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Updated: Fri Jul 30 14:32:11 UTC 2010
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APA NOTAMS ISSN 1836-7135
Hybridisation of Surface to Air
Missile Systems
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Air Power
Australia - Australia's Independent Defence Think Tank
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Air Power Australia NOTAM
18th January,
2009
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| Contacts: |
Peter
Goon
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Carlo
Kopp |
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Mob:
0419-806-476 |
Mob:
0437-478-224 |
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A problem which has received
little attention in the West over recent years is the ongoing evolution
of Cold War era legacy Surface to Air Missile systems. We are not only
observing some sophisticated upgrades being applied, but evidence is
now emerging that hybridisation may be occuring on a larger scale than
previously appreciated.
In terms of direct upgrades to legacy systems, the most prominent have
been the various packages developed for the semi-mobile S-125
Pechora/Neva / SA-3 Goa and its SNR-125 Low Blow engagement radar.
Upgrades are also available for the S-200 Angara/Vega/Dubna / SA-5
Gammon and its 5N62 Square Pair engagement radar, as well as the 2K12
Kub/Kvadrat / SA-6 Gainful, and 9K33 Romb/Osa /
SA-8 Gecko.
These upgrades parallel a very similar trend observed in widely
deployed legacy Soviet era early warning, search and acquisition
radars. Upgrade packages are on offer for the P-14 Tall King,
P-15 Flat Face, P-18 Spoon Rest, and P-35/37 Big Bar / Big Mesh / Bar
Lock series.
The motives for existing users of such equipment are simple: retaining
and extending the service life of often large inventories of equipment,
and large warstocks of missile rounds. In addition, the more
sophisticated upgrades increase the capability of these systems, with
many examples increasing radar performance, jam resistance and track
capabilities, and some examples improving either mobility of the
system, or the kinematic range of the missiles. It is worth considering
that many thousands of such systems and radars were built and exported
by the Soviets before the end of the Cold War, with
recipients ranging from former Soviet republics, former Warsaw Pact
nations, former Soviet allies, and Third World nations being courted or
influenced by the Soviets. In parallel, China has developed and
maintained its own market for indigenous and cloned Soviet missiles and
radars.
Players in the upgrade market vary from the OEMs who either designed or
manufactured portions of these systems, or whole systems, as well as
organisations performing depot level overhauls. There has been no
shortage of such players, nor has there been any shortage of proposed,
prototyped or sold upgrades. Prominent in this market are OEMs based in
ByeloRussia and the Ukraine, both former Soviet republics with large
military industrial infrastructure which previously manufactured or
overhauled many of these systems.
Given the absence of an established nomenclature for upgrades of legacy
Cold War era systems, APA will define one for convenience:
Class 1 Upgrades will
involve the replacement of Soviet era electronic, electrical,
electro-explosive and mechanical components which are obsoleted and no
longer supportable, with current production equivalents. Such upgrades
retain the capabilities and limitations of the original design, but
extend its service life over the effective service life of the new
components.
Class 2 Upgrades will
involve the replacement of Soviet era electronic, electrical,
electro-explosive and mechanical components which are obsoleted and no
longer supportable, with current production equivalents, plus the
replacement of key functional components such as radar receivers,
transmitters, signal processors and data processors with modern digital
equivalents. Such upgrades expand the capabilities and performance of
the system, and more than often impact key EW parameters such as jam
resistance, and radar detection range. As the original antennas and
scan formats are retained, the design may still retain many of the
electronic vulnerabilities of the original.
Class 3 Upgrades are
mobility enhancements of Class 1 or 2 upgrades, where the launchers and
often engagement radars are rehosted on new trailers, or rebuilt as
fully self propelled units on new built chassis. Such upgrades alter
the fundamental regime of deployment and vastly enhance survivability,
especially where the mobility upgrade replaces cables with digital
radio datalinks, and digital automation shortens deployment and stow
times for the system, or the missile battery as a whole.
Class 4 Upgrades involved
hybridisation, where an
entirely new engagement radar, and often new acquisition radar, is
introduced to fully supplant the legacy Soviet era radars
characteristic of the weapon system. A Class 4 upgrade may be performed
in parallel with a Class 1, 2 or 3 upgrade on the remaining system
components.
Table 1 shows some examples of legacy systems and available upgrades:
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System
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Class
2
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Class
3
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Class
4
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SA-2
Guideline
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TBD
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HQ-2B/J
/ SJ-202
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Possibly
H-200 integration
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Polish
Newa-SC
Almaz-Antey Pechora 2A
Tetraedr Pechora 2T/2TM
Defense Systems Pechora 2/2M
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Polish
Newa-SC
Tetraedr Pechora 2TM
Defense Systems Pechora 2/2M
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TBD
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SA-5
Gammon
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Tetraedr
S-200
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N/A
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Almaz-Antey
S-300PMU2
Almaz-Antey S-400
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SA-6
Gainful
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Czech
RETIA
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N/A
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TBD
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SA-8
Gecko
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Kupol
Osa AKM
Tetraedra Osa-1T
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N/A |
TBD
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SA-11
Gadfly
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Tetraedr
Buk MB
Agat 9B-1103M-350 |
N/A |
TBD
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The large 160 nautical mile range S-200 /
SA-5 Gammon SAM system has been widely exported, with users including
North Korea, Syria and most recently, Iran. The semimobile 5P72
launchers each carry a single 5V21 or 5V28 FMCW SARH missile round.
K-1M cabin
with 5N62 Square
Pair FMCW illuminator (above), 5N63S/30N6E phased array engagement
radar (below). The hybridisation of the SA-5/SA-20 is the best known
recent instance of this upgrade strategy. While details have not been
disclosed by Almaz-Antey, the technologies involved provide a good
indication of the capabilities of this upgrade (Image © Miroslav
Gyűrösi).
S-200 battery deployment
illustration from Soviet technical manual. Note each launcher has a
pair of transloaders with ready 5V28 rounds (RuMoD).
Iranian 5T82 transporter/transloader carrying a
5V28 round. The Kraz-260 is replaced by an Iveco 6 x 6 tractor.
Iranian 5V28 launch.
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The best known historical
example of hybridisation occurred when the Soviets transitioned from
the 2K12 Kub/Kvadrat / SA-6 Gainful to the 9K37 / Buk / SA-11
Gadfly. The 9S35 Fire Dome engagement radar appeared on late model SA-6
TELARs, and SA-11 weapon systems were capable of controlling late model
SA-6 TELARs and vice versa.
The best known recent example of hybridisation has been the
introduction of interfaces and software on the S-300PMU2 Favorit /
SA-20 Gargoyle and S-400 Triumf / SA-21 to control the S-200
Angara/Vega/Dubna / SA-5 Gammon and its 5N62 Square Pair engagement
radar. In this arrangement, an SA-20/21 system with its high power
aperture and highly jam resistant acquisition and engagement radars
prosecutes an engagement, but rather than launching its organic 48N6
series missile rounds, it uses the SA-5 Gammon round instead. The 5N62
Square Pair is effectively slaved to the 30N6E2 or 92N6E phased array
engagement radar and acts as a specialised Continuous Wave illuminator,
rather than long range target tracking and illuminating element of the
battery. This model is analogous to the S-300V/SA-12 scheme, where the
9A82/83 TELARs with their CW illuminators are slaved to the 9S32 Grill
Pan phased array engagement radar. The notion that any part of the
cumbersome, slow and electronically vulnerable acquisition and
tracking function of the Squair Pair would be retained in the hybrid
system makes no sense, and indeed it would nullify many of the benefits
of using the hybrid in the first place.
This has important implications for future combat against users of this
hybrid system. In the legacy SA-5 system, a search radar such as a Tall
King or Bar Lock would cue the Square Pair engagement radar, which
would search the area of interest with a narrow pencil beam in an
automated spiral or raster pattern, or manually, until the target was
acquired and tracked, upon which the SA-5 missiles with CW homing
seekers were tuned to the CW carrier (in early variants) and then
launched. As the 1980s skirmishes between the US Navy and Libyan air
defences illustrated, US EA-6B Prowlers with their ALQ-99 jamming
equipment were able to successfully disrupt tracking by the Square Pair
and render the SA-5 missiles unusable.
In a hybrid SA-5/SA-20/SA-21 system, attempts to jam the Squair Pair
will be ineffective as it is functioning as a simple open loop CW
illuminator and missile command uplink transmitter. Because the SA-5 is
a static system, operators can precisely calibrate the Square Pair in
azimuth and elevation, and given the availability of Glonass, GPS and
satellite imagery, this calibration is neither expensive in time or
resources. Once this has been performed it presents no difficulties for
a Glonass/GPS equipped autonomous SA-20/21 battery to issue over a
radio
datalink launch and cueing commands to the SA-5 battery, and once the
missiles have been launched, precision elevation and azimuth commands
to the Square Pair to control illumination and missile uplink
functions. Indeed, once such integration has been performed, it is an
open question whether it would be even economical let alone
operationally viable to retain the full SA-5 battery package of K-1,
K-2, K-3 and K-9 trailers, as a rack of digital equipment installed in
the Square Pair K-1/1M radar head trailer to provide interface and
control functions would be cheaper to run and more effective in combat.
The challenge which a hybrid SA-5/SA-20/SA-21 system presents is
considerable. The SA-20/21 battery is highly mobile, and with modern
digital frequency hopping radars, will be difficult to jam. Soft kill
and hard kill become problematic. In terms of defeating the SA-5
component of the hybrid, the only option is to jam the missile CW
homing seeker, the effectiveness of which will depend entirely on the
vintage of the 5G24N series seeker and the capabilities of the jamming
equipment. If the customer opts for an upgrade to the seeker
electronics, the seeker may be digital and very difficult to jam.
The hybrid SA-5/SA-20 option is available to nations using both of the
SAM systems - known instances being both Syria and more recently, Iran.
The hybridisation of the SA-5 presents a good case study of what is
achievable for modest development investment. It also allows Russia to
provide a counter-ISR capability to nations whon they may not trust
with the most advanced weapons such as the SA-21 40N6 missile,
currently in test.
Some evidence has emerged, albeit inconclusive as it is not supported
by public disclosures, that the PLA may be hybridising its new
HQ-12/KS-1A SAM system with the legacy HQ-2B/J / CSA-2 Guideline SAM
system. The PLA remains the world's largest single user of the SA-2,
with domestically re-engineered missile rounds and SJ-202 Gin Sling
series engagement radars. The PLA has also deployed a fully mobile HQ-2
TEL on a tracked chassis. In practical terms the PLA has a large
material and intellectual investment in the SA-2 family of weapons.
Hybridising the HQ-2 and HQ-12 would therefore make sense economically
as it would allow exploitation of the HQ-2 inventory and warstock until
the type is wholly replaced by newer technology weapons.
As the HQ-2 is a simple command link guided missile, hybridisation with
a newer missile system involves only the installation of software and
hardware in the engagement radar which cues and commands the HQ-2B TELs
or static SM-90 launchers, permits tracking of the missile, and which
generates uplink commands to the missile during flight. With the Fan
Song / Gin Sling operating at X-band (G/E/F depending on subtype), and
given the robust antenna bandwidth available with a transmissive space
feed PESA arrangement as used in the H-200 engagement radar for the
HQ-12/KS-1A, there would be no fundamental technological obstacles to
adapting the H-200 to provide a midcourse tracking and command uplink
guidance capability for the HQ-2 / SA-2 missile round. It is worth
observing that Chinese sources claim the predecessor to the KS-1A, the
KS-1, employed the same Gin Sling engagement radar as the HQ-2B/J. If
this is true, then the degree of commonality in missile electronics and
waveforms between the KS-1A and HQ-2B/J could be very high indeed,
facilitating hybridisation.
A HQ-2B/J missile battery equipped with a modern frequency hopping H-200 engagement
radar and a JY-11/JY-11B,
YLC-18, JYL-1 acquisition
radar becomes an entirely different proposition to the legacy article,
in terms of its engagement envelope, tactical mobility, and its
resistance to jamming.
Given the large number of existing users of the S-75 / SA-2 and HQ-2 /
CSA-1 on the global stage, China could well have a major commercial
motive to develop a hybrid domestically, since it would open a
significant export market for the H-200 radar, and its competitor, the
SJ-231, as well as replacement JY-11B, YLC-18 and JYL-1 acquisition
radars.
In conclusion, hybridisation is a trend which is likely to grow over
time as users of legacy Soviet era SAM systems seek to exploit their
sunk investments and the vastly better capabilities of new technology
phased array engagement radars, and manufacturers of radar equipment
seek to expand their markets.
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The H-200 phased array engagement radar
was developed to support the new HQ-12/KS-1A SAM system. Hybridisation
of the H-200 radar and the existing HQ-2B/J missile system would
transform the capabilities of the HQ-2, and open up a large export
market for the H-200 and other Chinese radars (Chinese internet images).
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Sources:
J.C. Wise, Said Aminov / Vestnik PVO,
http://www.s-200.de/
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Air
Power Australia Website - http://www.ausairpower.net/
Air Power Australia Research and
Analysis - http://www.ausairpower.net/research.html
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