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Updated: Sun Aug 29 16:43:38 UTC 2010
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APA NOTAMS ISSN 1836-7135
Numbers Matter:
Strategic Consequences of F-22 Termination
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Air Power
Australia - Australia's Independent Defence Think Tank
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Air Power Australia NOTAM
16th February,
2009
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| Contacts: |
Peter
Goon
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Carlo
Kopp |
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Mob:
0419-806-476 |
Mob:
0437-478-224 |
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The F-22A Raptor is the only US
fighter aircraft design in existence or planned which has the
capability to penetrate and survive the advanced air defence weapons
now proliferating globally. Unless the US deploys a minimum of 500-600
of these aircraft, it will lose the ability to access hostile airspace
with acceptable losses in aircraft and aircrew (US Air Force image).
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The Obama
Administration is in an invidious strategic position, which it
inherited from the preceding administration. Not only must it grapple
with the worst economic meltdown in recent memory, but also it must
prevail in the protracted Global War On Terror, and maintain America’s
long term strategic position that is critical to global stability. To
achieve the latter it must maintain and recapitalise the US fleet of
Cold War era combat aircraft, a task that is not simple given the
extent to which the Bush Administration neglected and arguably
mismanaged this effort.
Central to whether the US can maintain its global strategic posture is
having sufficient numbers of F-22 Raptor fighters, as the Raptor is the
only production combat
aircraft prior to the “2018 bomber / NGB” which
can operate and survive in advanced contemporary and emerging threat
environments. Evolutionary advancements in the technology used in
Russian and Chinese fighter aircraft, Surface to Air Missiles, and
supporting radar systems have made this so.
When the US Air Force launched the F-22 program over two decades ago,
it sought to deploy around 750 of these multirole fighters, to replace
over 600 F-15 variants and 60 F-117A stealth fighters. At that time the
F-22’s stealth capabilities and performance were specified to defeat a
projected future Soviet air defence threat. Two decades later that
exact threat capability has materialised - exactly as then predicted by
USAF technological strategists – but on the global stage, rather than
the territories of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.
The common catchcry of F-22 critics that the aircraft is “designed to
defeat an non-existent Soviet threat” is little more than a convenient
deception: these threat capabilities do now exist but are being
exported globally, making it very likely that the US will have to soon
confront them in combat, as compared to the defunct scenario of
fighting WW3 against the Soviets.
The Bush Administration’s SecDef Donald Rumsfeld arbitrarily chopped
the F-22 program down to 180 aircraft. Subsequently, DepSecDef Gordon
England, and his supporters conducted a systematic campaign to promote
the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) over the F-22A Raptor,
and to entrench the Rumsfeld edict. This campaign was characterised by
intimidation and political bullying - many good men who questioned this
unstated policy experienced unplanned career changes as a result.
The Bush Administration justified its pro-JSF/anti-F-22 campaign using
two items of pure fiction. The first item of fiction is that the F-35
is somehow comparable in capability to the F-22, the second item of
fiction that the F-35 is somehow much cheaper than the F-22. There is
ample hard evidence that both ideas are at best wishful thinking, which
in itself raises important questions about governance function and
institutional integrity inside the Bush era Pentagon.
The strategic reality of the coming decade is that if the US wishes to
retain the deterrent capability it has enjoyed since 1991, it has no
choice than to build and deploy up to 750 F-22 Raptors, with a bare
bones minimum of around 500-600 F-22 aircraft for a credible strategic
effect. Any significantly lesser number will result in the need to fly
vulnerable legacy aircraft in harm’s way, or almost as vulnerable F-35
Joint Strike Fighters. The inevitable result will be lost aircraft and
many dead pilots.
If the Obama Administration yields to the Rumsfeld edict for the US Air
Force, and terminates the F-22, there will be a considerable price to
be paid for it by Americans, both domestically and on the global stage,
in the short, medium and long term.
The first casualty will be the President’s drive for integrity in
public service governance and management, as the endorsement of a
policy that emerged as a direct result of all of the institutional
dysfunctions the President aims to fix, provides a precedent that every
single underperforming bureaucrat will exploit to the limit to block
and evade institutional reform. The latter years of the Bush era in the
Pentagon were characterised by the unrestrained use of political power
to suppress professional debate and expert analysis to favour the Bush
Administration’s pet projects, of which the F-35 is the largest and
most expensive.
The second casualty will be the credibility of the President’s effort
to stimulate the US economy. In a recent article Tom Donnelly and Gary
Schmitt of the American Enterprise Institute point out that up to
100,000 American workers would be likely to lose their jobs as a result
of F-22 termination. What Donnelly and Schmitt did not discuss is that
these jobs are mostly in high technology companies, many of which
depend on the F-22 program for survival since there is no other
substantial market for the advanced technologies they produce. The
systemic damage to America’s defence aerospace industry would likely
rival the calamity that brought down Britain’s industry in the 1960s,
the termination of the TSR.2 bomber.
These domestic considerations make a compelling case for the Obama
Administration to keep the F-22 in production. Global strategic
considerations make it imperative for the US that many more F-22s be
built.
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One of the Obama Administration's stated
policy aims is to “...preserve our unparalleled airpower capabilities
to deter and defeat any conventional competitors, swiftly respond to
crises across the globe, and support our ground forces.” The two most
urgent priorities in achieving this goal are the recapitalisation of
the fighter and aerial refuelling tanker fleets. Depicted is an F-22A
refuelling from a 1960s built KC-135R during trials of a new synthetic
fuel (US Air Force image).
Advanced Surface to Air Missile systems
like this new Russian S-400 / SA-21 can inflict very high loss rates on
all current and planned fighter aircraft, other than the F-22 Raptor.
Unlike Soviet era missile systems which were easily defeated by
jamming, anti-radar missiles, and stealth, newer Russian technology is
highly mobile, jam resistant, equipped with defensive decoys, and
supported by a diverse range of low band "counter-stealth" radars and
passive sensors (Almaz-Antey image).
The B-2A
Spirit is the only operational type in the US inventory, other than the
F-22, which can survive in a modern IADS. Only twenty one were built
due to the post Cold War budgetary collapse, and one was recently lost
in an accident. The small fleet size will see these capable aircraft
reserved for attacking targets which require unique munitions, such as
large bunker busting bombs (US DoD image).
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The global
proliferation of advanced and highly mobile Russian missile systems
like the SA-15, SA-19, SA-20, SA-21 and SA-22, as well as advanced
Su-30MK and Su-35BM Flanker fighters is rendering US air power
increasingly ineffective. The strategic problem is that these advanced
and modern weapons are being bought largely by nations that do not have
friendly strategic agendas relative to the United States.
Iran has acquired the SA-15 and in now deploying the SA-20, and has
publicly discussed purchases of other advanced systems. Iran also has a
long running agenda to destabilise Iraq to strengthen its own position
in that region, and has been implicated in numerous incidents during
the insurgency. Iran has also sponsored terrorism against Israel,
destabilising the Palestinian territories and Lebanon in the process.
Terminating the F-22 sends a clear message to Tehran that the US is
abandoning any thought of using force against Iran in the future, as
Iran will deploy increasing numbers of advanced Russian weapons over
time as its cashflow from increasing demand for energy exports grows.
Given Tehran’s past conduct, it is likely to accelerate its long
running campaigns against Iraq and Israel. With many more F-22s built,
Tehran can rest assured that the US can conduct an air campaign against
its new Russian weapons with absolute impunity, at any time.
Terminating the F-22 sends a clear message to Israel that the US will
never honour the Clinton Administration’s promise to supply the F-22 to
Israel.
In the West Pacific region the US faces the challenge of China’s long
running arms buildup. Central to China’s investment has the purchase of
advanced Russian SA-15 and SA-20 missile systems, and advanced Flanker
fighters. As the Pacific Vision exercise last year, and supporting RAND
analysis demonstrated, the US does not have a strong non-nuclear
deterrent posture relative to China. While Beijing is currently
choosing a policy of non-confrontation, should the US strategic posture
in Asia fail to match China’s ongoing military growth, Beijing will
have many more options available to weaken US influence in Asia.
Terminating the F-22 sends clear message to Beijing that the US does
not wish to contest China’s growing military might in Asia. It also
sends a clear message to US allies in this region, especially Japan,
that the US is ceding its long term position in Asia to China.
Tokyo will be especially upset if the F-22 is terminated. Japan has
lobbied hard to procure this aircraft and was rebuffed repeatedly by
the Bush Administration. The message F-22 termination sends to Tokyo is
simple: “the US cares so little about Japan’s defence that it will not
sell Japan the equipment it needs, and is not prepared to invest enough
to protect Japan”.
Other US allies in Asia are likely to draw much the same conclusions as
the Japanese. When former DepSecDef Gordon England publicly supported
Canberra DoD bureaucrats in their effort to steer Australian
politicians away from the F-22, to the F-35, there were numerous
complaints in Australian editorials and blogs that the US was treating
its closest and most loyal ally with contempt. While the Canberra DoD
bureaucrats favour the F-35, most strategically minded Australians
would strongly prefer the F-22 Raptor.
Closer to home the US has the ongoing problem of Venezuela. The Chavez
regime, which is intensely hostile to the US, offered to buy $30
billion of advanced Russian military equipment over coming years,
according to Russian sources last July. Russia is actively marketing
the Su-35BM Super Flanker, and the SA-20/SA-21 missile systems to
Venezuela. While Venezuela lacks the strategic potential for mischief
which characterises Iran, it is nevertheless not in the US interest to
weaken its ability to deter this regime.
In conclusion, the strategic cost to America of terminating the F-22
program vastly outweighs, domestically and globally, the dollar
investment required to build more of these unique and advanced aircraft.
The upcoming F-22 decision will be a litmus test of the new
Administration, both in the domestic and foreign policy areas.
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F-22A Raptor during air combat exercises
in Japan this January. Japan has been lobbying repeatedly to procure
the F-22A and will have an operational requirement for 100 or more
aircraft. Israel's requirement will be around 100 F-22A aircraft, while
Australia's strategic need will exceed 50 aircraft easily (US Air Force
image).
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Air
Power Australia Website - http://www.ausairpower.net/
Air Power Australia Research and
Analysis - http://www.ausairpower.net/research.html
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