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Updated: Sun Aug 29 16:43:38 UTC 2010
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APA NOTAMS ISSN 1836-7135
THERE’S
THAT ‘M’ WORD AGAIN!
With
Particular Reference to the RAAF
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Air Power
Australia - Australia's Independent Defence Think Tank
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Air Power Australia NOTAM
12th
November,
2007
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| Contacts: |
Peter
Goon
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Carlo
Kopp |
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Mob:
0419-806-476 |
Mob:
0437-478-224 |
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The ‘M’
word (Maintenance) crops up in all sorts of odd places today. Recently,
it appeared in an advertisement for a Maintenance
Requirements Determination Manager in Defence Material Office (DMO),
a fair distance organisationally from where it is most needed.
The
job description was also somewhat puzzling:
‘---provide
and oversee engineering requirements in support of Maintenance
Requirements Determination, involving design review, approval
acceptance for non-significant maintenance requirements determination
tasks for (various) weapon systems.
Prepare
and issue Technical Management Plans and Planned Maintenance
Schedules, and should have a good understanding of technical
airworthiness.’
(APS
Level 6, up to $81,300.)
‘M’
has a long life. During the system design and development phases, ‘M’
forms part of a team which includes ‘E’ (Engineering),
‘R’ (Reliability), and ‘A’ (Availability). Together, their job is to
drive the design/development objectives
that ensure the weapon system produced meets its specified
operational requirements with minimum down-time and at lowest cost.
On the
introduction of a system, ‘M’ assumes a lead role over
the system’s operational life, under the monitoring and
guidance of, you guessed it, that powerhouse ‘E’
(Engineering), which establishes and varies the technical,
operational, and airworthiness standards that have to be met by ‘M’.
‘M’ must guide ‘S’ (Supply) to ensure that
only technically acceptable items are procured for use during
maintenance, and also state the times and places that spares are
needed to meet maintenance plans. These activities must be managed
by the user to ensure the timely visibility and control of
maintenance the RAAF must have to be able to assure maintenance
efficiency, safety, and technical airworthiness.
With
these functions and relationships firmly in place, an organisation
can be confident of operating a system effectively, efficiently,
economically, and safely.
‘M’,
however, together with several of his associates, ran into trouble
with the new management approaches that swept Australia some years
ago. Firstly, in Industry, ‘M’ was caught up in the
general rush towards downsizing, flattening of organisations, and
out-sourcing embraced by a ‘new management’ wave that was
influenced heavily by accountant and MBA ‘experts’. Their common
characteristics included:
- A lack of understanding of, or patience with, technology;
- An obsession with the ‘bottom line’, itself somewhat
querulous;
- A short-term planning focus;, and hence,
- A drive to achieve short-term business indicators that must
show some form of continuing ‘improvement’, mostly through a perceived
reduction in costs (generally through the departure/loss of experienced
staff).
‘M’
fitted into these new perceptions most uneasily. From being seen
traditionally as a sound investment in reliable and safe production
capability, it was now seen only as a cost to production that had to
be reduced, with little if any understanding of the long-term
implications. As a result, maintenance, technical training and
maintenance infrastructure became ‘non-core’ activities. Before long,
industry and public instrumentalities stopped training
engineers and technicians (especially apprentices), effectively
killing off the breeding grounds for both current and future
technicians, technology managers and that important element of the
powerhouse E (Engineering); namely, the practical Engineer.
Throughout
this management ‘evolution’, the RAAF was able to keep
the role and importance of ‘M’ in sharp focus and under
tight management. However, under the pressures of the Commercial
Support Program (CSP), the Defence Efficiency Review (DER) and its
sibling, the Defence Reform Program (DRP), structural changes that
included the disbandment of its Technical Services Branch and the
introduction of a ‘General Branch’, RAAF technical
functions were dispersed indiscriminately across multiple
organisational, functional, and financial interfaces. Visibility and
control of the technology being operated were largely lost, as were
the professional operational and engineering management skills sorely
needed for new capability projects.
As the
problems associated with inadequate visibility and control of
maintenance practices and standards became unacceptable, the RAAF
established recently within Air Force Office the position of
Director, Maintenance Policy and Planning-Air Force. While a good
start, structural problems remain that will frustrate the changes
that must be made if the objectives set for the Director are to be
achieved.
Today, the
RAAF sees its maintenance management function largely reduced within
DMO to a ‘line item’ in long-term ‘supply and
support’ contracts by overseas aircraft manufacturers. The
main drivers of such contacts are generally perceived as ensuring
reliable and sustainable logistics support, ‘managing’
risk by transferring it to the contractor, and achieving a perceived
cost saving. However, there are several problems with this approach:
- An aircraft manufacturer is not generally an expert in the
through-life support of his aircraft, except in inherent design and
structural areas. His organisation is focussed upon production and so
his facilities, processes, documentation, spares, skills, specialist
equipment and so on are not maintenance orientated. Some contractors,
however, are now taking up maintenance support contracts, sensing a
lack of technical and contractual expertise in the non-military
organisations now becoming responsible for supply/support contracts.
Because of their lack of technical knowledge and confidence, these
organisations include a significant legal staff to argue any
differences that might arise – processes guaranteed not to consider the
Service being supported when lengthy and expensive legal argument takes
place. Corporate/Legal considerations will always come first where
differences arise.
- Furthermore, the aircraft manufacturer makes little of an
aircraft apart from the structure. The systems and equipment installed
come from a wide range of suppliers who themselves rely upon other
suppliers. Support from an aircraft manufacturer will thus normally
include several levels of mark-up in costs, making it much more
expensive than it has been traditionally. The approach also obscures
visibility of maintenance and engineering information that should be
evaluated to identify the need or potential for local support.
- The supply/support contract philosophy is seen as reducing
the risk of default, but no contract can achieve this. If a contractor
defaults for any reason, the prime risk – that is, the impact upon the
readiness, responsiveness, flexibility, effectiveness, safety,
preparedness, and airworthiness of military aircraft operations – must
always be borne by the Service affected. DMO can only impose commercial
sanctions upon a defaulting contractor, or attempt to as a long and
expensive legal process takes over. This is no substitute for
self-reliance!
- In addition, the likely demands for support can not be
foreseen easily over time, especially in terms of type, location, and
circumstances of operation, so the manufacturer must ensure that a
substantial ‘insurance’ loading is included in the contract to cover
these unknowns.
- Finally, there are ‘indirect’ costs inherent in all
supply/support contracts in terms of our local Defence Industry Base
and to Australia’s self-reliance. Every job exported results in a loss
not only of the work itself, but also the technical expertise that goes
with it. The resultant export of work and expertise makes Australia
dependent for its air power capability upon a foreign company operating
as a monopoly supplier, a parlous situation that was not allowed to
occur in over 70 years of RAAF management.
Traditional
RAAF Technical Services management not only provided visibility and
control of maintenance efficiency and technical airworthiness
standards, it established, through maintenance planning, the manpower
and skills, facilities, spares, support and test equipment,
documentation, and specialist training, indeed everything needed to
operate and support an aircraft in Australia from the date of its
introduction into service. Now, with all lines of maintenance, apart
from the lowest skill work at flight line level, coming under
supply/support contracts negotiated by DMO, primary responsibility
for most deficiencies in maintenance support, safety, and technical
air worthiness must reside with DMO and the contractor, not the Chief
of Air Force.
And Now
‘E’ ?
To date,
only ‘M’ has been discussed. It seems that DMO is now
considering adding ‘E’ (Engineering) support to its
supply/support contracts, much along the lines tried unhappily by US
forces during the 1980s and 1990s under a Total System Performance
Responsibility(TSPR) philosophy and contracting methodologies. These
contracts failed mainly through excessive cost (the ‘insurance
premium’) and an inability on the part of contractors to meet
the needs of dynamic Service operations. In effect, under this
approach, the contractor becomes the Technical Airworthiness
Authority, the far-reaching implications of which do not seem to have
been recognised by Defence planners, especially in DMO.
If
Australia goes down this path, we can look forward to:
- Further downsizing and de-skilling of the RAAF.
- Increased cost of ownership of our air power capabilities,
and an embedded long term inflexibility in financial management as the
financial tide ebbs and flows.
- A pervasive risk of reduced operational capability and
flexibility through unresponsive support.
- Further reductions in professional aerospace engineering
input to RAAF and Defence plans and programs.
- A marked, possibly total, withering of Australia’s Defence
Aerospace Industry.
- A critical reduction in Australia’s self-reliance
capabilities in the most critical area of Australia’s strategic need –
air power.
In
addition, we will have to change the phrased, Australia: The Smart
Country. Placing the control of sovereign assets into the hands
of
those who are non-Australian and live overseas is just plain stupid.
These
implications combine to impact Australia’s standing as a
significant contributor to stability and security, both in our region
and throughout the world.
In terms
of air power alone, if Government policy on the need for a sound
Defence Industry Base and a demonstrable measure of self-reliance is
to be implemented, it would be sensible to:
- Restructure the grossly inefficient organisational and
functional interfaces that exist, principally those between the RAAF
and DMO, to better reflect the supported/supporting relationships that
should exist. This must ensure that all new equipment analysis and
direct support activities come under direct Air Force Office (AFO)
management.
- Re-establish a Technical Services organisation within AFO
to provide Chief of Air Force with the technical visibility, control,
and coordination of all force elements to provide for the direction of
the RAAF as a force rather than a mixture of small, self-determining
force elements.
- Re-establish maintenance only units to free operational
units to concentrate on operations. This will also provide a breeding
ground for the technicians and engineers needed to run a modern air
force and provide professional input to RAAF and Defence plans.
- Re-skill the RAAF in all areas, and increase the level of
professional management by revising the ‘General List’ which, from
experience, can not be claimed as a success
Such changes will go far towards re-establishing the RAAF as a
skilled operator and proponent of high technology air power
capabilities. ‘M’, ‘R’, ‘A’,
‘S’, and ‘E’ all stand ready to do their part
once again, but they can do so only within a coherent system of RAAF
technical management.
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Related
Materials:
AIRCDRE Bates
G. -
ADA Defender - Autumn
2007
- Risking
the
Sustainment capability of the Air Force
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Footnote:
Ted
Bushell, AM is a retired Air Commodore with 35 years experience in
RAAF engineering, maintenance and new project management.
He joined the RAAF as an Engineering Apprentice in 1948 and left
the Service in 1983 following a career as an aeronautical engineer in
Unit, Command, and Air Force Office appointments. His final appointment
was as the last Senior Maintenance Staff Officer at Headquarters
Support Command, Melbourne.
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Power Australia Website - http://www.ausairpower.net/
Air Power Australia Research and
Analysis - http://www.ausairpower.net/research.html
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