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Updated: Sun Aug 29 16:43:38 UTC 2010
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APA NOTAMS ISSN 1836-7135
Destroying
Australia's Defence Industrial Base
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Air Power
Australia - Australia's Independent Defence Think Tank
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Air Power Australia NOTAM
19th August,
2007
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Dr Carlo
Kopp, MIEEE, SMAIAA, PEng
Head, Capability Research, Air
Power Australia
Editor, Air Power Australia
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| Contacts: |
Peter Goon
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Carlo
Kopp |
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Mob: 0419-806-476 |
Mob:
0437-478-224 |
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F-111s
at Red Flag in 2006 (US DoD).
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The March announcement
by the Defence Minister that $6.6 billion would be spent on 24 Super
Hornets as gap fillers after the 2010 premature and forced retirement
of the F-111
came only a week after ANAO auditors released a report which wholly
contradicted
many of the claims Defence bureaucrats have made in recent years
about the operating costs of Australia's F-111 fleet [1].
The ANAO report confirmed publicly what experts have
argued since 2003. Not only is there no economic saving from F-111
retirement and the purchase of new Super Hornets, but Australia would
also lose a key world class high tech industrial capability in the
F-111 support base, once the F-111 fleet is retired.
The decision to retire
the F-111 in 2010, rather than the 2020 timeframe as originally
planned for, was sold to then Minister Hill by the Defence bureaucracy
in 2003 mostly on the
basis that the cost of maintaining the F-111 would increase
dramatically in future years, a claim which the ANAO report now
proves to have been completely speculative [2].
The US planned to operate
much older B-52 bombers until the 2040 timeframe, and if the '2018
bomber' called for in the QDR does not materialise, then B-52s will
almostly certainly still be flying at that time. The B-52 due to the
maturity of its engineering support is now cheaper to operate than
the newer US B-1B and B-2A heavy bombers. In 2003 analysts argued
that the F-111 was no different than the B-52 and its running costs
would not blow out. Much evidence was provided to parliamentarians to
show
exactly why this was so.
The Defence bureaucrats in turn
claimed that the F-111 would not be viable since it could not carry
the latest satellite guided smart bombs, and was not equipped with
digital networking equipment, and integrating both into the aircraft
would be very expensive. APA also demonstrated at the time that this
was utter
nonsense.
Since the Defence bureaucracy made these unsupportable claims, RAAF and
Boeing engineers at
Amberley in Queensland integrated both the GBU-31 JDAM satellite guided
smart bomb and a Link-16 network terminal into the F-111's weapon
system, and did so on a small internal engineering development
budget. This proved yet another series of the Defence bureaucracy's
claims
about the F-111 to be at best pure speculation [3].
The F-111 is unique in
that it is the only combat aircraft in Australia which is wholly
maintained by Australian engineers, including the complex weapon
system software, electronic warfare systems, and the integration of
new smart weapons. During the 1990s hundreds of millions in
taxpayer's dollars were invested into building up the facilities and
developing the pool of engineering skills to support the aircraft.
Unfortunately, poor
planning, mismanagement and funding starvation by Defence bureaucrats
during the late 1990s resulted in a series of F-111 groundings and
much public embarrassment to Defence during the 2000 – 2001
period. Engineering support was subsequently transferred to Boeing
Australia who not only fixed the problems, but are now delivering
fleet reliability which is better than during the 1970s, when the
jets were delivered, and at a fraction of the cost.
When the Defence bureaucracy
decided to kill off the F-111, the motives were partly a fear of
future embarrassments, and partly internal funding competition for
upgrade money, which was diverted into the problem ridden Hornet
Upgrade Program.
The Defence bureaucracy has
strenuously avoided debating the impact F-111 retirement will have on
Australia's engineering skills base. The engineering facilities and
personnel used to maintain the F-111 are the "crown jewel" in
Australia's defence aerospace industry, and unique in Australia.
This capability was developed because every conflict since the 1940s
has seen the urgent need for technical fixes and modifications to
combat aircraft, and prudent RAAF planners during the 1990s sought to
plug this industry capability gap by building up a support base
around the F-111 fleet.
The Amberley engineering
facility has since then solved critical problems on the Boeing 707
tanker fleet, the F/A-18 Hornet fleet and is involved in the vital
Wedgetail program. If the F-111 is removed, the volume of work for
this facility becomes too small to maintain the skills base and
Australia loses this critical capability.
Analysis of the ANAO
report and Congressional reporting figures for the Super Hornet
proposal show clearly that no money would be saved by F-111
retirement and Super Hornet introduction. Three main consequences of
this deal arise:
- Critical engineering and software work would move to
the US, shifting sovereign control of a military capability overseas.
- Defence could also blame Boeing in the US for any problems
–
termed 'de-risking' - rather than have to explain their own internal
management problems.
- Finally a large capability gap is permanently
introduced in the ADF force structure, as the Super Hornet is not an
F-111 and never can be.
Most recently Defence
bureaucrats have argued that keeping the F-111 presents unknown
technical risks, but every example presented to make this case was
found to be ridiculous, and earlier disproved by APA in evidence to
parliament.
For instance, Defence made the utterly absurd claim that
performing further avionic upgrades on the F-111 would cost as much
as the complete development of the Super Hornet fighter.
If the Government
proceeds with the Super Hornet purchase, the long term damage to
Australia's military capabilities will go well beyond the capability
gap in strike aircraft numbers.
AGM-142E
Popeye Stand Off Weapon on F-111C (C. Kopp photo)
AN/ASW-55
Datalink pod on F-111C (C. Kopp photo)
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Endnotes:
[1] Refer ANAO Audit
Report No.27 2006–07 Management of Air Combat Fleet In-Service Support
[3] Refer Don Middleton
- ADA Defender - Summer
2006/2007 - Are
the F-111s Really Stuffed?
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Air
Power Australia Website - http://www.ausairpower.net/
Air Power Australia Research and
Analysis - http://www.ausairpower.net/research.html
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