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Last Updated: Mon Jan 27 11:18:09 UTC 2014







JUST HOW GOOD IS THE F-22 RAPTOR?
Carlo Kopp interviews F-22 Chief Test Pilot, Paul Metz



Carlo Kopp

First published Air Power International Vol.4 No.3
September 1998
© 1998, 2002, 2005 Carlo Kopp


"The Raptor will be the fighter that regains the high ground", this is how Lockheed Martin F-22 Chief Test Pilot, Paul Metz, describes a fundamental change in fighter tactics to be employed with the F-22: coming out of the 'weeds' on ingress to the target and 'taking the high ground' at medium to high altitude using stealthy supercruise technology and tactics.

In this world exclusive interview, Air Power International's Carlo Kopp asks Paul Metz about the great innovations being incorporated into the 'Raptor', innovations that will fundamentally change the way fighter pilots fly combat missions, and survive those missions. He describes how sensor fusion will allow the pilot to concentrate on fighting the opposing aircraft or attacking the target - confident that multi-sensor inputs have produced a complete target picture. The concept of software that synthesizes the traditional radar, ILS and communications 'black boxes', and can continuously evolve through the life of the aircraft, has far-reaching implications for a fighter which is expected to remain in service for three decades, and for future fighter designs.

In the following interview, Paul Metz comments on many of the fundamental questions which are today being asked about the future direction of fighter aircraft evolution.


Kopp:

Paul, as a former Northrop TP on the YF-23, and now the chief TP for the Lockheed-Martin/Boeing F-22A, you have had a long association with the USAF's Advanced Tactical Fighter Program. Could you elaborate on some of the thinking behind the program, and the decisions to integrate revolutionary technology such as stealth, sustained supercruise and sensor fusion into the program?

Metz:

The decision to integrate the technologies of stealth, supercruise, super-maneuverability and sensor fusion was the result of significant advances in each of these areas in the 1970s and 80s. In particular, stealth technology had advanced to the point that high lift, high angle of attack aerodynamic shapes could co-exist with stealth requirements. This was a significant evolution from the first generation stealth aircraft represented by the SR-71 and A-12. Second generation stealth as evidenced by the F-117 had yet to allow aerodynamic efficiency to co-exist with stealth. Only with the third generation of stealth inherent in the B-2 bomber were we able to achieve efficient aerodynamic shapes with a low radar signature.

Supercruise became a practical reality with innovative engine cycles which produced high thrust to weights in the non-afterburning range of engine operation. These engine technologies were demonstrated during the Demonstration and Validation of the Advanced Tactical Fighter concept in 1990 by both General Electric and Pratt and Whitney. Supermaneuverability (the use of vectored engine thrust to point the nose of the aircraft at virtually zero airspeed) was explored in the 1980s with the F-18 HARV and X-31 research programs and demonstrated during the ATF prototype phase. This technology was important for the slow speed dog fight where point-and-shoot missiles were still employed, but it had performance payoffs in supersonic flight as well. The concept of sensor fusion was driven solely by the explosive gains made in computer size and power requirements, which are still proceeding rapidly today. For the first time, it was possible to put massive computing power into a fighter-size airframe and provide the pilot with simple, intuitive pictures of the tactical world surrounding his aircraft. The ability to gather information, compare and analyze it at the computer level and present it simply at the operator level meant the pilot would not have to be a part-time data analyst and systems operator but could devote his total mental capacity to being a tactician - the job the human operator does best.

The synthesis of these four technologies meant that a new generation of fighter aircraft was practical, which could leap frog us over our future adversaries. There is another subtlety of the decision to build a new fighter aircraft that is not readily apparent when talking only about the four new technologies above: overriding the decision to build this next generation Advanced Tactical Fighter was the realization that national budget pressures would not allow the purchase of large numbers of aircraft, and that this new aircraft would be in service for well over 30 years. While the ATF would have ascendancy over other fighters when it was built, how could that ascendancy be retained after 30+ years? With fighter aircraft being defined more and more by their sensor or avionics capability, and computers being exponentially more powerful, how could the F-22 expect to remain viable in 10, 20 or 30 years from now? New aircraft every 10 years was not politically or fiscally viable so how could we maintain ascendant air superiority for 30+ years? The answer was to turn the F-22 into a 'changeling', a fighter that could alter its sensor 'shape' at will. To do this, the F-22 was designed so that it has no dedicated 'black boxes'. For example, the F-22 does not have a radio, an Instrument Landing System (ILS) or a radar - at least in the sense that we have come to know these devices. You cannot, for example, remove the UHF radio box from the F-22 and inspect it. What we have learned to do is emulate the radio (and radar and ILS and many other functions) in software rather than hardware. Like booting up a Microsoft Word application on your PC, the F-22 boots up the UHF RADIO application on a micro processor. These common integrated processors or CIPs are composed of identical modules, any one of which can boot up the UHF RADIO application program. The power of this approach is obvious. If battle damage should take out the processor handling your UHF radio, one of the spare modules re-boots the UHF RADIO application and you are back in business. But the real power of this use of the computer is to project the F-22 30+ years into the future. As we develop new and now-unknown weapons and sensors of the future we will simply reboot the F-22's computers with the new applications rather than build new and expensive black boxes. The exciting thing is that computers continue to get smaller and use less power. That means that the computer 'hole' in the F-22 structure where the existing CIPs reside today will hold much greater computer power 30 years from now. The aircraft will not have to go through expensive and time consuming structural changes to add blisters, bumps and cavities to house new hardware. New capabilities will become the software application of the future. 'Boot me up, Scotty.'

Kopp:

It is understood that both the YF-22 and the YF-23 met the USAF's performance and capability criteria for the ATF contest. Since you have flown both aircraft, could you comment on your observations of relative handling and performance between the two prototypes?

Metz:

I do not make direct comparisons between the two prototypes. In fact, no pilot ever flew both prototypes so a comparison between a prototype and a production-representative fighter may not be of value. The USAF position was that both the YF-22 and YF-23 met the requirements set forth by the Air Combat Command for an Advanced Tactical Fighter. Both the Pratt and Whitney YF119 and the General Electric YF120 engines were superb and provided eye-watering supercruise capability. I will say that the handling qualities of the F-22 have been superb to this point in the test program. The match of the aircraft to the wind tunnel and simulator predictions is very close and I would expect it to remain so as we expand the flight envelope.

Kopp:

Sustained supercruise is a vital aspect of the ATF package, could you comment on the implications of this, and how the F-119 differs in performance from current generation conventional turbofans, some of which nominally achieve similar static thrust ratings?

Metz:

Supercruise is vital to the entire concept of a stealthy fighter. Stealth alone does not make you 'invisible' , only very small. Speed confounds the enemy's problem by reducing the time allowed to detect, lock on, launch and have the missile or gun rounds reach your aircraft. Taken to its extreme, a fighter that could travel at the speed of light could probably survive on its speed alone. By the time you saw your speed-of-light fighter, it would be long gone. The F-22 has yet to conquer warp speeds but the high sustained supercruise speeds are a distinct advantage in evading the enemies weapons.

The F119 is the 'push' for supercruise, and it differs from conventional turbojets and turbo fans in several ways. Firstly, it is a low bypass turbofan. Turbojets are most efficient at supersonic speeds and turbofans are most efficient subsonically. The low bypass design of the F119 is optimized for sustained supersonic speeds. In addition, the use of digital engine controls, advanced turbine materials and cooling concepts allow the turbines to be controlled precisely near their maximum temperatures. High turbine temperatures allow high thrust at supersonic speeds where conventional engines must reduce airflow and, consequently thrust, to preserve the turbine blades.

Kopp:

What are your observations of in-flight engine handling with the F-119 powerplants, especially in the transonic and supercruise air combat regimes? How does the much higher sustained turbine inlet temperature rating impact the pilot? Does he still have to fly with one eye on the TIT gauges?

Metz:

The F-119 is, like most modern digital-controlled engines, a 'set-it-and-forget-it' power plant. Amazingly, the engine is able to self-diagnose its own health and performance and adjust its operation accordingly to keep thrust at a maximum. For example, the engine's own internal computers and sensors allow it to run a model of what the optimum engine should be doing at a particular flight condition. This theoretical engine model is then compared to the engine's actual performance using on-engine and on-aircraft sensors. The engine can then re-adjust itself to match the 'perfect' engine as represented by the engine model it computes. The real power of this technology is applied in combat. When the engine has failures of sensors or components that would fail a conventional engine, the computers can synthesize values for the failed parameters and the engine will continue to run. Pretty astounding technology which gives new meaning to the phase, "Doctor (or Engine in this case), heal thyself". These engines simply give the pilot what he asks for when he asks for it. Concerns over compressor stalls, over temps and similar engine problems are a thing of the past. Digital control of the engine's fuel flow and geometry allow the engine designer to extract maximum performance from the engine by running up to but not beyond stall margins. Parameters like EGT are monitored and controlled by the FADEC or full authority digital controls, the 'brains' of the engine. Quite frankly, modern fighter engines are so reliable in this regard that pilots tend to not monitor their engine instruments any more than you monitor your car's engine instruments (if you have instruments at all). We have achieved that level of sophistication and reliability.

Kopp:

There is some debate in the fighter community about the relevance of thrust-vectoring in this day and age of Helmet Mounted Displays and 4th Generation heaters. What advantages do you see in having thrust vectoring, and how does it influence both instantaneous and sustained turning performance in the F-22A?

Metz:

Thrust-vectoring is often thought of in terms of the classic 'dogfight' where one aircraft is trying to out-turn his opponent at ever decreasing airspeeds. Whether a pilot should ever engage in these slow speed fights is a matter that is hotly debated within the fighter pilot community. Certainly, there is general agreement that it is best to not get slow - ever. With the advent of the helmet mounted sight, 4th generation heat seeking, off-boresight missiles the slow dogfight becomes even more dangerous. 'To slow or not to slow' are questions of tactics and best left to the expert fighter pilots of the future. The F-22's thrust-vectoring can provide remarkable nose pointing agility should the fighter pilot choose to use it. What is not widely known is that thrust-vectoring plays a big role in high speed, supersonic maneuvering. All aircraft experience a loss of control effectiveness at supersonic speeds. To generate the same maneuver supersonically as subsonically, the controls must be deflected further. This, in turn, results in a big increase in supersonic trim drag and a subsequent loss in acceleration and turn performance. The F-22 offsets this trim drag, not with the horizontal tails, which is the classic approach, but with the thrust vectoring. With a negligible change in forward thrust, the F-22 continues to have relatively low drag at supersonic maneuvering speed. . But drag is only part of the advantage gained from thrust vectoring. By using the thrust vector for pitch control during maneuvers the horizontal tails are free to be used to roll the airplane during the slow speed fight. This significantly increases roll performance and, in turn, point-and-shoot capability. This is one of the areas that really jumps out to us when we fly with the F-16 and F-15. The turn capability of the F-22 at high altitudes and high speeds is markedly superior to these older generation aircraft. I would hate to face a Raptor in a dogfight under these conditions.

Kopp:

In terms of aircraft handling and manoeuvre performance, how does the F-22A compare with established types such as the F-15 and F-16 in areas such as transonic acceleration, supersonic acceleration, climb rates, and supersonic sustained turn rates? How does the supersonic energy bleed in manoeuvres compare to teen series fighters, optimised for transonic energy bleed?

Metz:

My previous answer touched on the subject of maneuver performance. It is interesting to fly an airplane like the F-22 which is optimized to fly supersonically as a matter of course compared to current generation fighters designed for momentary or transitory excursions supersonically. An example may illustrate this. The best subsonic afterburner climb speed in the Raptor occurs at 600 knots calibrated airspeed.

The fastest way to get to altitude in a Raptor is to accelerate to supersonic on the deck and climb all the way supersonically. Sorry, I can't quote the numbers but suffice is to say that we are talking high supersonic climb speeds. The F-15, on the other hand, has its best climb rate when the climb is made subsonically to 30,000-35,000 feet and the aircraft is then dived to a supersonic speed before once again pulling up into a supersonic climb. The difference in time to climb using the Raptor versus the Eagle climb technique is dramatic but, again, classified.

You also asked about handling qualities, which is a different subject than raw performance. Handling qualities refers to how hard the pilot has to work to accomplish a task. An airplane can be a great performer but, if the pilot is sweating bullets just to keep it upright and under control, it isn't a particularly usable machine. We formalized the desired handling qualities of the F-22 with the engineers early in the design process by defining 'carefree abandon' flying qualities. This meant that the pilot could do anything with the stick and rudder as well as the throttles with the assurance that he would never overstress the structure and break it; that he would never lose control of the airplane, or that he would never have his engines 'backfire'. Many hundreds of simulator and engine wind tunnel tests resulted in an airplane that today meets those expectations. The importance of 'carefree abandon' flying qualities is that it makes flying second nature and frees the pilot to concentrate on being the wiley tactician that the human being is so adept at.

Kopp:

You are on record as describing the F-22A to be 'as easy to fly as a Cessna 150'. Knowing how over-damped the 150 is in all axes, the tempting question here is what is the damping like in the various modes of the F-22A's fly-by-wire control system? Can you comment on FBW behaviour in different flight regimes, and how this appears to the pilot?

Metz:

Some days I wish I had never made that comment about the Cessna 150 and the ease of flying the F-22. I've had about a million applications since then so I need to get the word out through your publication. Here it is: "sorry folks, we're all sold out."

Seriously, the handling qualities are actually better than a light aircraft since we have an active control system that damps out unwanted disturbances to the flight path. Where a Cessna bounces in turbulence the Raptor rides smoothly. The sensation in the cockpit is of a more direct connection to the airplane - a very solid link between man and machine. Quantitatively, the F-22 is well damped in all axes (the technical term is 'heavily damped'). Since the Raptor is also an unstable airplane it requires very little control deflection to start it moving in a new direction. The combination of unstable airframe with a digital, fly-by-wire flight control system gives a cat-like quickness but very predictable and pleasant flying qualities.

The flight control computers coordinate roll maneuvers to eliminate adverse yaw so that rolls are executed with lateral stick inputs with 'feet-on-the-floor'. Fly-by-wire is one of those technologies that is totally transparent to the pilot. It is only when you go back to an un-augmented airplane (such as your Cessna 150) or less sophisticated flight control systems such as the F-15 that you realize how much improvement you gain from a computer controlled system. As an example, the F-15 pilot can overstress or over-G his airplane, particularly in the transonic region. As a result, the Eagle pilot must constantly be alert to rapid aft stick inputs as he accelerates in a fight. One careless input in an air-to-air fight and you can overstress the Eagle. It has been done and continues to be a problem. As a result, the Eagle driver cannot be quite as aggressive with his flying at all times for fear of over-G. The F-16 pilot is a little better off but his flight control system does not protect him from over-G while rolling so he must also temper his aggressiveness in a fight. The F-22 pilot has no such concerns. Aside from diving the airplane directly into the ground, the Raptor pilot can 'yank and bank' to his heart's content without fear of over-G, loss of control or otherwise 'hurting' the jet. This makes for one aggressive fighter pilot in a fight and makes the F-22 a lethal opponent.

Kopp:

The F-22A cockpit sets a new benchmark in automation, with virtually everything under software control, and sensor fusion employed to reduce the pilot's workload in combat. What are your observations on the aircraft's cockpit environment, in comparison with contemporary fighters?

Metz:

Stealth, supercruise and supermaneuverability are the components of the pilot's 'chariot'. The cockpit of the F-22 is the design component that allows the chariot become a weapon system and the pilot to become the charioteer. Several cockpit characteristics make the F-22 a departure from existing cockpit designs. The Raptor receives numerous inputs from its own or 'onboard' sensors as well as data from sources outside the aircraft (offboard sensors). Current fighters use the pilot as the sensor systems operator to point or cue various systems and sensors to acquire data. The pilot must then become the data analyst to sort through these sensor inputs and determine what it all means. The F-22 pilot is neither a sensor operator nor data analyst.

We looked at the cockpit problem from the outside in when we sat down with the avionics engineers. For example, we asked what did the pilot really want to know and at what time did he need to know it. We broke the airspace surrounding the Raptor into spheres or 'globes' where the pilot wanted to know specific things about the enemy and tactics. For example the pilot would like to know when he is flying undetected by the enemy. This area of 'cloaked' operation or the 'engage-avoid' globe allows him to move with impunity in the battle arena. I-see-you-but-you-can't-see-me affords the fighter pilot a certain degree of aggressiveness and tactical positioning prior to using his weapons. It allows him to not only position himself to maximum advantage but he can also vector friendly forces and his own flight members into positions of advantage: something akin to the perfect ambush. Five globes were subsequently defined to give the pilot knowledge about his surroundings, ranging from the engage-avoid globe where the F-22 is invisible to the defensive zone where the enemy can see and hit you with his weapons.

While the engage-avoid sphere may sound like a notional space, we were able to translate this globe into specific physical boundaries defined by sensor detection capabilities. But the importance of the globes is this. The pilot is always presented the final, analyzed data about the enemy. The pilot does not directly aim, cue or point his sensors in the F-22. He is not a sensor operator. The sensors are automatically tasked to constantly search the entire volume of space above, below, to the front and rear of the F-22 and then present the information as a single, simple picture of the battle space.

The pilot is also not a data analyst. For example, the sensors collectively determine that a particular aircraft is an enemy and presents a red triangle when the enemy is identified as such. That identification may be the result of inputs from one, two or six sensors working together to conclude that there is one and only one enemy fighter in that point in space. The pilot does not care nor does he need to know how the avionics conclude that there is a MiG-29 at 330� at 38.2 miles doing 0.85 Mach number at 30,000 feet. The MiG is real. It is there and he needs to do something about it.

This de-coupling of the pilot from the role of sensor operator and data analyst is the most profound change in cockpit design since the advent of fighters. It frees up tremendous human RAM to use for intuition, insight, innovation and inference - the attributes that make a human being so dangerous and a fighter pilot so lethal.

Kopp:

The new APG-77 active phased array air intercept radar embodies many of the technological ideas in fielded systems such as the Aegis radar. Can you comment on what the implications are, of having the equivalent of a miniaturised SPY-1 in the nose of a fighter aircraft?

Metz:

I am not familiar with the Aegis radar system so I cannot make a direct comparison. The main difference with this radar at the pilot's station is that the pilot does not think in terms of his radar or his EW suite or any of his specific sensors. With a conventional fighter radar, the pilot must direct the radar beam to search in specific areas and he must command the radar to lock on to a detected target. In the F-22, the pilot does neither of these tasks. The radar is one contributor to a knowledge base of information about the air and ground space surrounding the Raptor. The radar is self-cueing and continuously searches all available space within its field of regard. It can also perform multiple tasks at one time such as searching and tracking multiple targets. The radar does this with no pilot interaction and inputs its findings to the core avionics which, in turn, sorts and sifts this information along with inputs from the other sensors to formulate a complete picture of enemy aircraft, friendly aircraft and ground threats in the vicinity of the Raptor.

Kopp:

With all air-air weapons carried internally, the aircraft has zero stores drag in comparison with teen series fighters and their European cousins. Can you comment on the practical implications, from a pilot's perspective, of carrying a fighter's missile load internally?

Metz:

Internal weapons carriage has both pluses and minuses from a design point of view. The obvious advantages are reduced drag which translates into longer range, higher speed, better maneuverability and very small signature. The negatives are the challenges of having weapons survive inside an acoustically noisy cavity, the changes in performance and handling qualities when the doors are opened, especially at high speeds, and the requirement to lock on some weapons before launch. Many of these problems were considered and demonstrated by the Lockheed team during the prototype phase of the ATF program, and we believe we have design solutions for each. One of the challenges of the flight test program is to now validate those design solutions.

Kopp:

The F-22A Block 0 is intended to replace the F-15C in the air superiority role; but also be capable of performing much of the deep strike role currently performed by the F-117A, and previously the F-111. The stated intent is to perform these missions dropping GPS-guided internally-carried JDAMs, with Mk.83, BLU-110 warheads, and later MMTD derivative 'Small Bombs'. Can you comment on the practical and operational implications of abandoning the established 'hug the ground' ingress to target and penetrating high/fast/stealthy to engage surface targets?

Metz:

Hugging-the-ground tactics were, perhaps more than anything, the impetus to develop stealthy aircraft. The advent of the surface-to-air missile drove aircraft 'into the weeds' for survivability. Unfortunately, this is very disadvantageous for several reasons. Firstly, it opens you up to small arms and undirected AAA, traditionally the most lethal of all defensive ground weapons. Secondly, it significantly reduces range. Thirdly, it reduces your own weapons range. Fourthly, it reduces your ability to see and find the enemy (the 'high ground' is still the desired position). Finally, it is very fatiguing for the pilot and we still lose a number of pilots and airplanes when they simply run into the ground flying low altitude combat. Until the advent of stealth, there was no way for a force to survive at medium to high altitudes, so our fighter and fighter bomber effectiveness has been sorely reduced by low altitude tactics. The Raptor will be the fighter that regains the high ground.

Kopp:

One of the interesting design features on the F-22A is the provision to jettison the wing pylons to regain both stealth and performance, should this be required. Could you comment on this facility, and its practical implications for the pilot?

Metz:

Jettisoning wing pylons is neither new nor unusual for a fighter aircraft. To my knowledge, all current fighters have provisions for jettisoning some or all of their pylons. Certainly, the F-22 will enter the initial phases of combat as a stealthy platform and will continue in this mode until air superiority is assured for the less-stealthy strike aircraft. The F-22 can carry out air-to-air or air-to-ground missions in a stealthy mode. When air dominance is not in question, the F-22 can operate in a non-stealthy mode carrying up to 5000 pounds of stores at each of four external hard points. The pilot can jettison the stores and pylons at any time to 're-cloak' into the stealthy mode and use his internal weapons.

Kopp:

The JSF is to have provisions to carry weapons internally during the 'Day One of the War' scenario, to achieve best stealth performance, and later carry external weapons when observables are no longer an issue. Do you see any technological or performance obstacles in doing the same with a Block 20 or 30 'Strike Raptor'? How does the airframe/propulsion package measure up as a 'load carrier', in comparison with established types such as the F-15E?

Metz:

The JSF concept of stealthy and non-stealthy weapons delivery is similar to the one I postulated in the above question. The Raptor is a larger airplane and hence a larger load carrier than the JSF but it can operate in this same dual-mode manner. As I mentioned, the F-22 can carry a significant external load as well as an internal load and, while the exact gross weights remain classified, the design of the F-22A is capable of hauling large loads comparable to the F-15E Strike Eagle. We will have to certify each new weapon for carriage and release as they are identified but the basic load carrying capability exists in the airframe today.

Kopp:

Can you comment on current progress in the flight test program, and your intended strategy for clearing the aircraft envelope, as the program progresses?

Metz:

The first three test aircraft are what I call an 'engine and airframe'. That is, they do not have the sophisticated avionics of the full up F-22 as their job is to expand the flight envelope. The first aircraft will push out to maximum speed and maximum altitude ensuring that the engines, flight controls and subsystems operate under these extreme conditions. The second aircraft will explore the slow speed envelope of the Raptor, concentrating on high angle of attack flight, commonly referred to as 'spin' testing. Tragically, the Raptor has 'carefree abandon' flying qualities and won't spin so our job will be to punish the airplane at high angles of attack to prove the forgiving nature of the design. In addition, this aircraft will perform weapons separation and jettison tests. The third F-22 will be used to test the structure to maximum Gs.

The fourth through ninth Raptors will be identical, full-up rounds. They will contain all of the complex tactical avionics we have talked about and will be identically configured at any given time in the test program. The planned testing includes 4337 flight hours divided almost equally between the engine and airframe testing with the first three Raptors and the avionics testing on the remaining six aircraft.

The flight test program is progressing well with what I would consider a normal number of problems at this formative stage of the program. The problems encountered, while aggravating, have not stopped the program and all have solutions either in work or already applied to the airplane. That, after all, is why we have an engineering and development phase in a new aircraft program and why my job exists in the first place. There is a lot of good news coming out of the flight testing to date. Handling qualities, the 'carefree abandon' aspect of the design, have been very close or right on the money. They match simulator and wind tunnel predictions closely and are very gratifying to see come to life after years of development work in the simulator. The engines are truly extraordinary and trouble free and performance is breathtaking.

All in all, I look forward to exploring and proving the potential of this remarkable fighter in the next three years.

Air Power International would like to thank Paul Metz for making his time available and to Ray Crockett for his assistance.






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