Russian / PLA Point Defence Weapons

Russian / PLA
Point Defence Weapons

May, 2008
Updated June, 2008

by Dr Carlo Kopp

(Images RuMoD, Rosoboronexport, Xinhua, Almaz-Antey, KBP, Kupol, Other)

The 2S6 Tunguska/ SA-19 Grison is the replacement for the ZSU-23-4P SPAAG. It has spawned a series of variants, including the potent Pantsir S1 / SA-22 Greyhound, equipped with a phased array engagement radar derived from an aircraft design (Russian internet image).

Almaz-Antey High Energy Laser Directed Energy Weapon

Ranets E High Power Microwave Directed Energy Weapon

SA-8 Gecko

SA-13 Gopher

ZSU-23-4P/M4 Shilka SPAAG

Type 95 SPAAG

HQ-7/FM-80/FM-90 / CSA-4 Crotale

HQ-6/HQ-61

Background:

A topic which has received less than its due attention in the recent defence debate is that of the evolving role of point defence weapons.

Historically such weapons were employed mostly to stop 'leakers', aircraft which managed to penetrate through fighter defences and area defence SAM belts. Early Russian point defence weapons such as the SA-8 Gecko and ZSU-23-4P were mostly tasked with this role, defending armoured forces on the move and fixed installations against air attack.

After the enormously successful debut of the wire guided TOW missile in Vietnam, NATO forces deployed large numbers of helicopters armed with anti-tank missiles, initially wire guided, later sem-active laser homing and most recently, with active millimetric band radar seekers. The tank killing helicopter was supplemented by the tank killing A-10 Thunderbolt, armed with the AGM-65 Maverick anti-armour missile and a potent 30 mm gun.

The Soviet response to these highly effective anti-armour systems was to develop a new generation of highly mobile point defence weapons, these being the 2S6 Tunguska / SA-19 Grison and Tor / SA-15 Gauntlet, both designed to rapidly react to pop-up threats and engage them with fire before they could conceal themselves behind terrain.

With the end of the Cold War came the Desert Storm campaign, followed by US air campaigns against Serbia in 1999 and Iraq in 2003. All three of these campaigns saw the massed use of Precision Guided Munitions (PGM), more than often from standoff ranges.

Russian planners identified the PGM as the primary risk to their fixed and ground force installations, and pursued further evolution of the SA-15 and SA-19 to defeat this threat.

The latest Pantsir S1 / SA-22 Greyhound and Tor M2 / SA-15 Gauntlet systems are equipped with phased array engagement radars, very fast SAMs, and are designed to rapidly react to incoming PGMs and destroy them before they hit their targets. In a fundamental sense, Russia's designers have followed much the same path as Western naval air defence artitects have, reacting to late Cold War and subsequent anti-shipping missile capabilities. The problem is much the same.

From a force structure planning perspective, such point defence systems will over time render non-stealthy subsonic PGMs irrelevant, as these will be easily tracked and engaged. The future lies in PGMs which are stealthier and faster than existing designs.

This APA analysis surveys the most important Russian and Chinese systems currently deployed and in the market.

Resources:

«Оса», (9К33, SA-8, SA-8A, Gecko) зенитный ракетный комплекс
The OSA anti-aircraft missile system, JSC "Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant "Kupol".
The TOR-M1 anti-aircraft missile system, JSC "Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant "Kupol".
The TOR-M2E anti-aircraft missile system, JSC "Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant "Kupol".
Miroslav Gyürösi, Russian companies team to develop wheeled Tor-M2E , Jane's Missiles & Rockets, October 01, 2007.
Pantsir-S1 Air Defense Missile/Gun System, KBP Instrument Design Bureau, 59 Shcheglovskaya Zaseka St., 300001 Tula, Russia.
Tunguska-M1 Air Defense Missile/Gun System, KBP Instrument Design Bureau, 59 Shcheglovskaya Zaseka St., 300001 Tula, Russia.
30 mm 2A38M Automatic Anti-Aircraft Gun, KBP Instrument Design Bureau, 59 Shcheglovskaya Zaseka St., 300001 Tula, Russia.
Phazotron Shlem air defence radar system, Phazotron NIIR.
Martin Rosenkranz, MAKS 2007 Spezial: Pantsir-S1 (SA-22), Russlands neuestes Flugabwehrsystem.
PGZ95 Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Artillery, Chinese Defence Today.
HQ-7 (FM-80) Surface-to-Air Missile System, Chinese Defence Today.
HQ-61A Surface-to-Air Missile, Chinese Defence Today.
Schamiloglu E, High Power Electromagnetic Threats to the Civilian Infrastructure - A New Concern for a New Age,
IFIS Briefing, November, 2004, URL: http://www.ece.unm.edu/ifis/papers/CyberSecurity.ppt .
Air Power Australia - May 2008 - High Energy Laser Directed Energy Weapons
ГСКБ "Алмаз-Антей", Лазерные технологии, 125190, Российская Федерация, г. Москва, Ленинградский проспект, д. 80, корпус 16.

Russian Systems

KBP Pantsir S/S1 / SA-22A/B Greyhound Air Defense Missile/Gun System

The latest Pantsir S1 configuration at MAKS-2007, carried by an 8 x 8 KAMAZ-6560 chassis. This variant incorporates a new Phazotron designed agile beam phased array engagement radar, derived from Phazotron's earlier effort on the Zhuk MF PESA air intercept radar.

(Images via KBP, Vestnik PVO)

The KBP Panstsir S1 / SA-22B Greyhound is the most recent derivative of the Tunguska system, incorporating a range of improvements over the baseline Pantsir S, and its predecessor, the 2S6M Tunguska M SPAAG/SAM system.

This family of systems combines the 2A38M 30 mm automatic cannon system with the high velocity 9M311M two stage CLOS missile.

The 9M311M series SAM is unusual in it class as it is a two stage weapon, designed for exceptionally high acceleration to effect snapshots against fleeting targets such as heicopters. Compared to the earlier 9M311 variants, the higher impulse booster stage pushes the second stage to 1,100 m/s. KBP are marketing the system as a capability to engage and destroy the full spectrum of airborne targets, comprising aircraft, UAVs, cruise missiles, precision guided weapons, ballistic missiles and soft skinned surface targets.

KBP define the basic capabilities of the Pantsir series thus:

High jamming immunity in intensive ECM environment;
High survivability in massive employment of HARM-type antiradar missiles;
A capability of destroying high precision weapons, such as Tomahawk cruise missile, Walleye 2 guided air bomb, Maverick guided missile etc.;
A capability of engaging fixed- and rotary- wing aircraft, RPVs, etc.;
Effectiveness at any time of night and day, in good and adverse weather;
High mobility, specifically for protecting motorized and armor units;
High availability and reliability.

The Pantsir S introduced a 12 round missile capability, a thermal imaging system to complement the optical tracker, and revised engagement radar component.

While the Pantsir series is offered on a tracked chassis like the Tunguska, it has been primarily marketed in the road mobile configuration, which is less costly to acquire and maintain, and trades away off-road mobility for much higher 90 km/h road speed.

The Pantsir S1 introduces a number of important improvements over the baseline Pantsir S. The new 9M335/57E6 missile replaces the established 9M331 series, this weapon provide 20 km range, 70% more than the 9M331M1, a significantly higher maximum target altitude, challenging many area defence missiles, a larger 20 kg warhead, and more thrust to accelerate the missile to 1,300 m/s in 2 seconds. The radar package is also replaced, with a new planar array (claimed to be a PESA) search radar, and an X-band engagement radar derived from Phazotron's fighter phased arrays.

The new engagement radar is claimed to have a 45° off boresight deflection angle, yielding coverage inside a 90° solid angle, with mechanical elevation to provide up to 85° of vertical angular coverage. It can track 20 targets and automatically prioritise the top three for engagement, and four missiles can be concurrently gathered and tracked.

An opto-electronic search and tracking function is provides, in the midwave and shortwave infrared bands. The missiles can be alternately tracked by the engagement radar or the OE system. A digital datalink is provide to permit networking multiple Pantsir S1 systems in a battery.

The Pantsir has been ordered by the UAE, Syria and Algeria. European sources claim the PLA and Greece are negotiating for the system. The system is offered on the 8x8 KAMAZ-6560, 8x8 MZKT-7930 and tracked GM 352M1E chassis.

Early Pantsir S / SA-22A demonstrator. Note the configuration of the search and engagement radar antennas (KBP).

A configuration of the Pantsyr S and S1 which remains on offer uses the 8 x 8 MZKT-7930 chassis, providing much better cross country mobility than the lighter KAMAZ chassis, at a cost. Mockups of the Pantsyr S1 one the MKKT-7930 have also been displayed (KBP).

Stowed configuration for transit. The SA-22B Greyhound lives up to its name, providing very high mobility. The most recent Pantsir S1 variant has a PESA engagement radar and a planar array search radar antenna, with much better sidelobe performance compared to the concave reflective design in the Pantsir S.

Detail of 30 mm gun system, derived from the GSh-30 aircraft cannon.

Detail of new Pantsir S1 Phazotron X-band phased array engagement radar (above), Phazotron Zhuk MSF PESA antenna developed for the Su-33/33UB (below), variants of this design having been also built for the MiG-29.

Operator stations.

Pantsyr S1 launching a missile on a test range (KBP).

Basic Characteristics (KBP)
Armament	missile/gun
Ammunition load, pcs
ready-to-fire missiles	12
30mm rounds	1400
Control system	multiple-band radar-optical
Aircraft engagement zone, m:
by missiles:
range	1200-20000
altitude	5-10000
by guns:
range	200-4000
altitude	0-3000
Reaction time, s	4-6
Number of targets simultaneously fired at	2
Fire on the move by SAMs and guns	provided (for CV on tracked chassis)
Crew

Basic tactical and technical characteristics of the "Shlem" weapon control system (Phazotron)
TARGET ACQUISITION RANGE (RCS=2 m²), km	24-28
TARGET POSITIONING ERROR (MSE):
ANGULAR COORDINATES, mrad	0,2-0,3
RANGE, m	5
SAM GUIDANCE	RADIO COMMAND
OPERATION ON THE MOVE	YES
HAS A BUILT-IN TEST SYSTEM

2К22M1 Треугольник / Тунгуска-M1 / KBP 2K22M1/2S6M1 Tunguska-M1 /
SA-19 Grison Air Defense Missile/Gun System

The modernised 2S6M1 Tunguska M1 employs a planar array search radar, and a distinctive radome for the engagement radar component.

First introduced in 1982, the Tunguska series of hybrid SPAAG/SAM systems was deployed by the PVO-SV to provide a replacement for the legacy ZSU-23-4P, which despite its success in Vietnam and the Middle East, was recognised as vulnerable to the then new A-10 Thunderbolt, and to helicopters firing anti-armour missiles, such as the Hellfire equipped AH-64A Apache. From the Soviet perspective, both of these threats would popu up briefly above the radar/visual horizon, fire at Soviet tanks or SPAAGs, and then disappear below the horizon before the ZSU-23-4P or Romb / SA-8 systems could respond with defensive weapon fire.

The Soviets needed a weapon system which could win in a 'high noon' shootout with the A-10 or a nap-of-ther-earth pop-up rotary wing threat. This became one of the defining requirements for the Tunguska, and led to the development of the high speed 9M311 SAM, intended to cross the distance between the Tunguska and the target before the latter could hide below the horizon line. This capability would be supplemented by a 30 mm gun system, the Soviets clearly coveting the BundesWehr's Krauss-Maffei Wegmann FLAKPanzer Gepard SPAAG.

The missile requirement led to the unusual two stage 9M311 design, in which the first stage boosted the round to 900 m/s at burnout, the sustainer in the terminal stage burning to impact and maintaing a 600 m/s velocity. The missile employs command link guidance, with an automatic Command to Line Of Sight (CLOS) control loop for the terminal phase to impact, with an 18G capability. The engagement radar component of the 1RL144M Hot Shot system is claimed to operate in the millimetric band, using jam resistant monopulse angle tracking; a 1A29M optical sight is boresighted with the radar. A 1RL138 IFF system is included. Conceptually the 2S6 missile package has its closest Western equivalents in the Franco-German Roland system, and the UK Rapier Blindfire and Seawold systems.

The gun requirement led to the adaptation of the 30 mm GSh-30 aircraft cannon, carried by Russian fighters: the 2A38 series liquid cooled 30 mm gun delivers a rate of fire of 1950-2500 rds/min, a muzzle velocity of 960 m/s, using the 2A42 cartridge and 0.39 kg projectile.

The initial 1982 2S6 Tunguska variant was superceded by the 2K22M/2S6M Tunguska M in 1990, and the 2K22M1/2S6M1 Tunguska M1 in 2003. The product line has been further developed as the Pantsir S, primarily in a road mobile configuration.

The 9M113-M1 SAM has a higher impulse booster, and radio rather than laser fusing to improve effect against cruise missiles and precision guided munitions. Defeating the latter has become one of the primary requirements for late variants of the 2S6 and the newer Pantsir S.

Within the region, the Tunguska has been acquired by India, with claims that Burma also acquired the system.

Early configuration 2S6 Tunguska system, note the Hot Shot radar system with the paraboloid section search antenna and gimballed monopulse tracking antenna.

The characteristic conical radome shape of the monopulse angle tracking engagement radar conceals a parabolic reflector antenna with a quad waveguide feed for dual plane tracking. Note the smaller command link antenna.

A BundesWehr Gepard SPAAG. The Gepard was a German response to the highly effective ZSU-23-4P SPAAG, and clearly became a major influence on the design of the Tunguska system, intended to replace the ZSU-23-4P.

Basic Characteristics
Armament	missile/gun
Ammunition load, pcs
ready-to-fire missiles	8
30mm rounds	1904
Control system	radar-optical
Aircraft engagement envelope, m:
by missiles:
range	2500-10000
altitude	15-3500
by guns:
range	up to 4000
altitude	up to 3000
Combat vehicle weight, t

Almaz-Antey/Kupol 9K331M/M1 Tor M/M1
SA-15B/C Gauntlet Air Defense Missile System

Tor M1 / SA-15B Gauntlet system (Kupol JSC).

The 9K331 Tor-M1 / SA-15 Gauntlet system, a highly mobile rapid reaction SAM built to replace the Cold War era SA-8 Gecko system. Like the SA-8 Gecko, the Tor M1 TELAR is a fully self contained package, with a search radar, a monopulse tracking and engagement radar, and a magazine of Automatic Command to Line Of Sight guided missiles. The design aims of the Gauntlet were however broader than those for the Gecko, and not only are low flying aircraft and helicopters intended targets, but also cruise missiles, standoff missiles and smart bombs during their terminal flight phase. Russian thinking is that S-300PMU/S-400 battery elements such as radars and command posts are to be covered by Gauntlet point defence systems, intended to engage and destroy guided munitions targeting the S-300PMU/S-400 battery elements.

The Gauntlet is carried on a GM-355 tracked chassis. The E/F-band folding surveillance radar is carried on the top of the turret, and the G/H-band engagement radar, claimed to be a phased array design, is mounted on the front. Eight vertically launched 9K331 SAM rounds are carried in sealed magazines, these are vertically ejected before ignition using the cold launch technique. Once clear of the TELAR, the canard missiles use nose rocket thrusters to pitch over in the direction of the target and effect the engagement. Reaction time to threats is credited in seconds between track confirmation and launch.
While in conceptual terms the Gauntlet compares well to the Franco-German Roland, the missile is more advanced and the TELAR far more capable than the Roland ever could be.

Tor M1 system launching a missile. The Tor series uses the 'cold launch' technique, whereby the round is ejected vertically from the tube, and once clear ignites its motor. Note the nose mounted thrusters used to rapidly pivot the missile in the direction of the target.

The current production Tor M1 variant incorporates a range of design improvements over the baseline Tor/Tor M variants. Probably the best technical summary of this system was published by Iosif Drize [Chief Designer] and Alexandr Luzan [Advisor to the Director General of the State Corporation Rosvoorouzhenie] in the Rosoboronexport house journal, Military Parade (TOR-M1 SAM SYSTEM: PROTECTING GROUND INSTALLATIONS AGAINST HIGH-PRECISION WEAPONS; Military Parade, 1996), cite:

"In the 1970-1980s, several countries acquired airborne high-precision weapons (HPW - further abbreviated as PGM), boasting improved quality and produced in increased numbers. In terms of effectiveness, the PGM could compare to tactical nuclear weapons, while they could be carried by both strategic aircraft and most flying machines represented by the army and tactical aircraft.

At present, leading military specialists consider the PGM as the main weapon to deliver the first (preventive) strike, capable of disabling or paralyzing air defenses, increasing the capacity and enhancing the effectiveness of the conventional means of air attack. In the course of subsequent combat operations the PGM is used, as a rule, to destroy (neutralize) the vital pinpoint and small-size targets carrying important potentials.

According to modern classification, the tactical PGM include:

      1. Antiradar missiles capable of destroying targets at a distance of 15 to 70 and, in perspective, up to 150 km from the launching point and flying at altitudes of 60 m to 12 - 16 km. The effective RCS of such missiles is minimized to about 0.1 m2, while the flight speed varies from 200 to 700 m/s.
      2. Airborne guided missiles with infrared, laser or TV homing heads, with a launching range from 6 to 10 km, angles of attack from 8-10 to 45-60 deg, effective RCS from 0.06 to 0.5 m2 and flight speeds from 200 to 600 m/s.
      3. Gliding and controlled guided aerial bombs and clusters with a release (drop) range of 8 to 10 km, effective Radiation PatternRCS below 0.5 m2, speed of 250 to 400 m/s and angles of attack up to 50 - 55 deg.
      4. Missiles fitted with inertial guidance and terrain avoidance features using the terrain map and capable of flying at 60 m and lower altitudes.

The PGM also include antiship missiles.

Overall, the features that distinguish the PGM (or their destructive components) from other radar targets and offensive means alike are:

      - small effective RCS averaging in the forward hemisphere at 0.1 m2 for the centimeter waveband (1.5 - 5 cm);
      - wide range of angular rates and angles of approach to the objective of the attack: from level flight at an altitude of 30 to 60 m with terrain avoidance to angles of attack of 45 to 60 deg and more;
      - high cruising and maximum speeds of flight (200 to 700 m/s), variable values of such speeds (accelerated and decelerated flights) as well as high operational load factors reaching 8 to 10 g;
      - high mechanical strength of guided and controlled aerial bombs, reducing their vulnerability as targets.

Such PGM features help them effectively withstand such systems as Osa, Roland and Crotale-NG. The first two circumstances impose new requirements on radars employed by the SAMs designed to fight the PGM, while the other two impose requirements on the flight ballistics and control loop of the systems as well as on the muscle of their combat equipment.

The low values of effective RCS require huge expenditure of energy by both TAR and TTR, especially in case of electronic countermeasures undertaken by the enemy as well as the implementation of new procedures to seek out and track targets. The TAR must be either three-coordinate or capable of measuring the target angle of site to an accuracy that minimizes the fine search time by the TTR.

The wide range of angles at which the PGM may approach the objective dictates the need for the TAR to shape an isodistant target detection zone instead of the isoheight (cosecant-squared) one widely employed by the SAMs, which is the main reason for the poor effectiveness of the existing SAM systems against the PGM.

In addition, the TAR should realize the principle of criterional processing of the signals, thereby minimizing the level of false alarms, and also examine the target flight paths, categorize the targets, select the most dangerous ones from a group of detected targets and prioritize them. To solve these tasks, the TAR should incorporate a data processor with the required capacity.

The TTR must ensure prompt lockon of one or several targets and automatically track the PGMs to an accuracy sufficient for their reliable engagement by SAMs at prescribed ranges.

Meeting these requirements minimizes the system reaction time.

The following specific demands are imposed on SAMs intended to fight the PGM:

      (1) the missiles must be given a minimum possible time to be ready for launch (3-4 s);
      (2) the propulsion system of the SAM should ensure its most rapid acceleration (within 3-5 s) to the prescribed speed and support its powered flight to a range no shorter than the prescribed killing range of the PGM. The operational load factors of the SAM must allow it to hit the PGM with a g-load not less than 10 units;
      (3) the armament of the SAM must have sufficient power to destroy a highly strong PGM and allow the SAM to adapt to the type (class) of the target to be destroyed;
      (4) the cost of the SAM should be the minimum required to achieve the positive balance between the cost of the PGM (plus the cost of the prevented damage) and adjusted cost of the SAM.

The general demands on a SAM system designed to fight the PGM are as follows:
      - the engagement range of aircraft that carries optically guided PGM must exceed the effective range of such weapons;
      - the reaction time, that is, the time elapsed between target detection and missile firing instants should be at a minimum. This can be attained via high automation of the battle performance based on extensive employment of computers (multiprocessor systems), elements of robotization and artificial intellect for maximum reduction of the crew workload;
      - the maximum cost-effectiveness criterion versus minimum cost of the SAM and reasonable (from the viewpoint of its significance) cost of the facility it protects;
      - the ability to combine the requisite number of SAMs into a highly automated system designed to defend the vital installations and main groupings of troops at the appropriate level.

Russia's Tor-M1 SAM system is the world's first short-range air defense system specifically tailored for highly effective use against the PGM.

The Tor-M1 SAM system has been developed and series produced by the Antey Concern. The system is a logical sequel to the OSA SAM family, capable of repelling existing and potential threats with the maximum efficiency.

The core of the Tor-M1 SAM system is its combat vehicle (CV) whose main version is based on the cross-country tracked chassis of an intermediate weight category.

The CV comprises:
      - TAR with a ground-based radar interrogator;
      - target and missile tracking radar (TTR);
      - backup TV optical tracker designed to autotrack targets in angular coordinates;
      - high-speed multiplex digital computer;
      - air situation display equipment, CV systems and means monitoring equipment, and CV commander and operator control panels;
      - coded radio command operational communications system;
      - navigation, survey control and orientation equipment;
      - surface-to-air missiles in group launching transporting containers (two containers with four SAMs in each);
      - primary power supply with the generator driven by the gas turbine engine or the engine of the self-propelled chassis;
      - auxiliary equipment.

The Tor-M1 CV detects and selects air targets on the move and fires missiles at them from short halts.

The antenna system of the TAR is stabilized. It produces an eight-portion Battary command postradiation pattern (Fig. 2).
The scanning interval is 1 s, the beam flare (width) in the vertical plane is 4 deg; the portion switchover (scanning) mechanism is electronic. Any three portions of the radiation pattern can be scanned within one scanning interval. The entire elevation zone covers 32 deg and can be scanned within 3 s. The regular scanning program is selected in such a way that, in order to increase the detection range for low-altitude targets, the first portion is scanned twice within three scanning intervals.

To augment the TAR potential, the antenna system of the radar can be revolved mechanically through 32 deg with a detection zone of 32 to 64 deg. This means that two CVs of the Tor-M1 system can make up a detection zone of 0 to 64 deg, and the firing capabilities of each CV assure target engagement within 0 and 80 deg in elevation.

To increase the pulse energy, the length of the emitted pulse is increased, and the pulse is internally modulated. The radar can also operate in an active jamming environment when the entire transmitted power of the radar is accumulated in one critical portion instead of being distributed among three portions.

The receivers perform an automatic threshold and criterional processing of signals in digital form.

To detect targets against the background of the earth's underlaying surface, atmospheric perturbations or man-made passive jamming, the TAR is provided with the moving target indication (MTI) feature assuring detection of both high- and low-speed (up to 10 m/s) targets without "blind" speeds. The MTI system has two rejection zones allowing simultaneous suppression of both the clutter and moving passive interferences.

After their first (coarse) cessing, the signals are fed to a computer where target track initiation is performed. The most dangerous threats are identified by their minimum approach flight time, altitude and crossover range. This information is then used to designate the targets for the TTR. The accuracy of target designation is 100 m in range, 20 min in azimuth and 2 deg in elevation.

The main characteristics of the TAR and zone for detection of a target with the effective RCS equal to 0.1 m2 and detection probability p = 0.5. The radar has a detection range of 18 to 22 km, which is sufficient to engage air targets (depending on their speed) at ranges from 12 km and less and within virtually all elevations (up to 64 deg).TOR-M1 system components.

The TTR of the Tor-M1 SAM system is of the pulse Doppler type capable of determining four coordinates of the selected target. To assure steady passover to autotracking of point targets and obtain highly accurate target coordinates, the radar uses a high-powered pulse transmitter.

To reduce the time required to switch to the autotracking mode and materially weaken the influence of the motion of the target on its lockon, the TTR uses a phased antenna array (PAA) with a small number of elements, which deflects the antenna beam at a level of 3 dB within ñ7.5 deg. The fine target search is then accomplished through electronic deflection of the antenna beam within 7 deg in elevation and 3 deg in azimuth. With the selected accuracy of the target designation received from the TAR, the fine search limits assure 100-percent target lockon. The time required to switch to autotracking ranges from 400 to 600 ms, depending on the target speed and interferences. With this passover time, the target seems to be "frozen" with respect to the scanning sector of the PAA, ensuring the high reliability of the switch to the autotracking mode. The TTR uses the Doppler signal processing, pulse compression, fast Fourier transforms, and narrow-band filtration, which, when combined with the high-energy pulse, large gain of the PAA and low level of its sidelobe and background noise, makes the TTR highly immune to jamming.

The Tor-M1 SAM system uses a TV optical tracker, which autotracks target angular coordinates, as a backup tracking system.

The missile armament is used effectively by discriminating between target types. The TAR allows discrimination between four classes of targets: point targets (or PGM), airplanes, helicopters and unidentified targets. This results in increased probability of engagement of small-size targets, notably PGM.

To track missiles, the TTR has two channels. One of the channels serves to lock on to and track the missile by using beacon signals at the starting leg of the flight. The second channel uses the missile responder signals received via the PAA to track the missile throughout its flight path.

The commands are transmitted to the missile by the radar transmitter via the PAA. The indicator equipment, incorporating a commander's target flight path display, TTR target and missile tracking displays, a TV tracker video monitor, TAR operator displays, control panels and signalling devices, are brought onto a single console located in the CV operator compartment. The seat of the driver-mechanic, who drives the CV, starts and monitors the operation of the gas turbine driven power supply unit, is also located there.

In terms of shape, the Tor-M1 missile is of the canard type. It is launched vertically to a height of 15 to 20 m with the aid of a powder catapult and is then inclined by a special thruster towards the target, and its main solid propellant rocket motor takes over.

The motor of the missile is single-stage and two-mode. In the launching mode, the motor accelerates, within four seconds, the missile to a maximum speed of 850 m/s; in the cruising mode, which lasts for 12 seconds of flight, it maintains the above speed. This makes for the required power-to-weight ratio of the missile, allows the missile to cover a distance of 8 km in powered flight and effectively engage targets flying at speeds below 700 m/s and g-loads up to 10 g.

The missile is furnished ready for use inside a launching transporting container designed to accommodate four missiles.

      One major characteristic of the short-range missile systems is the reaction time or the interval between the moment of target detection by the TAR and the instant of missile launch. One can single out three characteristic stages in the process:
      - detection of targets by the TAR, their processing and track initiation, establishing priorities according to the relative threat criterion, and production of target designation data for the TTR;
      - orientation of the antenna post towards the most dangerous target in azimuth and elevation;
      - fine search of the target, switchover to autotracking and missile launch.

The total reaction time of the Tor-M1 SAM system changes from 3.4 to 10.6 s, depending on the employment conditions and intensity of interference. When employed on the move, the two seconds required to stop the CV are added to this time. It should be stressed that the high degree of battle performance automation, employment of artificial intellect and unique algorithms make it possible to perform all the operations, involving detection of targets and the switch to autotracking the two most dangerous ones, virtually without operator intervention.

Four Tor-M1 SAM CVs are organic to one SAM battery, which is the smallest tactical subunit capable of executing combat missions independently. To control the combat actions and fire of the CVs, each SAM battery has an automated battery command post (BCP). Using the coded communications and navigation, survey control and orientation equipment of the CVs, the BCP produces target distribution and precludes accidental concentration of fire of several CVs on one target. The essence of target distribution resides in the automatic exchange of information on autotracked targets among the CVs via the BCP and automatic reassignment of priorities by the CVs with corrections made for received information. The target distribution system realizes the step-by-step principle of adaptation of the CVs to the current air situation in real time. When necessary, the battery commander may intervene into (correct) the target distribution process and execute other combat control tasks.

Furthermore, the BCP can receive and display the current air situation (10 most dangerous targets) from one (any) subordinate CV and from the TAR located at a higher command post (CP) and establish operational communication inside the SAM battery and with the higher CP.

The entire process of control over the Tor-M1 SAM system CVs can be realized when all the elements of the SAM battery are on the move or brought to a halt. The BCP also integrates the SAM battery or a local system organized around it into the general structures of the air defense systems of a large unit or region of the country.

In addition to these combat means, the Tor-M1 SAMs are provided with transloaders, maintenance trucks and mobile SPTA sets."

A towed semi-mobile variant of the Tor M1 is on offer, sacrificing mobility for lower cost (Rosoboronexport).

During the 1990s the PLA procured the Russian 9K331M1 Tor-M1 / SA-15C Gauntlet system. Chinese sources put the SA-15 inventory at around 25 systems, deployed with the 31^st and 38^th Army Groups. The Russians have exported this system to Greece and Iran.

SA-15C Gauntlet of the PLA deployed with search radar fully elevated.

Tor M1 Specifications

Almaz-Antey/Kupol 9K331MK2/MU2 Tor M2/M2E
SA-15D Gauntlet Air Defense Missile System

The Russian Tor M2 or SA-15D Gauntlet is by far the most capable point defence SAM system deployed by Russia and its clientele. It is used to defend against low flying aircraft as well as cruise missiles and guided weapons like smart bombs. It is available on a tracked chassis, and more recently, a purpose designed semi-hardened MZKT-6922 6 x 6 all terrain vehicle. Depicted deployed configuration (Kupol JSC).

The Tor M2/M2E is a 'deep modernisation' of the baseline Tor M1 weapon system, available on the legacy tracked chassis, or the entirely new low profile wheeled MZKT-6922 6 x 6 chassis as the 9A331MK, the latter specifically developed by the ByeloRussian manufacturer for this application. Russian sources claim the Russian MoD sought the same KAMAZ chassis as used with the SA-22 / Pantsir S1, but the manufacturer was unhappy with the overall height and hardness of the vehicle, and contracted MZKT in Minsk to develop a new vehicle. The MZKT-6922 is semi-hardened, and intended to protect the crew and systems from small arms fire, shrapnel and spall. The new vehicle weighs 17 tonnes, with a maximum gross weight of 30 tonnes. It is powered by a 420 SHP YaMZ-7513.10 diesel, using an MZKT GMP-400 transmission, delivering a road speed of 80 km/h.

The Tor M2E has an improved weapon system. The new planar array surveillance radar can track up to 48 targets concurrently, retaining the range performance of the legacy system. The revised phased array engagement radar uses new phase shifters, and is capable of tracking targets within a claimed 30° solid angle around the antenna boresight. Paired command link antennas are mounted on both sides of the array, used to acquire the missiles post launch, while they are out of the field of view of the engagement radar array. Missiles can be launched 2 seconds apart. The manufacturer has identified the missile design as an area of future improvement, the turret permitting the carriage of a large number of smaller and lighter future missiles.

The envisaged Tor M2E battery structure comprises four 9A331MK TELARs, one 9S737MK Ranzhir-MK mobile command post, two 9T244 transloader vehicles, and one 9V887M2K engineering support vehicle.

While the Tor M2E offers incremental gains in system capability, its key advance over earlier variants is its much higher in-theatre mobility, and intra-theatre deployability, making it a much more practical asset for defending infrastructure targets than the legacy Tor/Tor-M1 variants, optimised to escort armoured battlefield manouvre formations. The Tor M2E is well suited for the envisaged role of protecting fixed targets and highly mobile S-300PMU2/S-400 missile batteries from PGM attack.

The improved Tor M2E variant is to deploy with Russian PVO-SV units in 2009, and has been marketed on a purpose designed 6 x 6 MZKT-6922 wheeled vehicle. Images depict stowed configuration (Kupol JSC images).

Tor M2E PESA engagement radar. The design is capable of tilting to engage high elevation targets The Electro-Optical targeting system is at the left of the image. Note the hemispherical command uplink antennas for post launch missile acquisition.

Tor M2E search radar in deployed configuration. The planar array design replaces the cumbersome paraboloid section reflector design used with the Tor M1 series.

Apertures for the Tor M2E Electro-Optical tracking system, used to supplement the engagement radar in heavily jammed environments.

Almaz-Antey High Energy Laser Directed Energy Weapon


Left: Almaz beam director optical turret mounted on a MAZ-7930 8 x 8 chassis, the turret is located on the turntable otherwise employed for the 30N6 radar. Centre: Primary optical aperture for beam director. Right: Carbon Dioxide Gas Dynamic Laser (GDL) bank testbed. Note the hardstand used to support the MAZ-7930 chassis.

Target drone engagement using the HEL GDL demonstrator. (1) shows target before illumination, (2) shows target being illuminated, and (3) shows target breakup following a successful hit. Almaz-Antey have not disclosed the range of this trial or the emitted CW power level of the GDL.

The interest in the use of High Energy Laser (HEL) Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) observed in the US, EU and Israel is paralleled by a development effort at Almaz-Antey aimed at trialling HEL DEW technology for air defence applications.

Little has been disclosed by Almaz-Antey on the detail of this program. It clearly intended to build up expertise and experience across the whole spectrum of necessary capabilities, in this instance beam director optics, adaptive optics, tracking capabilities, and high continuous wave power level laser designs.

The laser depicted is a CO₂ Gas Dynamic Laser (GDL), the same technology used by the US Air Force during the 1990s Airborne Laser Laboratory (ALL) program. It operates in the LWIR band at 10.6 microns, and is operationally attractive due to its simple fuel supply in comparison with Deuterium Fluoride (DF) and Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser (COIL). What is less attractive about CO₂ GDLs is that tropospheric CO₂ molecules increase propagation losses, and aluminium, the primary structural material in many potential targets, has a very high reflectance in this band, thus reducing power coupling efficiency into the target, and increasing dwell time.

What has not been disclosed by Almaz-Antey is the progress on this project, especially in the critical area of adaptive optics and wavefront sensor technology for controlling adaptive mirrors. GDL technology is relatively mature, and derivative chemical laser designs will be largely determined by Russian capabilities in developing power modules for a given laser type. The choice of CO₂ GDL may have been simply determined by its availability and low risk, as a means of demonstrating and proving other more sensitive system components.

An operational HEL DEW air defence system will emerge only once the laser and beam director technology has matured to the point where a robust deployable design can be built. Given the Russian penchant for robustness and incremental evolution of designs, it is not difficult to postulate a configuration for such a system:

Beam Director Platform (BDP): an evolution of the existing demonstrator carried on an 8 x 8 MZKT-7930, or towed by an MZKT-7930 in an articulated semi-trailer arrangement.
HEL Power Stage System (PSS): ideally integrated on the BDP vehicle to maximise mobility, but may need to be carried separately if volume is too great, the latter impairing mobility.
Engagement Radar System: a derivative of the existing 92N2E Grave Stone carried on an 8 x 8 MZKT-7930.
Fuel Supply Vehicles: 8 x 8 MZKT-7930, probably based on an existing fuel tanker.

The CONOPS for such a system would be similar to the US Army MTHEL system, although it is likely the Russians will pursue a fully mobile configuration, consistent with their doctrine for SAM systems (refer below). It is likely that a key role of such a DEW would be the interception of PGMs, this placing the weapon system firmly in the domain of point defence.

Until we see further disclosures from the Russian MoD or Almaz-Antey, a more detailed assessment of this system is not feasible. Given the sensitivity of HEL weapon lethality performance to operating wavelength and beam quality, any predictions of achievable range performance would be at best speculative. For a system to be operationally effective, a sustained power output of the order of a MegaWatt would be required.