompass such areas as:
- fundamental physics of
flight, physics of weapon design and physics of sensor equipment.
- basic engineering
knowledge required to assess military systems, and maintain military
systems, including basic reliability theory and risk analysis.
- basic qualitative and
quantitative relationships defining engineering economics and
operational economics of military systems, including basic probability
theory.
- fundamentals of modern
operational technique and planning.
- fundamentals of modern
strategic thinking and their application to force structure planning.
- specifics of regional
capabilities and military equipment within the region.
- specifics of extant and
proposed RAAF systems and capabilities.
- basics of critical
thinking, including logical reasoning technique, argument structuring
and technical writing skills.
- basics of professional
ethics.
These
evidence a deep and pervasive literacy problem
in basic domain knowledge, in solving technological and
strategic problems, and in the ability to solve logically and
rationally the kind of problems that characterise military staff work
in a highly technological era.
Less
publicly visible are the damaging effects arising from staff
deskilling, as they percolate down to operational units. A mainwheel
falling from an F-111 due to an improperly secured wheelnut is public
knowledge, as well as aircrew illuminating road traffic with a laser
designator, a fuel tank explosion in an F-111 due to the retention,
despite contractor advice, of defective components, and a whole range
of other skills related maintenance, support and operational problems
observed with RAAF aircraft and training operations. That there have
not been any fatal accidents in recent years is evidently more due to
good luck than good management. The same cannot be said for the
operation of aircraft by other two service armsv.
Clearly
visible effects of deskilling at this time include:
- Erroneous advice to the
Howard Government on the matter of F-111 life cycle costs and
operational risks, as well as capabilities.
- Erroneous advice to the
Howard Government on regional capabilities, especially those of Russian
fighter aircraft and weapons.
- Erroneous advice to the
Howard Government on the viability of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
relative to Australian strategic needs.
- Erroneous advice to the
Howard Government on the costs and risks in the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter program.
- Erroneous advice to the
Howard Government on the viability of the F/A-18F Super Hornet relative
to Australian strategic needs.
- Erroneous advice to the
Howard Government on the capabilities and costs of the F-22A Raptor.
- Erroneous advice to
Parliamentary Secretary Dr Mike Kelly on RAAF airbase vulnerability,
relative to regional weapons capabilities.
- Poor capability
development choices in a number of areas.
- Poor project management
technique on the Wedgetail AEW&C program.
- An active pursuit of the
'derisking programs' philosophy of equipment support, whereby
maintenance and upgrades are outsourced to overseas organisationsvi.
These examples indicate that the RAAF is
confronting
a
deep and pervasive systemic problem due to personnel deskilling,
especially prominent in the areas of science, technology,
foreign capability analysis, strategy, military science and thinking,
and critical reasoning techniques.
This
problem is cumulative, in the sense that the organisation's internal
belief system has been contaminated with numerous false beliefs in
lieu of verifiable facts, and that contamination will propagate and
reinforce itself over time. As a result, the RAAF will find itself in
an ’alternative reality’ which is not aligned with the
physical reality around it. This is a strategically dangerous state
for any organisation to be in, especially a military service.
If
this problem is not corrected, and remedial measures introduced
rapidly and aggressively, the only possible outcome is a major
operational failure and defeat in combat if the RAAF is put to use in
its stated role.
Analysing
the Causes of the Professional Mastery Problem
In
looking into the nature and extent of the de-skilling of the RAAF,
and its consequences, it is important to first review the structure
of the Service before the implementation of the DER/DRP and CSP.
At
that time, the RAAF’s Technical Services element:
- Operated and manned
three major Aircraft Depots which were responsible for the overhaul of
several aircraft types, the TF-30 engines for the F-111, a wide range
of aircraft sub-systems and equipment, and ground telecommunications
systems.
- Operated and manned four
major Maintenance Squadrons that provided direct support for the
operating elements, Bomber, Strike, Transport, and Maritime.
- Operated and manned No
1 Central Ammunition Depot which managed all explosives ordnance.
- Carried out a
comprehensive Engineering and Maintenance regulatory function, which
included airworthiness control.
- Planned and managed all
major repair and overhaul arisings for aircraft, engines, repairable
items and other equipment in RAAF facilities, and Contractor facilities
in Australia and overseas.
- Assessed and (with the
Supply Branch) procured and distributed the technical spares and other
equipment needed to support all RAAF maintenance programmes,
controlling a technical inventory of some 643,880 lines, designed to
meet engineering, maintenance, and supply requirements.
- Planned and managed the
updating of current capabilities, including the technical evaluation
and source selection of new capabilities, and the procurement,
introduction and establishment of all lines of support for new
capabilities by the time they were introduced into service. A key
element in the provision of technical services support was the Director
General, Technical Plans (DGTP) whose task it was to identify, plan and
manage all changes to the technical support base that flowed from Air
Staff Plans and Programmes, such as manning, skills, facilities,
support equipment, documentation, and so on.
- Monitored the
performance of all technical support activities and took corrective
action when necessary.
- The RAAF also provided
technical support for specific Army and Navy aircraft.
Together,
the Aircraft Depots and the Maintenance Squadrons safeguarded the
RAAF’s operational independence, developed the deeper-level
expertise need for the planning and introduction of new capabilities,
and provided a reserve of resources able to support prolonged
deployments.
The
organisation and functions of the RAAF, developed over some 60 years
of experience in peace and war, were directed towards:
- Maintaining the force at
a high state of readiness.
- Ensuring that the force
could be launched quickly in response to a wide range of tasks.
- Enabling the force, once
launched, to be sustained.
- Supporting a high degree
of flexibility in the application of air power in time, space, and role.
The RAAF Technical Services organisation
demonstrated its competence through many emergencies, not the least in
Vietnam where it earned much commendation from the US forces in that
theatre, refer Annex C for a more detailed summary.
At that time, the Chief of Air Force (CAF) had command and control over
all RAAF elements and the resources need to meet his Air Power
responsibilities. The short and direct lines of command and control
enabled the RAAF to absorb the inevitable ebbs and flows in
Government policy and funding with a controlled, minimum impact on
core operational capabilities and the support infrastructure. Support
plans could also be varied quickly to meet changing Air Staff
Plans and Programmes, while protecting the Defence Industry Base upon
which the Air Force depended.
The
Technical Services Branch carried out the functions listed above
under one Technical Services Chief supported by 718 engineers who
maintained a sound level of expertise in the aircraft operated, the
systems fitted, and the technological environment in which they
operated. The Service was recognized as being the most capable air
force for its size in the world.
The
Decline in Technical Mastery in the RAAF
Since
the mid-1970s, the RAAF’s Technical Services function has been
subjected to ‘Death by a Thousand Cuts’, the main
milestones being:
The
RAAF Re-organisation (1982 on). Under the prolonged and
unrealistic financial constraints imposed on the Services following
the Tange structural changes, the RAAF sought economies by moving
from its traditional Engineering, Maintenance and Supply support
structure centred on AFO and HQ Support Command to Weapon System
support elements located at the operational bases. Unfortunately,
RAAF implementation plans were overtaken by government driven
structural changes.
The
Sanderson Review (1989). This structural review led to the
downgrading of the RAAF’s Development and Technical Services
Branches, the latter ceasing to exist in 1989, although fragments
drifted through the organisation until 1993. This review also
required the three Service Offices to have a common structure, and
later limited their manpower to 100, both decisions being imposed
without thought for the marked differences between the Services in
the technology operated and supported.
The
General List. About the same time, the RAAF introduced a
‘General List’, which included all officers of the rank
of Group Captain and above, so as to provide a pool from which higher
management posts could be filled. In effect, it resulted in important
posts
being filled by officers with inadequate qualifications. The
inevitable impacts upon force structure decisions, source selection,
and project management competencies have been well illustrated over
the years since.
The
Impact of the Defence Efficiency Review (DER), the Defence Reform
Programme (DRP), and the Commercial Support Programme (CSP)
From
1996, these programmes, driven mainly by achieving ‘savings’
without thought for their impact on the management of the Service and
its technical support base, reduced the span and depth of RAAF
technical responsibility. Contractors failed to fill the resulting
engineering support gap on the grounds of cost.
The
DER/DRP imposed mainly structural changes and manpower constraints
that saw the RAAF’s size reduced significantly. The CSP
concentrated on outsourcing RAAF maintenance work, contracting out
the work of the three Aircraft Depots and the majority of that done
at the four major Maintenance Squadrons, as well as other RAAF units.
The
RAAF has been left with the lowest and least skilled maintenance
tasks done at Operating (Flight Line) level.
Support
Command Re-organisation. Firstly, the RAAF’s Support
Command (later Logistics Command) was absorbed by Support Command
Australia, which was then absorbed by Defence Materiel Organisation
(DMO)
which also assumed responsibility for both in-service support and the
acquisition of new capabilities. The continued inability of DMO to
properly specify, source and procure the needs of the RAAF through a
lack of the required technical skills and management experience has
been endemic.
The
impacts of these changes have been to:
- Disperse the RAAF’s
critical Technical Services functions and resources indiscriminently
across multiple organisational, functional and financial interfaces,
resulting in a loss of visibility and control across the Force of the
technology being operated and supported.
- Reduce the span and
depth of the technical skills and experience needed to manage RAAF
capabilities across the Force, provide professional input to Air Staff
Plans and Programmes, and support the evaluation, selection and
introduction of new capabilities. The continued problems within DMO in
managing Australia’s Air Power programmes can be traced back, to a
large extent, to the loss of RAAF technical expertise.
These impacts became visible
firstly
in a fall in airworthiness standards which led to the establishment
of a Director General Technical Airworthiness in 1990. Then,
continued poor maintenance standards led the CAF to form a Director,
Maintenance Policy and Planning in 2007. While these
responses will be helpful, their effectiveness will be limited
severely so long as the RAAF does not have a Technical Services
organisation at AFO level to achieve the visibility and control
needed to ensure effective engineering and maintenance support across
the Force. Detailed discussion
of the
role and importance of Technical Services functions and the penalties
that flow from ignoring them can be found earlier publications on
RAAF maintenance and airworthiness.
The
role and importance of engineering support to the RAF was put well by
Air Marshal Sir Roderick Hill, and his observations are quite
applicable to the RAAF today:
“ In
our view, air operations will always depend for their success to a
marked extent on the right handling of the related technical
problems. Intelligent direction of scientific and engineering
resources, as well as of the men who apply them, is therefore
fundamental. The evolution of a common technical doctrine and a
strong corporate feeling is prerequisite to really efficient and
economic management.
The
RAF is steadily becoming more dependent for its offensive power on
technical imagination, skill and accomplishment, while technical
equipment is increasing in variety of use and scope of function. In
these circumstances, leadership and the creation of a powerful
unifying influence is of primary importance, without it technical
endeavour may well tend to be sectional and separatist. Nevertheless,
while firmly harnessed to operational requirements, the
vigour of technical initiative has by all possible means to be
sustained. It is here that the balancing effect of professional
judgement is indispensable.”
Interestingly,
the strongest support for Hill’s views came from the senior
members of the General Duties Branch of the RAF and, in essence, the
decision spelt the end of a generalist approach to what remains a
specialist function.
Today,
the RAAF has reverted to 'generalist' managment, its engineers
absorbed into a culture of
‘management’ rather than one of professional engineering. The current
structure of the RAAF has become sectional and
separatist as Hill foresaw. There is no powerful unifying influence;
nor is there evidence of any balancing professional judgement between
operations and engineering.
That
the RAAF today still faces the structural, organisational, and skills
problems entrenched over the past 25 years or so is evidenced in the
Deputy CAF’s recent article ‘Re-engineering the RAAF’. He cites, for
examplevii:
- RAAF culture and
traditions as being impediments to needed change, which prompted six
months of senior officers speaking with all ranks about their role in
the Service and their values.
- The problems
associated with people in Maritime and Airlift facing their fourth or
fifth deployment. This resulted in a ‘re-balancing’, which amounted to
the re-allocation of resources, mainly from the Project Offices,
aggravating developing problems there.
- Problems with
manpower levels, training system dynamics, financial unresponsiveness,
and maintaining workforce experience.
- Problems with one
squadron that could not exceed 50% aircraft serviceability. After
twelve months this was raised to 85% after “They asked themselves
whether they were being effective and efficient in their work
practices, in how they were managing in the production management of
aircraft, and things such as that.”
- We want to send teams
into the workplace to ask “How can we help you? We are not going to
mandate what you do. We want to help you to achieve a greater, more
effective and efficient outcome”.
The
first point suggests a breakdown in the unity of direction that should
flow down the chain of command and control
from the CAF to the lowest levels of the RAAF, resulting in
uncertainty that must impact in turn upon morale and ethos. The second
reflects
ineffective co-ordination between Air Staff planning and personnel
management. The third a disconnect between Air Staff planning and
resource management, especially recruitment, training, finance, and
manpower development. The fourth points to the absence of a
Force-wide Technical Services management organisation able to
establish and maintain maintenance efficiency, effectiveness and
airworthiness standards across all Fleets. The fifth is a reactive
response to problems that have been allowed to develop. It
epitomises management lagging and reacting rather than leading
firmly. This is a totally inadequate and dangerous management
concept for a Military Service that should need no further comment!
RAAF
Operational Mastery
The
adverse impacts of interminable structural changes have also been
reflected in a decline in the professional mastery of operational
staffs, particularly where they interface with technology, support
elements, and the Defence bureaucracy. Within the RAAF organisation
pre-DER/DRP/CSP, Air Staff officers gained practical management
experience through having to work with the supporting branches,
mainly Technical Services, Material, Supply, Personnel, and
Administration, requiring them to understand the critical
interdependencies involved at Air Force Office, Command, and Base
levels and at RAAF elements overseas .
However,
the ‘gutting’ of the Service’s capabilities,
together with the current AFO and Force Element structures have
reduced dramatically the span and depth of Air Staff officer
professional and management expertise in much the same way that
Engineer officer expertise has been affected. Coupled with the lack
of the tertiary knowledge required of senior Air Staff officers to
perform at the higher levels in such specialist areas as force
structure and
force development, the problem becomes more critical.
Impacts
Summary
What
we see is the breakdown of the ability of the CAF to manage
Australia’s air power as a coherent force; an organisation that
has lost its way trying to survive and navigate the multitudinous
changes that have been imposed since Tange; a force following
management concepts that are wholly unsuited to any military force, a
force not structured or organised to manage its core dependencies; a
force constrained by the overwhelming preoccupation of the
bureaucracy with exercising financial power, making it and the RAAF
unable to respond coherently and timely to changing needs; a force
that carries primary responsibility for the defence of Australia, but
is ‘supported’ by a bureaucracy that does not accept any
responsibility.
In
summary, the current organization, management approaches, and skills
base do not, and can not, assure the CAF that his force elements will
provide him with the performance that he must have to meet his
operational responsibilities as a fully integrated and unified Force.
This situation points to a serious lack of the required professional
mastery.
Education
Standards in the RAAF Officer Corps – Then and Now
The
'classical' educational and training model for the RAAF officer
corps, as implemented during the pre-Tange era, comprised a range of
possible entry and growth paths, both for aircrew and engineers.
Traditionally,
the RAAF’s engineering corps comprised:
- Selected graduates from
the RAAF Engineering and Radio Apprentice Squadrons, plus some adult
trainees, who had acquired practical experience at maintenance and
other
units.
These ‘practical’ engineers provided some 33% of the RAAF’s engineer
corps.
- The Diploma Cadet Squadron
was formed to fill the gap between the ‘practical’ engineers and the
university-educated engineers, with courses developed in concert with
the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology. Graduates were awarded
Associate Diplomas in the MechEng, ElecEng, and RadEng disciplines
after completing four years of study and graduated as Pilot Officers.
The squadron closed when ADFA was formed.
In
1980, with the RAAF’s trade structure having to face the
proliferation of integrated systems and computer control, a Systems
Technician specialisation was introduced.
All
engineer as well as trade training was anchored firmly on what was
needed to maintain and develop the Air Force technologically. In
essence, the engineer corps highlighted the need for a technology
focussed Air Force in contrast to the general air crew concept that
flying was an end in itself.
The
Engineer Corps then undertook both specialist and staff training, as
follows:
- On commissioning, engineer
officers obtained a common, basic Service education at the Officers’
Training School.
- Both engineering and
general service subjects were included in promotion examinations ‘B’
(to Flight Lieutenant) and ‘C’ (to Squadron Leader).
- For those wishing to
compete for the higher staff ranks, the ‘Q’ examination qualified them
for the RAAF Staff College which awarded the annotation ‘psc’.
- Further education was
conducted at the Joint Services Staff College (later the Australian
Defence College), which awarded the ‘jssc’ annotation.
- Limited members were then
selected to take a range of courses overseas, usually with the RAF or
USAF, such as the RAF Technical College, the Empire Test Pilots’
School, the Royal College of Defence Science, the Royal Military
College at Cranwell, and the USAF’s Institute of Technology.
At
all levels of training and experience, there was a constant thread
that emphasised airworthiness and the many and diverse activities
that go to make it up. Members were also inculcated with both the ethos
of the engineer and that of the Service as a whole. A more detailed
discussion of engineer training is in Annex A of this document.
Before
the DER/DRP/CSP changes, RAAF pilots entered the Service via:
- The RAAF College (later
Academy) which was attended by selected officers, the majority
graduating as pilots with a BSc qualification, later supplemented with
a GradDipMilAv.
- No 1 Flying Training
School (1 FTS) which took in mainly direct entrants and some selected
servicemen.
- Qualified aircrew from
overseas services.
No
1 FTS also trained pilots for the other services.
Navigator
training was conducted at the School of Air Navigation (SAN) and Air
Electronic Officer (AEO) training at the School of Radio and SAN.
Entrants for these categories came often from 1 BFTS students who did
not qualify as pilots, and serving members.
On
graduation, these aircrew were posted for operational training at:
- No 2 (Fighter) Operational
Conversion Unit.
- SAN (School of Air
Navigation) for specialist training.
- No 292 Squadron for
Maritime crews.
- The Training Flights at 6
(Bomber) Sqn, and No 37, 37, and 38 Sqns (Air Lift).
Selected
officers would then be selected for further training and experience
overseas through exchange posts, and facilities such as the Central
Navigation and Control School (UK) and the Empire Test Pilots’
School (UK) or the USN Test Pilots’ School (US).
Air
staff members then progressed through the ranks, taking their
promotion examinations, and professional development courses in
common with the officers of the other branches (psc and jssc). Some
were selected for courses overseas such as those at the Royal
College of Defence Science (UK), USAF Institute of Technology, and
the Air Warfare College (US).
Although
the number of Air Staff officers having tertiary qualifications
varied considerably across the ranks, they still represented a
significant percentage, and by graduating its RAAF College pilots
with a BSc, the Service was clearly endeavouring to raise the general
technological awareness of its operational staffs. The tertiary
qualifications at the time are summarised in Annex B.
Unfortunately,
these basic qualifications do not seem to have been followed up with
post-graduate qualifications in fields such as science,
technology-based operational analysis and air power development. The
Air Staff seemed to be content to leave the management of technology
in the hands of the Technical Services Chief, perhaps not
surprisingly, as that Branch had performed consistently well.
However, having lost that support base when the Technical Services
Branch
and HQ Support Command were dismantled, the RAAF faced a great void
in its ability to manage technology in both operational and technical
support areas.
The
contemporary in-service undergraduate and postgraduate professional
education system reflects the current focus on ’jointery’
and this is reflected in tri-service teaching establishments.
Undergraduate education is
provided for officer cadets by the Australian Defence
Force Academy (ADFA) in Canberra, which is affiliated with the
University of New South Wales, a Go8 (Group of Eight) university.
This places the quality of undergraduate education provided in the
same bracket as other first tier Australian universities, and
graduates are awarded accredited degrees in their respective
disciplines, which cover most of the categories found at other Go8
universitiesviii.
Postgraduate
staff education is primarily provided by the Australian Command and
Staff College (ACSC) and the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies
(CDSS), both part of the Australian Defence College. The ACSC
amalgamates the three previous single service staff colleges into a
single entity, and its purpose is to provide ’classical’
staff college courses to mid ranking officers.
The
CDSS course is aimed at senior officers (colonel and 1-star), and
covers strategic leadership and command, the strategic setting,
higher command, capability development, and policy development.
The
CDSS is accredited to award Graduate Certificates, Graduate Diplomas,
or Master of Arts degrees in Strategic Studies via Deakin University
(non Go8).
Historically,
the RAAF has also posted a small number of high achieving mid ranking
officers overseas, to undertake research or coursework Masters
degrees at the US Air
Force Institute of Technology
and the UK Cranfield University Defence
College of Management and Technology.
A
mid ranking or senior general duties branch RAAF officer will
therefore have completed staff college training, and in some
instances a coursework Masters degree, the latter mostly in
management related disciplines, or humanities, frequently involving
strategic studies, all of which may be categorised as ’soft
disciplines’. What is observed much less frequently are
research masters degrees in sciences, engineering, operations
research and other ’hard disciplines’. Doctorates (PhD,
DSc, DS) are exceptionally rare, regardless of the discipline in
question. RAAF Engineers will typically have a higher fraction of
Masters degrees, especially in engineering and the MBA category, but
few of these will be research degrees.
The
latter contrasts strongly with the US Air Force, an excellent
benchmark, which has a good number of senior and mid ranking officers
with PhD degrees, a robust proportion of which are in the ’hard
disciplines’.
The
educational background most senior RAAF officers have is primarily
orientated towards management and leadership, with some component of
service specific strategy and doctrine. What is largely absent is
training in research skills, especially skills involving hard science
areas like mathematics, physics, operations research, engineering and
military strategy and science.
A
coursework Masters degree, which in the globalised tertiary education
system is typically similar in depth and difficulty to the final year
in undergraduate studies, cannot provide the depth of domain
knowledge, research skills and critical thinking taught in a research
Masters or PhD from a world class university. To believe otherwise is
to discard a century of empirical experience, in which many high
achieving and innovating military officers on the global stage had
exactly
this type of postgraduate education.
In
the rapidly evolving and technologically complex strategic
environment Australia finds itself in now, the RAAF officer corps is
mostly equipped with the wrong kind of postgraduate education and as
a result, is seriously deficient in the kind of intellectual skills
sets critically required for success.
How
to Fix the Professional Mastery Problem
Failure
to correct the problems inherent
in the RAAF's current staff training and education mechanisms will
have dire consequences not only for the RAAF as an organisation, but
also for the Australian community which is funding it. In extremis, the end state
of the current trend is best observed in a range of Third World air
forces, where professional mastery is largely absent with planning
choices made for arbitrary reasons.
In particular, there
is a genuine risk that the current deskilling problems will
contaminate advice provided to the current Air Combat Capability
Review, and the
current White Paper development process, damaging the outcomes
produced by both reviews.
To
remedy the situation it will be necessary to introduce a series of
short, medium and long term measures, which will need to be
implemented with promptly and efficiently, both to protect the RAAF
from
the cumulative problems it is experiencing, and to protect the
Defence organisation as a whole from
poor advice and its inevitable consequences.
- Short/Medium Term
Measures intended to protect the community from bad advice include
staffing the minister's office with proven independent expertise in air
power
matters, and the engagement of
external independent reviewers to critically analyse
the advice provided by the RAAF to the Minister for Defence. This
requires
immediate implementation.
- Short/Medium Term
Measures to protect the RAAF and Defence organisation internally
against deskilling related problems include red teaming, the design and
implementation of internal
organisational feedback loops, and the engagement of
independent reviewers design the robust analysis and management systems
needed. This also
requires immediate implementation.
- Long Term Measures will be required to reskill the officer
corps, and these will
inherently be progressive in implementation, with both
structural and education / training components. These include the
re-establishment of an RAAF technical services organisation to restore
relevant practical experience and skills, as well as changes to
educational criteria for entry, and especially promotions within the
RAAF. The latter measures must be applied to officers in the General
Duties Branch as well as to engineers.
These
measures are essential if change is to be effected, and the RAAF and
community are to be protected from the cumulative damage of the last
three decades of mandated change.
Long
Term Measures to Resurrect Professional Mastery
If
the RAAF is to be resurrected as a coherent Force, based upon sound
mastery and management of its technology, it would be sensible to:
- Restructure the grossly
inefficient organisational, functional, and financial interfaces that
now exist, principally those within the AFO and its interfaces with
DMO. The objective here is to ensure the RAAF operates and is managed
as a Force under CAF, with a strong unity of direction, rather than a
conglomeration of small, independent capabilities focussed largely on
Joint Operations.
- Re-establish a Technical
Services organisation under CAF to provide the technical visibility,
control and co-ordination of all Force elements.
- Re-establish Maintenance
Units to free operational Units to concentrate on operations. This will
also provide a better breeding ground for the technicians and engineers
needed to run a modern Air Force and provide professional technical
input to RAAF and Defence plans. Such units would also provide the
resources needed to support operational deployments – one of the main
reasons for their original establishment.
- Re-skill the RAAF in all
areas, and increase the level of professional management by revising
the philosophy behind the General List which, from experience, can not
be claimed a success.
-
Provide incentives and material support to
enable a much larger proportion of officers to gain relevant university
postgraduate qualifications, to increase the education standard and
pools of skills sets in the sciences, information technology,
engineering and related quantitative areas like operations research.
Qualifications in non-technical management and administration should
not be actively encouraged, but technical management degrees should be
encouragedix.
Given
a proper organisational structure, the skills required to manage the
RAAF’s current and planned technology will need to be
established for both maintenance and engineering functions. The
former must provide the basic and advanced skills to carry out and
manage all maintenance tasks. Within those areas involved with higher
level engineering tasks, engineers will have to be competent in
technology, analysis techniques, and technical management.
Unfortunately, the management of technology has not been well served
by the tertiary institutions, so RAAF may have to develop these
courses in conjunction with a selected tertiary organisation.
Such
changes will go far towards re-establishing the RAAF as a skilled and
experienced operator and supporter of high technology air power with
the necessary professional mastery.
The
Role of Education in Restoring Professional Mastery
Organisational
structure and practical skills alone cannot address all of the
cumulative problems observed, and education and training will have to
play a major role.
All
newly qualified junior officers should have a university
undergraduate degree. The Non-Graduate or Direct Entry category for
aircrew, which requires high school Year 12 education only, should be
amended, such that the officer candidate is required to do a
university undergraduate degree as part of their training process.
There
is another important consideration in relation to undergraduate
university degree education of officer candidates. The reality is
that since the early 1990 amalgamation of the University system,
there has been a strong trend away from teaching durable fundamental
knowledge, in favour of more marketable vocational and applied
skills. This, combined with the ongoing decline in the quality of
much of available high school education, especially in the sciences,
presents some important problemsx.
A
Non-Graduate or Direct Entry aircrew applicant in 1970 will have been
far better educated in English language skills, basic science
including mathematics and physics, than many current university
graduates in soft or applied science disciplines. Most university
academics in Australia have to contend with undergraduate student
literacy problems in English language, mathematics and physics, all a
result of an underperforming high school system. In practical terms,
a university graduate with an honours degree entering the RAAF today
may have poorer skills in these key areas than a high school graduate
of 30-40 years ago.
A
military aviator today must be competent in basic physics and
mathematics to properly understand tactics and the technology he/she
is using – and his opponent is using against him/her. Every
aviator needs this foundation knowledge, and needs to be competent in
using it. While modern aircraft might be easier to fly than Sabres or
Mirages, the complexity of the systems, sensors, weapons and computer
equipment which runs this equipment is in many respects greater. For
a warrior to prevail, or even survive, in this type of environment,
he/she has to play every technological advantage he/she has against
his/her opponent, and doing that competently requires solid
understanding – not just the ability to regurgitate lecture
notes or slides.
This
and the current unsuitability of the skills imparted by typical
undergraduate
university education leads to one inevitable conclusion. The RAAF
will need to engage one or more universities to provide undergraduate
courses which are optimised for aircrew, with a 'classical' education
in mathematics, physics and problem solving, to provide aircrew with
appropriate foundation skills sets.
The
issue of postgraduate education for mid ranking and senior officers
is no less important. The RAAF will need selected decision makers and
planners
for staff positions who are intellectually equipped to provide
disciplined and rigorous analytical and problem solving capabilities.
This skills set is today primarily produced by postgraduate research
degrees such as masters or doctorates in science or engineering, at
upper tier universities.
A
model which might be appropriate is that espoused by US General
Curtis E LeMay, Commander of Strategic Air Command and later Chief
of
Staff Air Force, who was a vocal advocate of intensive training and
high standards of education in the officer corps. LeMay favoured
officers seeking higher promotions who completed postgraduate
research degrees from top tier US universities, with a bias toward
science, engineering, operations research and strategy, all
disciplines of high value in strategic planning staff work.
In
practical terms, an RAAF officer should not be promoted to GPCAPT or
higher, unless that officer has completed a rigorous high quality
postgraduate research degree in an intellectually
difficult and relevant discipline. Areas such as science,
engineering, operations research and strategy should be favoured,
over other, less relevant disciplines. A coursework masters
degree,
especially in a 'soft' discipline, should not be counted as a useful
measure of academic achievement in assessing a mid-ranking or senior
officer for promotion. A problem which is likely to arise is that the
quality of earlier undergraduate education may preclude entry to the
higher quality universities, and suitable strategies will need to be
developed to overcome such difficulties.
In
summary, the RAAF will need to change the type of education its
officers receive, from the undergraduate level to the postgraduate,
to provide skills sets which are relevant for staff work in a
complex, technologically driven planning and warfighting environment.
|
The
Language of Professional Mastery
One reliable measure of
professional mastery within an organisation is the clarity of thinking
and expression in its writings. Traditionally, the RAAF placed
great emphasis on Service writing, with conciseness, clarity of thought
and expression key elements in its courses and examinations. High
standards were set and maintained for Service Papers Appreciations, and
General Service Writing, and failure to reach the required standards
was to place a limit upon a member’s career. The reasons were
simple – a lack of clarity of thought and expression cannot be
tolerated in any military organisation. The consequences of false
or confused information were too high to accept, particularly so in a
high technology service.
Today, little evidence remains of those high standards. A recent
example of current standards is seen in the discussion paper released
by the Air Power Development Centre titled ‘ An Air Force of Influence: A Strategic
Framework for the Future Air Force’. Any document which
includes such sentences as the following must cause concern:
“ Faced with a choice of distinct but
equally viable means of satisfying the challenges presented through
these developments and afforded by this opportunity, we, the Air
Force’s senior leadership, have chosen to continue Air Force’s
maturation as a key strategic national security contributor by
transforming our force into a strategic one. We call this
strategic force an air force of influence.”
This standard of thinking and writing is quite unacceptable in any
organisation, let alone a military one. George Orwell summarised
well our increasingly widespread inability to express ourselves clearly:
“ Don’t you see that the whole aim of
Newspeak is to narrow the range of thought?” (George
Orwell, ‘ 1984’.),
and:
“ A man may take a drink because he
feels himself to be a failure, and then fail all the more completely
because he drinks. It is rather the same thing that is happening
to the English language. It becomes ugly and inaccurate because
our thoughts are foolish, but the slovenliness of our language makes it
easier for us to have foolish thoughts. The point is that the
process is reversible. Modern English, especially written
English, is full of bad habits which spread by imitation and which can
be avoided if one is willing to take the necessary trouble. If
one gets rid of these habits one can think more clearly, and to think
clearly is a necessary first step toward political regeneration : so
that the fight against bad English is not frivolous and is not the
exclusive concern of professional writers.” ( George
Orwell, ‘ Politics
and the English Language’.)
Those wishing to be led entertainingly through the manner in which we
have largely lost the habit of thinking clearly and using clear English
are referred to ‘Death Sentence – the Decay of Public Language’ (Don
Watson, Random House, 2003.)
If the RAAF is to recover and develop its professional mastery, it must
start at the fundamental levels of thinking and expression.
|
The
Role of Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO)
The contracting methodology
adopted by the DMO is based upon an approach used in the USA during the
1980s and 90s, known as ‘Total System Performance Based Contracting’.
This approach resulted in financial and capability consequences that
were far from optimal. The DMO versions of long-term equipment supply
and support contracts are based upon the DMO ethos of ‘De-risking
Projects’, a hazardous concept unique for any industrialised Nation,
and an approach not recognised by any Risk Management Standard.
In effect, it places responsibility for the engineering, project
management, maintenance, and supply support of Australia’s primary
defence capabilities wholly in the hands of non-Australians reporting
to overseas companies. Local support is limited to those simple tasks
involved with repair by replacement, stores accounting, and shipping.
Deeper level maintenance, together with the skills base involved, will
be evacuated to overseas facilities, in keeping with the business
development strategies set in train by overseas contractors during the
early 1990s. That is, management of our front line defence assets will
move out of Australian control into the control of foreign companies,
and at considerable long-term cost. When questioned about this in the
case of the Super Hornet, a senior executive of one overseas prime
replied “But this was always going to be the case with the JSF, anyway!”
This approach is seen by DMO as transferring risk from Defence to the
Contractor, but no contract can ever achieve this. If a contractor
defaults for any reason, the prime risk – that is, any adverse impact
upon Australia’s force readiness, responsiveness, flexibility,
effectiveness and, in the case of aircraft, airworthiness.– must always
be borne by the RAAF, and hence Australia, not the contractor. DMO can
only impose commercial sanctions upon any defaulting contractor, or
attempt to as a long and expensive legal process inevitably takes over.
Finally, the whole concept is in direct conflict with the policies of
successive governments of both persuasions which have emphasised the
criticality of a robust Defence Industry Base to underpin Australia’s
self-reliance. In fact, current policies herald a marked, possibly
total, withering of Australia’s remaining Defence Aerospace Industry.
Current DMO contracting practices are inimicable with government
policies and will also be a major impediment to the re-skilling of the
RAAF, and indeed the re-skilling of Australian Industry.
|
Summary
and Conclusions
There
is much empirical and public evidence which shows
that the the RAAF has suffered a critical loss of professional
mastery, especially in areas related to basic military science and
military technology.
The
consequences of this problem range from public statements containing
numerous factual and logical errors, across poor decisions in
capability
development and procurement, to incorrect advice to Government and
parliament on a range of operational, technical, strategic and force
structure planning issues.
The
root causes of this deep and pervasive problem can be traced back to
the disestablishment of the RAAF's Branch structure, especially the
Engineering Branch, during the progressive implementation of the
Defence Efficiency Review (DER), the Defence Reform Programme (DRP),
and the Commercial Support Programme (CSP), and a failure to
introduce and implement alternative measures for maintaining critical
intellectual skills sets in engineering, science, operational
analysis and strategy.
The
consequence of this is that the current RAAF officer corps is mostly
not equipped with a suitable educational background or experience
profile to master the kind of problems which arise in management and
planning of complex and intellectually demanding areas. Solving
this problem will require a combination of short, medium and long
term measures, detailed in this paper.
Unless a
sustained and aggressive effort is made to re-skill the RAAF, and DMO
ceases to enter into long-term, ‘De-risking’ contracts,
the cumulative and ongoing effects of de-skilling will not only
continue to damage the RAAF severely, but will also cause ongoing and
increasing damage to Australia’s Defence Industry Base and its
key military capabilities.
Acknowledgments:
The authors wish to express
their gratitude to the six expert reviewers, in Australia and the
United States, who contributed cogent, incisive and relevant critique
of the draft of this paper.
|
Annex
A - Education
Standards in the RAAF Engineer Officer Corps
“For
sixty years, no activity has been more important to the RAAF’s
professional well-being than its education and training programs. It
was primarily through these programs that after the trials of WW11
and the neglect of the interim period, the RAAF reinvented itself as
one of the world’s premier high-technology defence forces.” (The
Australian Centenary History of Defence, Vol2, The Air Force,
Alan Stephens, 2001).
Traditionally,
the RAAF’s engineering corps comprised:
- Selected
graduates from the RAAF Engineering and Radio Apprentice Squadrons,
plus some adult trainees, who had gained sound, practical experience at
maintenance and other units. These ‘practical’ engineers provided some
33% of the RAAF’s engineer corps. Apprentices graduated after three
years of full-time training followed by two years of on-the-job
supervised experience.
- The Diploma
Cadet Squadron, formed to fill the gap between the ‘practical’
engineers and the university-educated theoreticians. Their courses were
developed in concert with the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology
so as to ensure a strong, practical focus. Graduates were awarded
Associate Diplomas in the MechEng, ElecEng, and RadEng disciplines.
Students were required to satisfy the Victorian Leaving Certificate,
the same entry standard as the RAAF College, and completed four years
of study before graduating as Pilot Officers. The squadron closed when
ADFA was formed.
The
apprentice and diploma cadet schemes were both major successes,
proving, some 30 years after the diploma scheme was started, about
20% of the RAAF’s total number of Air Commodores. The
Equipment Branch followed with its AssDipComm from RMIT, which was
transferred to QIT, but this scheme also closed when ADFA was formed.
In
1980, with the RAAF’s trade structure having to face the
proliferation of integrated systems and computer control, the Systems
Technician was introduced, but the important balance between systems
and trade technicians in fault diagnosis and rectification may not
have been fully resolved. The RAAF also drew its engineers from:
- The RAAF
College, which planned to provide an annual output of engineer (BSc)
and equipment graduates.
- Direct
entries who were tertiary qualified engineers from universities.
- Engineers
from overseas services, mainly the RAF and RN (Fleet Air Arm).
- Engineers
with tertiary qualifications as a result of RAAF policies providing
incentives for members to undertake further study.
A
small number of engineers were also given flying training as the
Chief Engineer traditionally held flying qualifications.
All
engineer as well as trade training was anchored firmly on what was
needed to maintain and develop the Air Force technologically. In
essence, the engineer corps highlighted the need for a technology
focussed Air Force in contrast to the general air crew concept that
flying was an end in itself.
The
type of tertiary qualifications that were held are identified at Annex
B.
Specialist
and Staff Training.
The
Engineer Corps then undertook both specialist and staff training, as
follows:
- On
commissioning, engineer officers and those of other specialities
obtained a common, basic Service education at the Officers’ Training
School which covered drill, law, and administration. The school also
conducted advanced courses in administration and law, as well as a
Warrant Officer course.
- Both
engineering and general service subjects were included in promotion
examinations ‘B’ (to Flight Lieutenant) and ‘C’ (to Squadron Leader).
- For those
wishing to compete for the higher staff ranks, the ‘Q’ examination had
to be passed at one sitting, with a maximum of three sittings allowed.
Successful candidates were considered for the RAAF Staff College which
awarded the annotation ‘psc’.
- Further
education was conducted at the Joint Services Staff College (later the
Australian Defence College), which awarded the ‘jssc’ annotation.
- Limited
members were then selected to take a range of courses overseas, usually
with the RAF or USAF, such as the RAF Technical College, the Empire
Test Pilots’ School, the Royal College of Defence Science, the Royal
Military College at Cranwell, and the USAF’s Institute of Technology.
Employment
on Commissioning.
On
entering the RAAF, engineers were employed so as to maximise their
expertise while providing them with appointments that would develop
their technical and management expertise throughout their careers. This
required a continuous dialogue between Personnel Branch where career
development was planned and the Technical Services Branch.
‘Practical’
engineers with previous maintenance experience could be posted to a
wide range of appointments at:
- Operating
units or small maintenance squadrons in Maintenance Units or Sections.
- The major
maintenance squadrons in deeper level maintenance flights.
- The
aircraft depots in aircraft, engine, or ancillary maintenance squadrons.
- The two
Commands. At HQ Support Command, this might be in maintenance
programming and management for aircraft, engines and repairables at
RAAF depots and contractors, training, new project support, assessing
and managing spares requirements, or management data development.
- Air Force
Office to support qualified engineers.
Those
without previous RAAF experience would generally be posted initially
to smaller operational or flying training units where they would be
exposed to the basics of aircraft maintenance management, technical
administration, and Service life.
At
all levels of training and experience, there was a constant thread
that emphasised airworthiness and the many and diverse activities
that go to make it up. They were also inculcated with both the ethos
of the engineer and that of the Service as a whole.
Two
lessons stand out from this period, which were emphasised by Alan
Stephens in his book ‘The Royal Australian Air Force’:
- The human
technological edge must come before an Air Force’s technological edge
can be achieved, and
- The Air
Force with a technological advantage is likely to prevail in combat.
|
|
Annex
B –
Selected Statistics
SAMPLE TERTIARY
QUALIFICATIONS – ENGINEER BRANCH
PRE –
DER/DRP/CSP
|
Rank
|
Numbers
|
Qualifications
|
|
AVM
|
1
|
BSc
|
|
Air
Cdre
|
5
|
MSc (1),
BSc (3), BE (2), ASTC (Mech Eng) (1)
|
|
Gp
Capt
|
24
|
MSc (2),
BSc (6), BE (5), B Mech E (1), MEngSc (1), FDipCoEng (1), DipMEng (2),
DipCoEng (2), None (9).
|
|
Wg
Cdr
|
110
|
MSc (8,
incl 3 USAFIT), BSc (4), BE (13), MEngSc (1), FDipCoEng (7), DipMechEng
(15), DipCoEng (16), DipAeEng ((2), DipElEng (11), FDipMEng (1),
FTCMechEng (1), DipMan (1), DipGradMan (2), BA (1), None (37)
|
|
Sqn
Ldr
|
185
|
MSc (1
Cran), BSc (7), BE (22), BAeEng (2), BEc (1), BMechTech (1), BTech (2),
BPhil (1), DipMechEng (24), DipCoEng (25), DipElEng (24), GradDipDp
(1), DipAeEng (22), DipMan (2), FDipCoEng (1), FDipMechEng (2), None
(56)
|
|
Flt
Lt
|
257
|
PhD (1),
BSc (14), BAppSc (3), BAeEng (3), BMechEng (2), BE (44), BTech (2),
DipEd (1), DipElEng(23), DipMEng (15), DipAeEng (24), DipCoEng (15),
GradDipMilAv (3), MIEE (UK) (1), None (115).
|
|
Flg
Off
|
127
|
BSc (3),
BE (7), BMechE (2), BElecEng (8), BEng (1), BAeroEng (3), DipAeEng (6),
DipElEng (14), DipMEng (7), DipCoEng (8), GradDipMilAv (1), DipT (1),
None (68)
|
|
Plt
Off
|
10
|
DipEng
(1), DipCoEng (1), None (8).
|
Those
without tertiary
qualifications comprised:
Gp Capt: 37.5%
Wg Cdr: 33.6%
Sqn Ldr: 30.2%
Flt Lt: 44.7%
Flg Off: 53.5%
Plt Off: 80%
Note:
Non-tertiary
qualified officers comprised many from the NCO and W Officer ranks
who had completed an Engineering Apprentice course and had gained
considerable practical experience in maintenance and project
management.
Source: The
Air Force List – 1981.
SAMPLE
TERTIARY
QUALIFICATIONS –GENERAL DUTIES BRANCH
PRE –
DER/DRP/CSP
|
Rank
|
Numbers
|
Service
Qualifications
|
Tertiary
Qualifications
|
|
M
|
1
|
AFC,
AE, jssc, psc, qfi.
|
None
|
|
AVM
|
10
|
The
majority comprised officers with decorations such as DSO, AFC and DFC,
staff qualifications such as rcds, jssc, and psc, and specialist
qualifications such as qfi and fci.
|
None
|
|
Air
Cdre
|
24
|
These
followed the general pattern above, plus some additional
qualifications, such as swo, ndc, awc, and asq.
|
BSc (2),
MPolSc (1), Grad DipAdmin (1),
BA
(1), BComm (1), BEc (1).
|
|
p
Capt
|
57
|
Mostly
staff and specialist qualifications, as above.
|
BSc (3),
MPolSc (1), BA (1),
MPubAdmin
(2), MBus Admin (1).
|
|
Wg
Cdr
|
164
|
As
above.
|
BSc
(20), BEc (2), MSc(USAFIT) (2),
BEc (1),
MEngSc (1), DipRMCS (2),
BA (1),
MComm (1), BE (1).
|
|
Sqn
Ldr
|
235
|
As
above.
|
BSc
(24), BAppSc (1), MSc(USAFIT) (1),
BA (2),
DipEd (1).
|
|
Flt
Lt
|
427
|
As
above.
|
BSc
(54), BSc &GradDipMilAv (38),
BAeroEng
(1), BEc (1), BMechE (1),
BE (1),
|
Those with tertiary
qualifications comprised:
Air Cdre: 29%
Gp Capt: 14%
Wg Cdr: 18.9%
Sqn Ldr: 12.3%
Flt Lt: 22.3%
Source: The
Air Force List – 1981.
Annex C –
PERFORMANCE
STATISTICS – NO. 9 SQUADRON RAAF VIETNAM THEATRE
JUNE 1966 TO
DECEMBER 1971
5.5 Years (2,000 Days) Including 2.5 Years (900 Days) of Gunship
Operations]
Deployment Strength: 8 x Bell UH-1B Iroquois Helicopters and about 90
personnel
Mature Unit Strength: 16 x Bell UH-1H Iroquois Helicopters and about
170 personnel
Hours Flown: 58,768
Sorties: 237,806
Passengers: 414,818
Freight: 12,207 tonnes
Casevacs/Medevacs: 4,357 personnel
Weapons Expenditure: 7.62mm – 15,512,361 rounds / 2.75 inch Rockets –
29,285 rounds
Maintenance Effort: 250 Major Servicings & approximately 1,800
Intermediate Servicings
Aircraft Availability: Averaged 13 of 16 aircraft on line daily; about
83 percent
Aircraft Attrition: 7 lost due multiple causes and 23 suffered battle
damage
Casualties: Killed – 6, Wounded – 8, Injured – Under review
HONOURS & AWARDS, NO. 9
SQUADRON RAAF
VIETNAM WAR – 1966 to 1971
(The Australian Order of Precedence of Awards)
4 x DSO (Companion of the Distinguished Service Order)
2 x MBE (Member of the Order of the British Empire)
32 x DFC (Distinguished Flying Cross) RAN 1, RAAF 26, RNZAF 5
1 x CGM (Conspicuous Gallantry Medal)
1 x GM (George Medal)
9 x DFM (Distinguished Flying Medal)
1 x BEM(G) (British Empire Medal for Gallantry)
2 x BEM (British Empire Medal)
38 x MID (Mentioned-in-Dispatches) RAN 2, RAAF 34, RNZAF 2
1 x Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry (with Silver Star)
Source: National Curator,
No. 9 Squadron Association Inc., 2005
Endnotes:
v
Refer Sea King Tragedy and Black
Hawk 221 Board of Inquiry Reports.
vi This
is especially concerning for two reasons. The
first is that this transfers control of sovereign military assets to
foreign organisations, beholden to their own governments and
shareholders. The second is the resulting deskilling of Australian
defence industries, as design, engineering and software development
capabilities are shifted overseas.
vii Refer
AVM John Blackburn, DCAF, Interview, Australian
Aviation, Phantom Publications Pty Ltd, No.247, March, 2008.
viii The Go8 comprises The
University of Adelaide, The Australian National University , The
University of Melbourne, Monash University, The University of New South
Wales, The University of Queensland,The University of Sydney,The
University of Western Australia.
ix Technical
or Engineering Management
education is a distinct category which is not widely taught in
Australian universities, primarily as such courses or units are
considerably more difficult to teach and learn, and have thus been less
than a stellar performers in the enrolment popularity stakes, compared
to 'soft' general management qualifications like the Master of Business
Administration (MBA), by far the most popular postgraduate
qualification in Australia.
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Air Power Australia
Analyses ISSN 1832-2433
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