National Military Strategy
and the
Defence 2008 White Paper
The Russian designed Sukhoi Su-30MKI
Flanker H long range
fighter-bomber is characteristic of the deep transformation taking
place in Asian military capabilities. As Asia industrialises its
economies, increasing wealth is resulting in increasing technologically
sophisticated and potent military capabilities (US Air Force image).
This paper proposes a new national military strategy for Australia,
centred in an extended regional denial model. Specific force structure
changes are required to implement this strategy. These include
numerous important changes to the RAAF, RAN and Army force elements,
detailed in this document. The new national military
strategy is the result of a broad and deep strategic
analysis which establishes several important
constraints.
Nations
in Asia are acquiring and deploying capabilities which, for the first
time since the 1940s, will provide the ability to strike at
Australian territory and within Australia's regional area of
interest. Therefore, the
most important strategic imperative for Australia in coming decades
will be to acquire and maintain military capabilities which make the
prospect of military conflict with Australia unattractive to any
nation in Asia.
The period of 2015
and
later will be characterised in this region by the widespread use of
long range weapons, such as cruise missile armed aircraft and
submarines, air delivered smart munitions, and supporting air
capabilities such as tanker aircraft and Airborne Early Warning and
Control (AEW&C) Aircraft. Therefore, a
critical strategic imperative for Australia will be to have and
present the ability to decisively and rapidly defeat any opponent
armed with modern high technology weapons, especially long range high
performance fighter aircraft, cruise missiles and smart munitions.
An important
strategic consideration for Australia is that as the
military reach of nations in Asia expands, and their militaries
become more capable, and better educated and trained, Australia will
need to adopt a far more dynamic model for developing and maintaining
military capabilities compared to past decades. Australia will also
need to systematically benchmark its own capabilities, and planned
capabilities, against a range of regional capabilities, to minimise
risks to Australia and its interests.
Full implementation of
China's “Second
Island Chain” and “String of Pearls” strategies and
associated force structure elements will provide China with
significant coercive striking capability against Australia, as well
as the capability to project power into Australia's sea-air gap.
As a result, China's strategic
agendas will clash with
Australia's long established strategic agenda of maintaining control
of the air and sea over the north of the continent, and the sea-air
gap. Australia must face this matter as a priority in its national
military strategy and its force structure.
Given the strategic overstretch of the United
States, a key strategic consideration for Australia is that there is no
guarantee at present that the US will make the necessary investments
in force structure to retain its long term strategic position in the
Western Pacific region. As a result, the deterrent capabilities the
US could apply in the past may no longer be effective, leaving US
allies like Japan and Australia largely exposed and having to rely on
their own capabilities in any future regional conflict of any
substance.
Operating
directly from bases on the Asian mainland, long range bombers armed
with cruise missiles and submarines armed with cruise missiles or
ballistic missiles will have the capability to hold at risk most
potential targets of interest in Northern Australia. Many such
systems will be capable of also threatening Australian population
centres along the southern and south-eastern coastlines.This
is the most profound change in Australia's strategic circumstances
since the 1940s.As a
result, Australia should centre its future
military strategy on “regional denial” with the aim of
denying operations in the sea-air gap, above and around the
Australian continent, and also denying the basing of combat forces
and facilities in the northern archipelago.
Current and future
capabilities
for the RAAF will need to be focussed in
persistent air dominance and the related
capability to kill cruise missiles and their launch platforms;
providing long range strike capabilities with sufficient
weight of fire to render regional basing unusable in combat; and
enhanced maritime
patrol and Anti-Submarine Warfare capabilities.
Current
and future capabilities for the RAN will also need to be
refocussed. Anti-Submarine Warfare must be prioritised, requiring
surface combatants and submarines which are suitable for this task
and sufficiently numerous. Organic cruise missile
defences for surface
warships and escorted shipping will be required.
Current
and future capabilities for the Army will need to include Surface to
Air Missile, and in the future Directed Energy Weapon, defences
against cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and other guided weapons,
to protect critical military and industrial infrastructure, and
population centres. The Army will also need to assume responsibility
for protecting such targets against Special Forces attack. Sufficient
capabilities should be also be available to covertly deploy,
sustain and extract useful numbers of Infantry and Special Forces
troops across the region.
Introduction
Australia
is at an important strategic crossroad. If the right choices are
made, Australia can enjoy a strong strategic position in the
Asia-Pacific-Indian region, with all of the benefits that entails. If
the wrong choices are made, Australia's strategic position in the
region will continue to decline, with all of the risks and costs that
entails.
Inevitably,
the question must arise as to what these right choices are, in terms
of national military strategy and in terms of the ADF force structure
and capabilities required to execute that strategy.
Strategy
is inherently a very long term game of positioning. Those involved
develop capabilities which provide them with the ability to perform
specific tasks, or deny opponents opportunities to perform specific
tasks. Those specific tasks vary widely, as widely as the spectrum of
military operations seen in conflicts between nation states, and more
recently, conflicts with non-state entities.
For
Australia, the basic strategic calculus is simple: what strategy and
force structure provides the most robust strategic position in our
region, yet does not incur unreasonable material expenditures,
is not too confronting to our neighbours, nor imposes unwanted
constraints upon other military options on the global stage?
Much
of the public strategy debate in Australia since 9/11 has been
dominated by the idea that the Global War
On Terror is a genuine
existential threat to Western civilisation and indeed to Australia,
and that this conflict with its global deployment demands must take
priority over other strategic needs.
There
is little doubt that the intent of the Islamofascist movements that
are at the core of the GWOT is to be an existential threat to the
West, and to be treated as such. This ambition is however not matched
by capabilities. Since 9/11 the Islamofascist revolutionary warfare
movements have taken significant losses, especially in leadership
cadres, and in territory controlled or owned. Key strategic aims,
such as the toppling of secular governments in the Islamic world,
have not been achieved and are much further out of reach today than a
decade ago.
The
only circumstance under which Islamofascism can be considered to be a
genuine existential threat to Western civilisation is should these
movements gain access to robust nuclear and biological weapons
capabilities – and delivery systems. A dozen nuclear bombs is
not enough to bring down Western civilisation, or any major nation
state power bloc for that matter. Hundreds of nuclear weapons would be
required for that purpose. The notion that Islamofascist terrorist
movements will be able to acquire, maintain and deploy such numbers
of nuclear weapons, even with the active support of like minded
nation states such as Iran, is difficult to accept.
What
is abundantly clear is that Western civilisation will need to
continue this conflict until Islamofascism burns itself out, just as
1930s fascism and Soviet communism did. For Australia this conflict
cannot be the primary focus of national strategic policy and force
structure planning. At best it is a secondary priority.
Another
theme which has occupied disproportionate attention in Australia's
public debate on strategy is the “Arc of Instability”
which spans developing nations from the Middle East through to the
Pacific island nation states. Australia has had little choice other
than to commit military and civilian personnel to a number of peace
enforcement, peace keeping and stabilisation operations over the last
decade.
In
grand strategic terms, the “Arc of Instability” and the
GWOT share one common set of features. They are products of the post
Cold War world in which the competitive purchasing of allegiances by
the West and the Soviet Bloc through economic and military aid, a
practice which pervaded the four and a half decades of the Cold War,
has vanished to the detriment of the economies of nations which were
recipients of such material support. This has been exacerbated by the
effects of globalisation, where increasingly, wealth has concentrated
in nations with developed economies and institutions. Developing
nations which were able to sustain themselves during the Cold War era
are more than often unable to maintain themselves, creating power
vacuums which have been filled by a range of political, religious,
ethnic/tribal movements or groupings.
Internal
conflicts and institutional collapses across the “Arc of
Instability” are not an existential threat to Australia,
although they may produce strategic opportunities for other nation
states to improve their strategic position within Australia's area of
geographical interest.
As
is the case with the GWOT, Australia will need to continue its
involvement in operations intended to stabilise nations or localised
regions which are suffering internal problems across the “Arc
of Instability”, and maintain
required capabilities. Similarly, such conflicts cannot be the
primary focus in Australia's national strategic policy and force
structure planning. At best such operations are another secondary
priority.
The
biggest strategic issue Australia must grapple with is the industrialisation
of Asia and the resulting military growth,
especially in long range weapon systems capable of reaching
Australian territory or its geographical areas of interest.
At
the end of the Cold War in 1991, there were four major centres of
gravity in the global economic machinery. These were the United
States, the European Union, Japan and the rapidly disintegrating
Soviet Comecon Bloc. Most of the world's economic activity and wealth
were being generated and concentrated in these four nodes.
The
world is very different now. The United States and the European
Union remain as major centres of gravity in the global picture, the
Soviet Bloc has effectively dissolved, but North East Asia has
replaced it as a significant centre of gravity. The industrialisation
of Japan has peaked, South Korea is approaching its peak, while China
and other Far Eastern nations have yet to peak. India is following
much the same pattern as nations in North East Asia.
In
the most basic sense, what we are observing now is an ‘Arc of
Industrialisation’ stretching from South Asia to Japan, in much
the same pattern observed in North America and Europe a century ago:
industrialisation produces national wealth, which is invested into
national economies, infrastructure, institutions, military forces and
national education.
The
“end state” of this industrialisation process is a
“modern” nation state with well developed infrastructure,
economy, institutions, military forces and a well educated
population.
There
is little doubt that much of what is fuelling this growth in Asia are
individual and national ambitions of becoming “like the West”
- or in simpler terms, becoming wealthy, comfortable, secure and
globally respected.
The
path to this end state was not an easy one for the West, involving
two World Wars, a four and a half decade long Cold War, and the moral
abominations of Fascism and Communism along this path.
The
notion that Asia can arrive at the same end state as the West, but
without the kind of turmoil seen during the twentieth century is
optimistic, but it is also a goal which should be actively sought by
Asian nations and the West alike.
The
scale and patterns of military spending across Asia since the end of
the Cold War are much more indicative of the type of unfettered
nationalism-driven competitive arms race which helped produce the two
World Wars in Europe.
The
pivotal strategic consequence of this, for Australia, is that nations
in Asia are acquiring and deploying capabilities which, for the first
time since the 1940s, will provide the ability to strike at
Australian territory and within Australia's regional area of
interest.
The
most important strategic imperative for Australia in coming decades
will be to acquire and maintain military capabilities which make the
prospect of military conflict with Australia unattractive to any
nation in Asia.
Asia's "Arc of
Industrialisation" presents
a
parallel trend to the "Arc of Instability", a term coined by Prof Paul
Dibb some years ago. What we are observing in Asia is analogous in one
sense to what we observe in North America and Europe - wealthy
industrialised nations neighboured by poor agrarian and pre-industial
nations, the latter more than often with weak institutions and domestic
movements
or groups contesting the power of the nation state.
Military
Capability Growth in Asia
Much
has been written and said about military capability growth in Asia
over recent years. More than often it is described as “modernisation”
and uncritically accepted as no more than the natural evolutionary
process of replacing obsolete equipment with new equipment.
This
view of what has happened in many parts of Asia has proven very
popular but it is at the most fundamental level, deeply misleading.
This is because obsolete equipment is mostly being replaced with new
equipment of more than often fundamentally different capability.
Frequently we observe equipment designed for local area defensive
operations being replaced with equipment built to project power and
the associated destructive effect over a much greater range. This has
been observed both in naval fleets and air forces across Asia.
When
the Soviet Union collapsed, only two nations with a military presence
in Asia had the capability to deliver nuclear or conventional attacks
of substance over distances of well over a thousand nautical miles.
These nations were the United States and the Soviet Union.
Less
than two decades later, several nations in Asia have the ability to
deliver strikes, using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or air
delivered guided bombs, over distances of well over a thousand
nautical miles.
This
is a fundamental and profound change in where the region sits in the
global constellation of military power.
Several
capabilities are becoming prominent as a result:
Air
Launched Cruise Missiles: China, Pakistan and India have programs
based on indigenous and/or Russian missile technology. China has several designs and
is developing the indigenous H-6K Badger
bomber
to carry such missiles to targets at ranges well beyond 2,500
nautical miles.
Sub/Ship
Launched Cruise Missiles: China and India have programs based on
indigenous and/or Russian missile technology. The Russian Club /
SS-N-27 Sizzler has been supplied to both nations, and will likely
be
supplied to most nations procuring Russian submarines.
Ballistic
Missiles: China, North Korea, India and Pakistan have a range of ballistic missile programs,
spanning tactical, intermediate/theatre
and in some instances, strategic range categories. China is expanding
its fleet of ballistic missile armed submarines, equipped with the
JL-2 SLBM.
Long
Range Strike Aircraft: Russian designed Sukhoi
Su-27/30 Flanker
family fighter aircraft are becoming the most numerous type in the
region, and with aerial refuelling support these aircraft can easily
strike targets at ranges beyond 1,000 nautical miles. China and India
have negotiated with the Russians for surplus long range Tupolev Bear
and Backfire aircraft, although none
has been exported to date. China
is developing its indigenous H-6K Badger bomber.
Aerial
Refuelling Tanker Aircraft:China,
India, Japan and Singapore
have procured a range of different aerial refuelling aircraft. These
can extend the reach of fighters and bombers well beyond 1,000
nautical miles.
Fixed
Wing Aircraft Carriers: India is currently recapitalising its
aircraft carrier fleet and embarked air wings, the latter with the
MiG-29K Fulcrum. China is refurbishing the former Soviet Varyag and
procuring a wing of Su-33
Flanker D strike fighters.
There
can be no doubt that these nations are emulating the United States'
and former Soviet models for the long range projection of coercive
striking power. The success of the United States in air wars since
1991 has presented a clear template for nations in Asia to follow.
While
China and India are clearly the most prominent in the quantities and
the sophistication of long range weapons procured, planned or
deployed, they are also seen as “trend setters” in Asia,
and their acquisitions have been and will be emulated, relative to
budgetary capacities, by smaller nations in the region. The history
of Flanker fighter sales across Asia is an excellent example. The
Kilo class SSK is another.
The
trend to acquire weapons systems built to strike hard at increasingly
greater ranges is paralleled by increasing technological
sophistication in the types of weapons being acquired across Asia.
Russia's extensive and capable
defence industry has played a major
role in this, both as an exporter of equipment, services and
munitions, and as provider of basic technology for collaborative
and/or licenced manufacturing programs.
Driven
by market demand, Russian industry has aimed to develop and refine a
wide range of capabilities, many of which are specifically designed
to symmetrically or asymmetrically frustrate or defeat key US and
other Western capabilities.
US
precision guided bomb and cruise missile capabilities are now being
countered by a wide range of guided
missiles, and the development of
directed energy weapons technology. In addition China has a well
established program to develop and deploy high power laser directed
energy weapons for this exact purpose.
US
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities are
being countered by a range of weapons, especially very long range
air-to-air missiles and surface
to air missiles. In addition, China
has developed and tested an anti-satellite weapon based on the
DF-21/JL-2 ballistic missile airframe, and has experimented with high
power laser directed energy weapons for this purpose.
While
the compilation of detailed and exact statistics is, at times,
tedious, there is more than ample evidence to show that both
the numbers and sophistication of modern weapon systems deployed
across Asia, or being procured, challenges and in many categories
exceeds the capabilities deployed by the Soviets and Warsaw Pact
nations in Europe at the end of the Cold War. This is especially true
of top tier fighter aircraft like the Flanker, cruise missiles, and
smart munitions. As many of these programs have yet to fully mature
and complete deployment, the final tally will comfortably exceed the
Cold War end state capability.
What
is clear beyond any doubt or dispute is that the period of 2015 and
later will be characterised in this region by the widespread use of
long range weapons, such as cruise missile armed aircraft and
submarines, air delivered smart munitions, and supporting air
capabilities such as tanker
aircraft and Airborne Early
Warning and
Control (AEW&C) Aircraft.
A
critical strategic imperative for Australia will be to have and
present the ability to decisively and rapidly defeat any opponent
armed with modern high technology weapons, especially long range high
performance fighter aircraft, cruise missiles and smart munitions.
With India recapitalising its aircraft
carrier fleet, and China developing a fleet, regional nations are
gaining genuine power projection capabilities across the region.
Depicted Russian Sukhoi
Su-33 Flanker D fighters on a carrier flight deck (KnAAPO).
Regional
Strategic Risks
It
is fashionable in some analytical communities to treat strategic
risks in Asia in a piecemeal fashion, by looking at specific
historical disputes, current or ongoing disputes, and potential
disputes between specific nations. While there is some merit in
exploring such specific cases, this approach can rapidly lose sight
of the larger picture in such a geographically extensive, culturally
diverse, complex and rapidly evolving region.
Asia
parallels Europe in the reality that almost every nation has, over
time, been embroiled in various disputes or even armed conflict, over
territorial boundaries, with its neighbours. The neo-Clausewitzian
perspective is that this behaviour is characteristic of nation states
and is thus an unavoidable but ugly reality.
Industrialised
nations survive on resources and energy to feed their industries, and
on markets for their products. Many, and arguably most of the wars
observed between Western nations during recent centuries have
directly or indirectly revolved around competition for access to
resources and/or markets. While some conflicts have presented as
disputes over ideology, the Cold War being the prime example, the
ideology itself was more than often little more than a facade to
conceal greed for material resources and population access i.e.
markets.
With
the depletion of easily accessible
fossil fuels due to sharply rising
global demand, security of energy resources will become an
increasingly important consideration for Asia's strategic planners.
Whether we are dealing with crude oil, natural gas, or coal derived
products, industrialised nations have a long history of conflict over
security of energy supplies.
Security
of supply of raw materials for manufacturing economies has followed a
similar pattern to disputes over energy resources, and Europe's
abundance of coal to fuel its manufacturing economy over much of the
last two centuries has tended to skew the relative importance of raw
materials versus energy supply.
Competition
over access to markets has also been a factor in a range of disputes
over recent centuries.
The
notion that an industrialised Asia, with its fundamental dependency
on imported energy, raw materials and its need for markets, will be
immune to the pressures which led to so many conflicts in the Western
world, can only be said to be optimistic.
A
good case study is presented by China and India, both of which have
been negotiating access to supplies of natural gas from Iran. Iran,
with its abominable human rights record, long running history of
sponsoring terrorism, and a defacto pariah state due to its nuclear
ambitions, could hardly be said to be a politically attractive
trading partner for India, a robust democracy, and to China,
preoccupied as it is with cultivating its public image on the global
stage. Yet both of these nations have been seeking access to Iran's
gas, in the full knowledge that revenue going to Iran will be used to
further Iran's ambitions for regional power.
China's
ongoing disagreements with Japan are often presented in the light of
Japan's lack of repentance for World War II activities in China, yet
the most prominent aspect of this dispute is competition over seabed
energy resources located along economic zone boundaries. The long
running multi-partite argument over the Spratley Islands fits a
similar pattern.
The
strong investment being made by both China and India in naval
capabilities, and long range air power, is characteristic of
perceived and/or actual strategic pressures to protect vulnerable
lines of supply for energy resources.
While
there is considerable potential for conflicts in Asia to arise over
ideological, religious and ethnic disputes, such as the long running
disputes between India and Pakistan, or North and South Korea, or
North Korea and Japan, or China and Taiwan, the greatest risk of
escalated conflict will arise where access to energy, raw materials
and markets will be at stake, as these are fundamental to the
economic wellbeing and, ultimately, the survival of industrialised
nation states in a highly competitive globalised economy.
This
analysis looks at this problem from the perspective of “strategic
risk”, rather than the more traditional model of “threat”.
The threat based view of strategic problems is predicated upon the
equation of “threat = capability + intent”. This approach
to looking at strategic problems was well suited to situations like
the Cold War, where the Soviet Bloc had both capabilities and a
declared intent which was essentially hostile to Western
civilisation, and neither of these circumstances changed
fundamentally between 1945 and 1991.
Asia
presents a far more dynamic reality for coming decades. Economies
will grow, military capabilities will grow commensurately, strategic
agendas and interests will change, as will alignments and alliances.
Intent will therefore change continuously, and cannot be reliably
predicted even in the shorter term.
It
is unlikely that we will ever see a simple strategic picture as
during the Cold War, of two monolithic and mutually opposed blocs,
with overtly stated intent, and diametrically opposed ideological and
philosophical views of the world.
The
important strategic consideration for Australia is that as the
military reach of nations in Asia expands, and their militaries
become more capable, and better educated and trained, Australia will
need to adopt a far more dynamic
model for developing and maintaining
military capabilities compared to past decades. Australia will also
need to systematically benchmark its own capabilities, and planned
capabilities, against a range of regional capabilities, to minimise
risks to Australia and its interests. In pragmatic terms, Australia
needs to adopt much the same model of strategic planning and
capability development practiced by the United States during the Cold
War, where capabilities which altered the strategic balance were
systematically and rapidly countered to minimise strategic risks.
One of the critical byproducts of the
transformation of military capabilities across Asia is that older short
range weapon systems are being replaced by systems with significantly
greater reach, which for the first time since the 1940s places
significant portions of Australian territory and its area of interest
under the footprint of foreign military air forces. The depicted
footprint labelled "Cruise Missile Armed Bombers" is representative of
types such as the Xian H-6K turbofan Badger and Tupolev Tu-22M3
Backfire. The coverage depicted for the Flanker excludes aerial
refuelling support. Greater reach has coincided with a greater economic
dependency in Australia upon energy and mining resources across the
north and north-west of the continent (C. Kopp).
While
most of the trends in economic and military growth observed across
Asia are generally true for all nations actively pursuing
industrialisation of their economies, China deserves additional
discussion for a number of important reasons.
The
first is that China has made the greatest investment in force
structure of any nation in Asia, and has embarked on constructing a
military machine which is clearly intended to rival that of the
United States in Asia.
The
second is that China has a well developed national military strategy
and associated force structure plan, which has been well articulated
and is being followed meticulously.
The
third is that China presents a major strategic risk of future
conflict in the region. This is due to China’s stated intent to
use force to seize Taiwan, backed by the size of its military with
its increasing technological capabilities, which could result in a
major conflagration should hostilities arise.
Much
has been said about the “rise of China” and its
transformation from an agrarian economy to a major industrial
powerhouse and military power on the global and regional stages.
Predictions of China's future economic and military growth vary
widely.
Factors
which favour ongoing long term growth include an increasingly well
educated population, which is highly industrious and mostly cohesive
and nationalistic, as well as a shared national ambition to become a
major economic and military power on the regional, if not global
stage.
Factors
which will impede long term growth include high levels of dependency
on foreign markets, these including investment funding, a
communist era legal code with underdeveloped property law and poor
provisions for managing debts and civil disputes, and a communist era
public service bureaucracy which will increasingly have to confront
the complexities of managing a modern economy and nation state.
In
a sense China's rise parallels that of Germany during the 1930s, as
it has been fuelled by foreign investment borrowings and massive
industrial growth, resulting in unprecedented levels of urbanisation
and demonstrably, social dislocation.
China
confronts a range of internal risks, associated with its economy,
infrastructure, internal institutions, disaffected minority ethnic
and religious groups, and deep and pervasive mismatches between its
communist era machinery of state, and its increasingly modern
capitalist economic system.
The
Communist Party leadership's obsessive preoccupation with Taiwan
represents an unnecessary distraction from solving far more important
problems centred in China's development of modern governance systems
and a more representative system of government.
Many
scenarios can be developed for how China could become embroiled in
conflicts with its neighbours and/or the United States. The common
thread which runs through all of these scenarios is that as China's
military power increases relative to the US and other regional
nations, there is an increasing risk that a future Chinese leadership
group may perceive the use of force as a viable choice in foreign
policy.
A
detailed discussion of China's military growth and strategic thinking
exceeds the scope of this paper. Several fundamental factors are,
however, of importance.
The
first is that China has defined a strategy for developing and
deploying its military capabilities within the region. This is the
“Second Island Chain” strategy which aims to deny the use
of, or access to, basing which could be used to attack, bombard or
blockade China during time of conflict. The “Second Island
Chain” runs through Japan, the Marianas, Papua New Guineau,
Northern Australia, Indonesia and the Andaman Islands. Targets along
the “Second Island Chain” sit at radii between 1,500 and
2,500 nautical miles from basing in mainland China.
China
has been developing a range of capabilities intended to support the
“Second Island Chain” strategy.
The first of these is a
robust force of ground launched, highly
mobile intermediate range
ballistic missiles, of which a good proportion will be fitted with
terminal guidance making them accurate enough to attack air bases,
naval task forces, naval bases and fixed military infrastructure within
the “Second Island Chain”.
The second of these is a land
attack cruise missile capability, deployed on mobile launchers,
submarines and combat aircraft. While less mature than the ballistic
missile capability, China's cruise missile forces present a greater
long term risk as they are more difficult to detect, track and
intercept than ballistic missiles, and will be more accurate and more
flexible in deployment. China has intentions of deploying a theatre
range bomber force armed with cruise missiles, using the H-6K Badger
and/or imported Tu-22M3 Backfire and Tu-95MS Bear bombers.
The third capability
intended to support the “Second Island Chain” strategy is a robust
force of conventional and nuclear powered submarines, armed with
torpedoes, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. The Shkval
supercavitating torpedo has also been acquired to arm the PLA submarine
force.
The fourth capability in
advanced deployment is a force of up to 500 or more variants of the
Russian designed Su-27SK/SKM/Su-30MKK Flanker fighter bomber, supported
by aerial refuelling tanker aircraft and indigenous Airborne Early
Warning and Control aircraft. These fighters would be used to deny
an
opposing air force access into Chinese littorals and mainland airspace,
as well as providing additional strike capability beyond 1,500 nautical
miles using aerial refuelling.
The fifth capability which
is clearly intended to support the “Second Island Chain” strategy is a
planned number of aircraft carrier battle groups, the first of which is
intended to be built around the former Soviet Varyag, and an air wing
of around 50 Su-33D Flankers.
Other extant capabilities
are being expanded and upgraded. China has more
than 200 military or
dual use airfields, of which a large proportion are semi-hardened
(to
baseline Warsaw Pact standards), hardened, and more than a dozen are
“superhardened” using underground hangars and auxiliary takeoff strips.
A major superhardened submarine base
is reported to be under
construction in Southern Hainan Island, Hainan hosting already six
military or dual use airfields, one of which qualifies as superhardened.
The
“Second Island Chain” strategy is supported by a further
strategy, often labelled the “String of Pearls” strategy,
whereby China via military and economic aid cultivates regional
nations along the “Second Island Chain” to deny basing to
other nations, or to gain basing for PLA assets. The extensive
military infrastructure constructed in Myanmar (Burma) is consistent
with this model. The cultivation of East Timor, and some Pacific
Island nations, via economic aid, is also consistent with this model.
There
is little doubt that China sees its principal strategic competitor in
Asia to be the United States. The preoccupation with defeating
specific US capabilities, and the “Second Island Chain”
and “String of Pearls” strategies are both centred on
denying the US basing which could be used in a conflict against
China, and defeating those key US capabilities which have been
central to US victories in recent conflicts. In addition, these
capabilities provide significant coercive and deterrent capability
against India and Japan, both of whom China has at various
times
considered regional competitors.
China's
military growth is of pivotal strategic importance to Australia for a
variety of reasons.
One
is that China may opt at some stage to challenge the US presence in
Asia, so as to surround itself with compliant smaller nations as a
strategic buffer. Arguably this is an established aim of current
strategy.
Another
is that China's unrelenting military growth will continue to
stimulate military growth across Asia, resulting in ever increasing
capabilities across Asia as smaller nations seek to counter perceived
or real coercive capabilities deployed by China's PLA.
Perhaps
the most important is that full implementation of the “Second
Island Chain” and “String of Pearls” strategies and
associated force structure elements will provide China with
significant coercive striking capability against Australia, as well
as the capability to project power into Australia's sea-air gap.
In
pragmatic terms, China's strategic agendas will clash with
Australia's long established strategic agenda of maintaining control
of the air and sea over the north of the continent, and the sea-air
gap. Australia must face this matter as a priority in its national
military strategy and its force structure, as diplomatic posturing
will become totally irrelevant if a future Chinese leadership chooses
to exercise its military options against Australia.
Hainan Island is a critical element in the
'Second Island Chain'
strategy, as it would provide basing for combat aircraft and submarines
operating into
the Indonesian Archipelago, the Australian 'Sea Air Gap', and the
approaches to Guam. Hainan Island has six airfields, three are
semihardened / hardened fighter bases, and three are dual use civil
airports, two of which have 11,000 ft runways capable of accommodating
long range aircraft. Burma with four runways which exceed 11,000 ft
length supplements Hainan Island, covering the Western arc out of South
East Asia through the Andaman Islands. A major underground submarine
base is now under construction at
the southern tip of Hainan Island (Map - C. Kopp).
The PLA-AF fighter base at
Feidong in the Nanjing MR [Click for more ...] is a good example of the design of a
'superhardened' fighter base. The primary runway , available for
takeoffs and landings, has a wide full length parallel taxiway to
enable
recoveries in the event of damage. An auxiliary take-off only alert
runway is directly connected to the underground hangar entrance,
allowing the fighter to roll out of the tunnel, line up, open the
throttles and take off quickly. The PLA invested considerable thought
into planning its network of 'superhardened' fighter bases, usually
placing the runways behind a hill or mountain, relative to the threat
axis. Another good example of such a base is at Yinchuan [Click for more ...] in the Beijing MR. While modern smart
weapons have diminished the effectiveness of such base designs, they
still present genuine challenges in targeting and achieving robust
weapons effects (US DoD).
Andersen
AFB, at the northern tip of Guam in the Marianas island chain, is a
strategically critical basing site for the US Air Force in the West
Pacific (WESTPAC) region. With the large scale proliferation of a
precision guided munitions in the region, including cruise missiles and
terminally guided ballistic missiles, the absence of modern hardening
measures, a weakness shared by other US basing in the region and
RAAF basing in the north of Australia, presents a major
survivability issue for this base in any escalated regional contingency
(US Air
Force image).
The
United States Presence in Asia
The
United States has been the dominant power in Asia since the defeat of
Japan in 1945. During that period the US had a large network of naval
and air bases across the Pacific, constructed to support the aerial
bombardment, naval blockade and eventually, the planned but never
executed invasion of the Japanese home islands.
Much
of this basing infrastructure remained in use through the Cold War,
and was employed extensively during the Korean War and Vietnam
conflict. Since the end of the Cold War, and the subsequent Base
Realignment And Closure (BRAC) program, the US basing infrastructure
in the Far East has been reduced. The single largest loss in
capability resulted from the US withdrawal from the Philippines,
which saw the loss of both Clark AFB and the Subic Bay naval base, as
well as a wide range of other supporting facilities.
At
this time the United States has a permanent basing presence at only a
modest number of sites in the region:
Andersen
AFB, Guam, and Naval Base, Guam, in the Marianas. These are the
remaining elements in the large cluster of airfields and supporting
infrastructure in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
(CNMI), including the basing on Tinian and Saipan islands. Training
facilities at Saipan, Rota, Tinian and Saipan Harbour are available
for US military usage.
Osan
Air Base, Pusan Anchorage and 2nd Infantry Div basing in
South Korea. These are the remainder of more extensive basing
developed during the Korean War and sustained through the Cold War.
Okinawa,
in the Ryukyu Islands, Japan. Okinawa hosts Kadena AFB, and a
range of US Marine Corps basing and training areas.
Misawa
and Yokota AFBs, Atsugi, Yokosuka and Sasebo Naval Facilities, Japan. This
basing is primary to provide logistical support for
US forces in
Asia, although the Yokosuka is used to home port US aircraft
carriers.
Hickam
AFB and Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Hickam provides permanent basing
for fighter and transport aircraft, and the Kenney Warfighting
Headquarters facility. Pearl provides basing and a shipyard.
Elmendorf
and Eielson AFBs in Alaska. These bases host a range of
aircraft,
including fighters, tankers and AEW&C aircraft.
Until
recently, the US Navy's carrier battle groups provided a critical
component of US deterrent capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region.
Increasingly, these are becoming irrelevant in the face of developing
capabilities in Asia, especially capabilities being developed by
China.
Aircraft
carrier battle groups defended by F/A-18 Hornets and Super Hornets,
and guided missile cruisers and destroyers, will not have a credible
capability to defend themselves against saturation attacks by more
capable land based Flanker fighters, or cruise missile armed bombers
and submarines. The capabilities being developed and deployed across
Asia, especially those being developed and deployed by China, rival
or exceed the capabilities of the former Soviet
naval strike forces.
With the loss of the F-14 Tomcat fighter, the US Navy no longer has
the “outer air battle” capabilities
created during the
Cold War to defeat such threats.
While
the US Air Force has the highly capable B-2A Spirit bomber and the F-22A Raptor multirole fighter, and
will have the planned “New
Generation Bomber” post 2020, it faces several key problems in
maintaining its position in Asia.
The
first is that the United States does not have enough runways and
basing infrastructure across Asia to deploy credible strength in the
numbers needed to deal with anything beyond medium level
contingencies. A second associated problem is that what basing exists
is “soft” and highly vulnerable to attack
using smart
bombs, cruise missiles or terminally guided ballistic missiles. A
third associated consideration is that most basing within close range
of potential flashpoints, such as Taiwan, is within the footprint of
a wide range of weapons types.
A
factor underpinning problems with basing is that current US planning
is not providing for sufficient numbers
of F-22A Raptors to prevail
in any major conflict in Asia. This is exacerbated by block
obsolescence problems across much of the current US fighter, aerial
refuelling tanker and heavy bomber fleets. A further problem is that
the Joint Strike Fighter, of which
around 800 are planned for the US
Air Force, is completely unsuited
to the type of conflicts likely to
be seen in Asia. US efforts to recapitalise its Air Force fleets have
been frustrated repeatedly by strategic
overstretch, associated
budgetary problems arising from the Global War On Terror, and more
than often by political meddling by industry seeking to promote their
strategically irrelevant and less than capable equipment programs.
To claim that the United States
is a
“spent power” and “has lost its strategic
pre-eminence in Asia” is premature,
however this is a real and, therefore, significant risk. The
US has many options still available
to reclaim its strategic
advantage in Asia. However, these will need robust and rapid
investment, a major political challenge given the US budgetary
situation and continuing demands of the Global War on Terror.
Australian
Governments have long given lip service to the need for Australia to
develop a sound measure of self-reliance in combat and support
capabilities. This is to demonstrate Australia's willingness to pull
its weight in concert with its allies and to demonstrate a real
capability to conduct military operations in Australia's area of
interest should Australia's allies, especially the US, not be able to
provide support to Australia when needed. The developments that we
are seeing throughout our region make the need for genuine Australian
self-reliance much more urgent.
The
key strategic consideration for Australia is that there is no
guarantee at present that the US will make the necessary investments
in force structure to retain its long term strategic position in the
Western Pacific region. As a result, the deterrent capabilities the
US could apply in the past may no longer be effective, leaving US
allies like Japan and Australia largely exposed and having to rely on
their own capabilities in any future regional conflict of any
substance.
A major strategic problem the US faces is
block obsolescence across its fleet of Cold War era combat aircraft and
aerial refuelling tankers. The fiscal pressures of the protracted
Global War On Terror have severely impacted the recapitalisation of the
US Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps aircraft fleets. Current planning
for the US Air Force fighter fleet restricts the number of F-22A Raptor
fighter-bombers to around 180 aircraft, as a result of which it is
unclear that the US could retain air superiority in any
escalated contingency in Asia. The video shows F-22As on a bombing
exercise flying from Guam, the weapons deployed are GBU-32 JDAMs (US
Air Force).
Defining
a National Military Strategy
Recent Defence White Papers have
centred Australia's national military
strategy in the denial model, which essentially amounts to denying
any regional opponent control of the sea-air gap to the north of
Australia, control of airspace over the Deep North, and where
applicable, denying the use of air and naval basing in the
archipelago to the North.
This
is a sound model, born from the experience of World War II, when the
Japanese used the Indonesian archipelago to base bomber and fighter
aircraft used in attacks against Australian cities, ports, basing and
shipping in the North and the sea-air gap.
This
model is centred in the realities of Australia's geography, and
historically constrained by the capabilities of power projection
weapons such as bomber aircraft which were limited mostly to ranges
of the order of 1,000 to 1,500 nautical miles.
Much
has changed since the 1940s, and all of these changes have increased
the importance of focussing Australia's national military strategy on
the defence of the North and the
sea-air gap.
The
first change of pivotal importance has been the economic development
of the north and the continental shelf.
Australia's
resource industry now accounts for a very much larger fraction of
national export earnings than it did six decades ago, and much of
that industry is located in the North-West, the Northern Territory,
and Queensland. A regional opponent opting to shut down this industry
could inflict significant economic damage very quickly, and possibly
with long term impact if key infrastructure is heavily damaged.
Parallel
to the development of the mining industry, the oil and gas industries
have flourished across northern Australia. With major facilities at
the Burrup Peninsula and Barrow Island, exploiting North-West Shelf
oil and gas, and the development of the Timor Sea reserves via
facilities in the Northern Territory, Australia now has a major
export revenue source, and domestic energy supply source, centred in
the north. As with other components of the resources industry,
closure of the energy industry as a result of hostile military
operations could inflict significant loss of national revenue. A no
less important consideration is the increasing dependency of other
industries on gas supplied from the north. Western Australia has
suffered repeated economic losses across a range of industries as a
result of accidents impairing the flow of North West Shelf gas to
consumers across the state.
Tourism,
across the north of Australia and Queensland, has become another
important source of national revenue, and it is another industry
which would suffer heavily in any circumstance where sea and air
lanes in the North, as well as population centres, could be
threatened by military action.
Importantly,
many of these industries would have to shut down, or severely curtail
operations, were they to be subjected to the threat of air or cruise
missile attack, even if these were relatively small “harassment
raids”. The gas and oil industry is especially vulnerable to
attack by guided munitions and cruise missiles [1].
The
confluence of Australia's economic growth across the north, and
military growth across Asia, results in Australia becoming
increasingly exposed to the potential for coercive military
operations aimed at inflicting economic damage.
Unlike
the World War II and Cold War era, where a regional opponent would
have to base assets in the Indonesian archipelago to reach northern
Australia, many of the capabilities now deploying in Asia and/or
planned for deployment can bypass this geographical constraint
completely.
Operating
directly from bases on the Asian mainland, long range bombers armed
with cruise missiles and submarines armed with cruise missiles or
ballistic missiles will have the capability to hold at risk most
potential targets of interest in Northern Australia. Many such
systems will be capable of also threatening Australian population
centres along the southern and south-eastern coastlines.
This
is the most profound change in Australia's strategic circumstances
since the 1940s, and a change which must be reflected in national
military strategy and force structure planning, if the Australian
Defence Force is to have any future relevance to the national
defence.
A
question often asked is whether any capabilities the Australian
Defence Force could deploy and operate could actually make a real
difference, were Australia confronted by the upper tier of regional
capabilities in a conflict.
Australian exports by industry. The mining
and energy sectors represent an important source of export revenue for
the Australian economy, a trend which is likely to increase over time
especially as global demand for energy soars, and further energy
resources are developed (Chart by Australian Bureau of Statistics).
Western Australia and Queensland generate
most of the nation's export revenue through mining, including ores,
minerals, coal, oil and gas. The growth in this industry sector across
the north of the continent has resulted in a major economic
vulnerability to disruption (Chart by Australian Bureau of Statistics).
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (above) and
F/A-18F Super Hornet (below) are both completely unsuited to the
strategic realities Australia must now confront. Neither aircraft has
the performance or survivability to confront the advanced Russian
designed fighter and missile systems now extant and also planned across
Asia. In practical terms these aircraft will only be viable for
training, close air support and counter-insurgency operations (US DoD
images).
This
is dependent upon two factors. The first is whether Australia invests
in the right type of capabilities to deal with such threats. The
second is that no regional nation can afford to bear significant
combat attrition in capabilities such as long range combat aircraft
or submarines, without losing much of its strategic potential. If
Australia invests robustly in capabilities which can inflict
significant combat attrition against hostile combat aircraft and
submarines, the cost of exercising coercive power against Australia
will be driven up significantly. If Australia's capabilities are seen
to be capable of inflicting serious attrition on such forces, a
deterrent effect will result.
In
strategic terms this means that Australia should centre its future
military strategy on “regional denial” with the aim of
denying operations in the sea-air gap, above and around the
Australian continent, and also denying the basing of combat forces
and facilities in the northern archipelago.
To
implement such a strategy, Australia will need to fundamentally
rethink its approach to air power, naval power and land force
capabilities.
Current
and future capabilities for the RAN will also need to be focussed in
two key areas. The first is in Anti-Submarine Warfare, requiring
surface combatants and submarines
which are suitable for this task
and sufficiently numerous. The second capability is in providing
organic cruise missile defences for surface
warships and escorted shipping.
Current
and future capabilities for the Army will need to include Surface to
Air Missile, and in the future Directed
Energy Weapon, defences
against cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and other guided weapons,
to protect critical military and industrial infrastructure, and
population centres. The Army will also need to assume responsibility
for protecting such targets against Special Forces attack. Another
important future role for the Army is providing covert insertion and
extraction means for Infantry and Special Forces operating across the
region. Sufficient capabilities should be available to deploy,
sustain and extract useful numbers of Infantry and Special Forces
troops.
These
are deep and fundamental changes against the hitherto planned
capabilities for the RAAF, the RAN, and the Army.
The
RAAF's currently planned F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter and F/A-18E/F
Super Hornet aircraft are essentially battlefield interdictors and
close air support fighters, and thus wholly unsuitable for the air
dominance and deep penetration strike roles. The number and size of aerial refuelling tankers planned
for the RAAF is completely
inadequate to credibly support persistent air dominance, cruise
missile defence and long range strike
operations.
The
RAN's currently planned Air
Warfare Destroyers are, by design,
focussed on long range air defence of Surface Action Groups,
rather than Anti-Submarine Warfare and cruise missile defence, and
are too few in number. More numerous and smaller surface combatants,
designed for Anti-Submarine Warfare and cruise missile defence, will
be required. A larger number of replacement submarines for the
Collins class will also be required, and given the range and
persistence requirements of the role, options such as nuclear
propulsion should be considered very carefully.
The
problem of Special Forces insertion, sustainment
and extraction will require a more appropriate
and complete solution, spanning fixed wing RAAF, RAN
submarine, and Army rotary wing capabilities, or other technological
alternatives. Similarly, the need to deploy and sustain army forces
to defend infrastructure against precision guided munitions attack
and special forces will require specialised new weapons, supporting
equipment and personnel. The Army Reserve, which has access to good
technological skills across the wider community, is a natural
candidate for operating and maintaining Surface to Air Missile
capabilities.
Other,
joint, capabilities will be required to support all three services in
performing these roles. Robust strategic, operational and tactical Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities will
be required. Strategic ISR will require a survivable airborne
component, as well as persistent airborne components such as
Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAV). High capacity networking and
digital communications capabilities will also be needed which
exceed
the simple expedient of additional satellite capacity. Electromagnetic hardening against
nuclear EMP and microwave attack
will also be necessary for critical Commonwealth computer and
communications facilities. A technical intelligence collection and
analysis capability of substance will be necessary. Specific
capabilities for the rapid recovery from attacks against the
infrastructure will also be necessary.
The
basing infrastructure of all three services, but especially that of
the RAAF, will need to be hardened to
withstand attack by precision
guided munitions. This is most important for infrastructure in the
north of Australia, and must encompass aircraft shelters, fuel
storage and replenishment, munitions storage and command, control
and
communications facilities. Other facilities, such as materiel
warehousing, need to be physically dispersed rather than physically
concentrated. The drive for cost efficiency in material handling and
storage is at odds with the military imperative of survivability, be
it against attack by guided weapons, special forces, or saboteurs.
A
major consideration, now of strategic importance, is the cumulative
impact of sustained long term deskilling, loss of talent, and
erosion
of professional mastery in the Australian Defence Organisation. No
matter how good a fundamental national military strategy and
resulting force structure might be, it will be ineffective if the
personnel base lacks the skills sets to execute it effectively and
sustain the required military capabilities.
The
strategic realities Australia will need to face over coming decades
cannot be solved by incremental changes to the force structure model
which has evolved since the Defence 2000 White Paper. Much of that
model has been constructed on an
ad hoc basis, or to reactively
address short term needs identified by the Global War On Terror. Produced with no regard for the strategic
direction in the Defence
2000 White Paper, the current force
structure plan is a basic impediment to
Australia developing the force structure and capabilities required to
maintain its relative strategic position in a much more challenging,
complex and dynamic region.
[1] An analogous argument can be made for closure of
sea and air lanes carrying other exports, and imports. Australia is
more dependent now on technological imports, and sustaining the
domestic economy would be difficult were these restricted or otherwise
impaired.
References and
Bibliography:
Kopp, Carlo,
Goon, Peter A.Inquiry
into Australia's Regional
Strategic Defence Requirements: Meeting the Regional Challenge, Submission,JSCFADT, 13th April, 2006. (PDF)
Kopp, Carlo,
Goon, Peter A. Inquiry
into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority: Attaining Air Superiority in the Region,
Submission,JSCFADT, 17th February, 2006. (PDF)
Kopp, Carlo,
Goon, Peter A. Inquiry into
Australia's Relationship with China: China's Rise as a Regional
Superpower, Submission,
SFADT , 10th April, 2005. (PDF)
Kopp C. and
Cobb A. - Parliamentary Submission - October 2003 - Evolving
Force (Submission
/ Rationale)
Kopp,
Carlo, Goon, Peter
A. Inquiry into Australia's Defence Relations with the
United States: The Cruise Missile Defence Problem, Submission,
JSCFADT , 6th April, 2005. (PDF)
![Australia's First Online Journal Covering Air Power Issues [ISSN 1832-2433]](APA-Title-Analyses.png "Australia's First Online Journal Covering Air Power Issues [ISSN 1832-2433]")
