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Updated: Sun Aug 29 16:43:38 UTC 2010
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APA NOTAMS ISSN 1836-7135
F-22: 187 Raptors is NOT Enough!
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Air Power
Australia - Australia's Independent Defence Think Tank
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Air Power Australia NOTAM
8th April, 2009
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| Contacts: |
Peter
Goon
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Carlo
Kopp |
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Mob:
0419-806-476 |
Mob:
0437-478-224 |
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The F-22 Raptor is the only US fighter
design with the stealth, speed and agility to defeat the new Russian
fighters and Surface to Air Missile systems, and their Chinese built
clones (US Air Force image).
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For some sixty five years the USA has
enjoyed air superiority. For the last fifty eight years the USA has had
air supremacy. There are precious few people left alive, civilians or
veterans, who have ever seen an airborne enemy on attack. We are now on
the verge of losing that strategic and tactical advantage.
With the growing hazards of fatigue failure affecting our F-15s, F-16s
and F/A-18s we are certain to see a constant and increasing loss of
these aircraft as the years go by. This is the same fate suffered by
all fighters from the Korean War onward, notably the F-4s and the
F-105s. It is inevitable. Nothing lasts forever and the stresses on
fighters, by the nature of their use in realistic training, add up
cumulatively until failure is inevitable.
Avoid stresses in training? That makes such training ineffective. I
cite less than satisfactory fighter employment prior to Top Gun and Red
Flag, and now the F-22 fleet is to be cut off at 187 aircraft. I do
hope people realize that does not mean all 187 will be available for
combat on any given day. Far from it.
The F-22 was built to achieve and maintain air dominance. It is an air
superiority fighter, and capable of penetrating the heaviest air
defences to also destroy opposing air defences and critical ground
targets. No other fighter in the world
can meet it on an even basis thanks to its superlative performance,
weapons system and stealth characteristics.
Will those traits mean that
we will never lose an F-22 in combat. Hardly. Clausewitz said it best:
“there is friction in war”. We used to call it an unlikely hit from a
“golden beebee”. Unpredictable things happen, and the statistical
realities of aerial combat cannot be escaped. Potential and actual
opponents of the US forces are doing their very best at this time to
negate the advantages of the F-22. All the common perils of flight,
disregarding risks in combat, apply to the F-22, as they do to any
other aerial vehicle.
Consider the closing days of World War II when Germany's Luftwaffe had
a terrific advantage in an excellent combat jet aircraft, the Me-262
Schwalbe. Yet Allied fighters, because of their numbers, shot them
down.
Vastly superior numbers of Allied fighters meant that there was
literally no safe haven for the fast jet. Could this happen to a single
F-22 or a flight of F-22s? Most enemies are not stupid; if they
were, combat would be a lot simpler.
Soviet fighter doctrine was replete with ploys and traps to seek to
ensure numerical superiority. You can wager any possible rival knows of
these tactics. You can also wager they study our tactics seeking out
our
vulnerabilities. Modern Russian doctrine, packaged into the support
sold with Russian fighters, is based largely on former Soviet and
current US fighter doctrine.
Strategy: America's war plans have always aimed at securing at least
air superiority. Maybe we can achieve it now - how long can we hold it,
say, in any one of a number of hot spots? Will we still be able to do
that five or ten years from now?
Mention has been made repeatedly of using the F-35 JSF as an air
superiority fighter. I differ with that premise. The F-35 lacks the
performance and the stealth to be effective as an air combat fighter.
It was designed to be a single seat bomber, not an air superiority
fighter or a deep penetrator.
For instance, some have cited the F-35's Electro-Optical Targeting
System (EOTS) as anti-air capable, as if it could overcome the F-35's
other basic limitations. Unfortunately, for an infrared sensor
to work it must have clear air; clouds occlude IR radiation. I tested
and flew the F-102A with its quite capable IRSTS. Excellent gear;
clouds rendered it useless.
What happens if the underperforming and understealthed F-35 meets two
or more enemy fighter aircraft of at least Su-27 Flanker
performance? Personally I believe the odds will be more like 4 or
6 to 2, but that is my own opinion, crediting the enemy with only going
for a sure bet.
It is only too true that America's long period of air dominance has
left its ground forces, and the Navy too, for that matter, lacking
experience as to what hostile air power can do when friendly forces are
inadequate as defenses. Who in general/flag officer rank has ever been
subject to air attack? Does anyone now in high office in the DoD have
an understanding of what hostile air power can do even lacking air
superiority? Skilled, determined men achieve remarkable results. The
men who felt the full force of enemy air in WW2 are long retired. How
many of our people spot a speck in the sky and wonder if it is friendly?
The Korean War had several enemy attempts that were quickly defeated.
The attacks in the Vietnam campaign were derisory. A US helicopter shot
down a biplane attempting to roll munitions out a door. Two US
Navy ships shot down two MiGs with missiles. Serbia, weak as far as air
power goes, produced some “lessons learned” except we failed to
eradicate the SA-6 missile battery sites and one precious F-117 was
lost through sheer disregard of the elements of security and surprise.
Shades of Vietnam and “going north” following the same routes
repeatedly. One would hope that simple lesson has been learned by now.
I am reminded of the pre-WW2 maneuvers where the rules would state “the
weather is bad and all the airplanes are grounded.” I just recently
attended an unclassified Red Flag briefing. One item was missing; there
were no ground forces columns involved. No armored forces operating
under hostile air forces. No support units, no troops on foot. I well
remember overseas missions where we would make mock daily attacks on
troops on the march or in bivouac in both Taiwan (ROC) and South Korea
(ROK). Our task was to catch them unawares - their task was to respond
quickly and properly. Our flying rules were those in actual combat - do
whatever worked best to catch them wide open. And we did and they
learned. So did we.
I understand some air is involved in the Army's Fort Irwin maneuver
exercises. I wonder how many times a full strike force is involved?
SEAD packages, plus a 16 ship strike force followed by another 16 ship
“clean-up” package shortly afterward. Full surprise of course, other
than the general warning “hostile aircraft are expected.” Paint balls
would make a good and legible substitute for cluster munitions. Their
colors could be chosen to reflect the type of munitions. I do think
such missions would be instructive to all armed forces.
Unfortunately I cannot come up with a practical and safe substitute for
air-launched sea-skimming supersonic anti-ship missiles targeting
aircraft carriers.
Lastly, I am reminded of Britain in the nineteen thirties, preparing
each year's defense budget. The continuing premise was “No hostile
action is anticipated for the next ten years.” They were almost
correct, and prevailed only by the skin of their teeth, once that
premise collapsed. It may have played out differently if not for the
extra year of preparation won by the Munich Agreement.
We do have existing defense commitments that involve the full faith and
credit of the United States of America. Will we be able to honor those
commitments or simply die trying because our forces are inadequate and
obsolescent?
Philosopher George Santayana summed this up so eloquently when he said
“Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it”.
Thus I maintain that a failure to produce a significant, meaningful
number of F-22s, using attainment and retention of air superiority
anywhere on the globe as the primary strategic criteria, would amount
to a tragic strategic error on the part of the United States of
America. It is an invitation to hostile action from other nation states
in a world which is increasingly competitive, and increasingly
concerned about a critical supply of natural resources.
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| CV: LtCol
Walt
“BJ” Bjorneby, USAF (Retd) |
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Related Reading
When America’s Stealth Monopoly Ends,
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Surviving the Modern Integrated Air
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The
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F/A-18E/F
Super
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Sukhoi
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F-22A
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Joint
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Air
Power Australia Website - http://www.ausairpower.net/
Air Power Australia Research and
Analysis - http://www.ausairpower.net/research.html
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