These are words from the Coalition's Plan for Defence dated
October 2007:
Military
forces in the Asia-Pacific region are becoming increasingly
sophisticated and Australia must work harder to ensure that our forces
retain leading-edge military capability. To give our forces the
capacity to meet new and emerging challenges, the Coalition has
committed to a 3 per cent real increase in annual defence spending out
to 2016. This will ensure Australia has ... an Air Force capability
second to none in our region.
The Coalition has committed to
building: ... a top flight Air Force .... designed to give the
RAAF unprecedented capabilities, reach and operational flexibility.
These are words from Labor's Plan for Defence dated
November 2007:
Much
has happened in the world since the
last Defence White Paper was released in 2000, and it is time for a
full and detailed reassessment of Australia’s strategic circumstances.
Without superior air
combat capabilities, the ADF’s ability to control the air and sea
approaches to our nation and implement a maritime strategy is
compromised.
Labor will ensure that
there is no air combat capability gap.
What is common to the political
argument on both sides is a stated interest in maintaining competitive
capabilities with those in the Region. What is different is
that a Coalition government, if elected, will be saddled with the
baggage of bad decisions, breaches of capability development procedures
and a failure to correctly assess the rapid development of military
capabilities - especially air power - in Australia's Region.
Conversely, if elected, a Labour government would not be burdened by
these political encumbrances. Any new government will have an
unhindered opportunity to secure Australia's future by taking the
initiative on the lessons learned from the blundering of the past seven
years and developing Australia’s air combat capabilities from the
perspective of a “clean, unsullied” White Paper. After all, the Defence 2000 White Paper
was the most widely publicly consulted Defence strategic guidance
document of all time. Just because Defence, the Ministers and the
Government of the day failed to follow it does not mean the people’s
wishes should not be heeded.
Looking out some 15-20 years, we know what adversary
capabilities the RAAF will
face. The Sukhoi Su-30 is already in the Region in several
variants
- the MKK, MK2, MKI and the MKM. The MiG-29 has been in the
region
for several years, and the derivative MiG-35 is a strong future
contender for a
large regional fighter purchase.
At the Moscow Air Show this year, Sukhoi released the Su-35BM/Su-35-1,
to be
fitted with the 20 kiloWatt IRBIS-E
ESA radar and competent
electronic
warfare equipment; this aircraft is expected to be operational in
2012,
or earlier,
and is therefore likely to be inducted into existing fleets of Sukhoi
aircraft. The IRBIS-E is a natural upgrade for the Su-30
series, as it is a growth variant of the NIIP BARS carried by Indian
and Malaysian Flankers.
Next to arrive will be the PAK-FA / T-50 “JSF-ski” which will use a low
observable, twin engine design which will confer a substantial
“shielded” weapons bay and extended range. The expected
operational date is circa
2015 - which will likely be well before the F-35 JSF is operational,
and “combat coded”.
The new MiG-35 Fulcrum
(above) is the first Russian flighter to employ an active phased array
AESA multimode radar (below), developed by Phazotron. It is like its
Western counterparts, a
fully digital fighter (MiG bureau).
The new Su-35-1/Su-35BM is the
most lethal variant of the Flanker developed to date. The digital
cockpit emulates the JSF style of "large screen" layout using mature
low risk AMLCD technology (Sukhoi/KnAAPO).
PAK-FA (Перспективный авиационный комплекс
фронтовой авиации
- Future aviation system for tactical aviation)
rendering by NPO
Saturn. Unlike the JSF, the PAK-FA is being designed with air
superiority performance and high agility as the primary consideration.
These aircraft are widely regarded as presenting a formidable air
combat capability, and with high power radars, large aperture antennas,
multi-spectral sensors, modern ergonomically efficient cockpits, and
long-range weapons, are generally assessed
as being substantially superior to both the F/A-18F and the F-35
JSF.
Australia must therefore reassess its air power strategy or it will
lose future
air combat engagements.
The F-22A Raptor is the most capable
“Western” aircraft available and
is considered superior to the Su-30 and Su-35 series. Australia can and must procure the F-22A. The
USAF defined “anti-tamper” modifications to secure the advanced
capabilties of the Raptor in anticipation of a sales request from
Australia. If asked, they may be prepared to release the next 25
to 50
F-22As from their production line, which would make the aircraft
available as soon as the Australian staff are trained to support the
type and in time to avoid any air combat capability gap. This
arrangement may well suit the USAF if, as predicted and now expected,
the F-35 JSF's operational readiness slips further to the right in
time.
The
F-22A production line would remain in full production for a further 15
months, so if the USAF operations require a different aircraft mix, or
the
F-35 fails to meet its capability requirements as expected, more F-22As
can be
built from an open production line. Should massed coalition air
operations be required, the
RAAF
could supplement the USAF's air dominance and survivable deep strike
capabilities provided by the F-22A fleet.
With a competent air dominance fighter in the inventory, the RAAF can
continue to operate its existing Hornet and F-111 fleets while the
future air combat fleet options are properly considered. This
observation was made by the Chief of the Air Force at a recent Senate
Estimates hearing. Should there be a need for strike missions to
be conducted in hostile airspace, the F-22A can escort and protect the
F/A-18A/Bs or the F-111Cs.
In June, 2006, twelve F-22As of
the 27th FW deployed from Langley AFB to Elmendorf AFB for the Northern
Edge 2006 exercise. During this exercise the F-22As scored 144:0 in air
combat engagements against opposing fighters (US
Air Force).
The lead-in F-22A acquisition has an immediate payoff. The
F/A-18Fs are
no
longer relevant to Australia's air combat requirements and can be
released back to the USN production line.
Expensive and risky fleet maintenance programs such as the Hornet
centre-barrel replacement can be scrapped. A worst case unit
“fly-away” cost of
the 25 x F-22As at (say) $AUD150 million would be $AUD3.75B, so there
would be abundant change from the announced $AUD6.6B F/A-18F cost for
F-22A
spares, training, weapons, support equipment and
support arrangements; easily several times the capability for the same
cost. Nor would the high-risk F-35 JSF be
our only air combat aircraft option.
Australia needs to acquire
the F-22A, not on the specious grounds that it is 'easy and available',
but because it is NECESSARY to counter the advanced air combat
capabilities of aircraft that will enter our region in the next 15
years.
Next, Australia needs to consider its broader air power capability
requirements. In anticipation of the revisions to the Defence
White Paper, these considerations should and must include:
- long range
strike;
- persistence at range, especially for time sensitive
surface targets;
- protection of our sea lanes, especially the merchant fleet
exporting much needed resources traffic;
- carriage of large, deep ground penetrating stores such as
the
EGBU-28 “Bunker
Buster”;
- defence against air and submarine launched cruise missiles;
- electronic attack; and
- self reliance.
Few air combat aircraft can deliver this mix of diverse
capabilities. The
F/A-18F and the F-35 JSF cannot and never will - they have limited
range, endurance
and neither can carry the EGBU-28 or its successors. Sukhoi
Su-30/35
and the AESA variants of the F-15E can, but with no wideband capabilty
for
electronic attack. As the F-22A weapons clearance proceeds, it
will in the future have such capabilities, especially once electronic
attack
modes are developed for its AESA radar. The F-22A is often
under-rated in this regard, but it is a large aircraft with substantial
range and payload capabilities as well as large growth margins -
although very large stores must be
carried
externally which compromise its low observability.
So does the F-111 - and options exist beyond the F/RF-111C and F-111G
we
currently have in inventory. The USA's Aerospace Maintenance and
Regeneration Centre (AMARC) has ~70 low-flight-time F-111Fs and ~30
EF-111A Ravens. Refer AMARC link: http://www.amarcexperience.com/Default.asp
[1]
Before the EF-111A Raven was mothballed, still a controverial issue in
the US, the USAF developed an
engineering plan to upgrade it to provide modern electronic warfare
capabilities, via an ALQ-99E tactical jamming system block upgrade
similar to the late ICAP-II and early ICAP-III in the EA-6B Prowler.
Both the F-111F and EF-111A could be 'regenerated' at the
Amberley F-111 maintenance centre by Australian Industry, and in
progressive block upgrades fitted
with a modern AESA radar
(preferably with a derivative of the AN/APG-77 as fitted to the F-22A
for commonality), plus more recent avionics required for air combat -
radar warning receiver, internal
self
protection jammer, towed decoys, Link-16 networking (already
demonstrated on the F-111C testbed), multi-function displays
etc [2].
In addition, longer term, the F-111's diverse capabilities could be
greatly enhanced by incorporation of a more advanced engine.
During the early 1990s the USAF planned such an
engine retrofit, and initial engineering work was performed by GE,
using the F110. When the USN replaced the F-14D TF-30 (the same
engine as Australia's F-111s) with the F110-GE-400, range improved by
60% on
some missions. There are later versions of the F100-PW and the
F110-GE that fit the F-111, and surplus F110s from mothballed F-14Ds.
The expected range and
endurance improvement would be in excess of 20%, with the
additional advantage of a valuable supersonic cruise capability.
F-111F (above) and EF-111A Raven (below).
The re-engining of the F-111 increases total static sea level thrust
from about 40,000 lbs to over 58,000 lbs. The F-111 is already
very slick, aerodynamically, and can reach Mach 2.5 with
its current 40,000 lbs of static sea level thrust. The
increased power and economy would provide additional takeoff, payload,
climb, cruise, endurance, manoeuvre and dash performance. There
is no pretense that the F-111 is a “stealthy” aircraft, but with links
to other sensors and its own AESA radar and warning receiver, it can at
least avoid a fight by using its superior speed - unlike the F/A-18F
and the F-35 JSF which are barely able to go supersonic in useful air
combat configurations.
If the F-111C/F was fitted with the MBDA Meteor and/or the AIM-120D, it
could give a good account of itself in an air combat engagement, and
provide a highly valuable cruise missile intercept capability in the
developing regional environment. Both the F-111C/F
and the EF-111A would have the potential for a narrowband
electronic attack capability using an AESA radar. Escort by the
F-22A would enhance the survivabilty of the F-111C/F and EF-111A with
the
Raptor clearing the way, the F-111C/F delivering strike weapons and the
EF-111A attacking an adversary's sensors systems - all at standoff
range.
Development of these air combat capabilies is vital to Australia's
future security. What is urgent and important at the moment is to
regain an air dominance capability as called for in the existing White
Paper and foreshadowed by the Labor Defence Plan. The incapable
and very expensive F/A-18F does not meet Australia's immediate or
future defence needs, and the acquisition should be terminated
forthwith. Gaining access to the F-22A now - with the
assistance of our ally the USA / USAF - would buy much needed time to
consider the long term future of our air combat fleet - whether it is
all F-22As, or a mix with a regenerated F-111 fleet. It would
also put any consideration of the F-35 JSF into the right
perspective - a “fly-before-you-buy” perspective which, after all,
makes eminent sense.
Cost is always the bottom line. The AMARC F-111s hulls
are available now and virtually free, but allowing a generous
$AUD30M per for the upgrade of (say) 50 F-111C/Fs costs
$AUD1.5B and $AUD50M for (say) 25 EF-111As costs $AUD1.25B.
Adding in the $AUD3.75B lead-in batch of F-22A cost gives a total cost
of $AUD6.6B. Support, training, infrastructure and spares
costs need to be added in, but there is still a gap as wide as a
country mile to the projected cost of $AUD23B for the F/A-18F, the HUG
centre-barrel et al, and the F-35 JSF. The latter come with all
the incumbent risks and “newness/de-risking” challenges inherent in
these far less capable “solutions”, particularly in the areas of
support, training and infrastructure, as well as the decimating effect
current Defence plans are having on Australian Industry.
Action on building a competent air combat fleet for the RAAF is both
urgent and important, and such activity should be conducted in parallel
with the development of the next Defence White Paper.
The all important question to
the past, current and all future Chiefs of the Air Force is
this:
To meet the
Defence White Paper imperatives, the RAAF must have an
air combat fleet
that
will provide regional air dominance, not for the next few months, but
at all
times
for the foreseeable
future.
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![Australia's First Online Journal Covering Air Power Issues [ISSN 1832-2433]](apa-analyses.png "Australia's First Online Journal Covering Air Power Issues [ISSN 1832-2433]")
