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In a recent post
on his Blog
in the Canberra Times, Mr
Brian Toohey, one
of Australia’s
most respected mainstream media journalists, ended with the somewhat
sobering
declaration, “This time, if the allegations stand up, heads must
roll”.
His article
is entitled
“Rudd’s blind spot on defence”, and of course refers to the
latest controversy to surround this august, though, as described by one
former Vice
Chief of the Defence Force, “somewhat
elephant-like”
organisation.
Presumably, Brian Toohey’s closing statement
is referring to the need for accountability, which by its nature,
requires three things of those to whom it is to be applied.
Firstly, they must accept the responsibility; then, be provided
with and employ the authority to act; and, finally be provided with and
have control over the resources necessary to discharge such
responsibility, in order for them to be accountable, let alone held to
account.
The absence of at least one of these ‘pre-requisites for
accountability’ is more often than not the case in the Australian
Department of Defence, and its sister organisation, the Defence
Materiel Organisation (DMO) – oftentimes by design.
How often does one observe senior officials in these organisations,
jointly or severally, expending inordinate levels of time and effort
(resources and costs) steering their Minister down a particular path
only to find, once the Minister/Government reaches the point to which
they have been steered, and announces the decision sometimes only some
of the senior officials want to hear, these very same senior officials
revert to the tried and proven oratory of non-accountability – “The
Government has decided”…. “This is a Government decision” and so on ....
So much for
the acceptance of
responsibility!
Now let’s suppose the advice to Government
from these very same senior officials is flawed or proves to be
wrong. For example, the decision to buy the F/A-18F Super Hornet;
the decision to prematurely retire the F-111; and, the expenditure of
inordinate levels of time and effort (resources and costs) steering our
politicians towards the F-35A JSF as opposed to the F-22A Raptor.
Other examples range from the many failings in Defence Procurement, the
ongoing malignancy that is the the Military Justice System, right
through to why the ADF
Director of Mental Health resigned out of frustration and disgust
with indifference and lack of caring.
When has a
Government –
any Government – admitted to making a mistake?
If the
question is resolved
in the negative, then what well known form
of organisational
dysfunction has, as one of its fundamental traits, the failure to
admit
when mistakes have been made?
However, we are getting a little ahead of
ourselves.
How do
Governments and their
Ministers end up in such invidious situations?
To better
understand this
conundrum, one needs to look no further than the advice they receive
from those
same senior departmental officials who expend those inordinate levels
of time
and effort (resources and costs) doing the steering.
When having
gone and looked
at this, one quickly finds that, in the main and at best, said advice
is
heavily ‘nuanced’, grossly skewed, lacks objectivity and any
supporting data or facts, and reeks of a total indifference to reality.
The current
Minister for Defence
has observed this behaviour and appears
to have drawn the very same conclusions.
But you
don’t have to
believe these words or, even, those of Australia's Minister for
Defence.
Proof of
what is being said
here and what the Minister has determined can be found in abundance in
the
evidence senior officials of Defence and the DMO provide to the various
Parliamentary oversight committees, such as the Joint
Standing
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JSCFADT) or the Joint
Committee of
Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA).
Or, if
readers of this short
monograph are not able to make the time to scroll through pages and
pages of
Hansard Transcripts, then they might take a brief look at the
many examples that may be found via the
following links:
Analysing
“The
ADF Air Combat Capability- On the Record”
JSF:
Through the
Prism of Risk Management
Initial
Problems in Defence Give Lasting Problems for Australia
The
Critical Gap Between Government Policy and
Department
of Defence Implementation Planning
As to
whether this material
gets read or not will stand for many things, not the least of whether
those
charged
with the responsibility of representing the Australian people believe
there
should be accountability at the senior levels of the Defence Department
and
the DMO, or are happy to continue to be fed advice based on a total
indifference
to reality.
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![Australia's First Online Journal Covering Air Power Issues [ISSN 1832-2433]](apa-analyses.png "Australia's First Online Journal Covering Air Power Issues [ISSN 1832-2433]")
