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Updated: Fri Jul 30 14:32:11 UTC 2010
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The
Impact of Russian
High Technology Weapons: Transforming the Strategic Balance in Asia
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Air Power Australia Analysis
2008-09
12th December, 2008
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by Dr Carlo Kopp, SMAIAA, MIEEE, PEng
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©
2008 Carlo Kopp
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The F-22A Raptor, B-2A Spirit and planned “2018
bomber” are the only US designs capable of surviving in the
technological environment presented by the current and emerging
generation of Russian high technology weapons. The 'Fulda
Gap optimised' F-35
Joint Strike Fighter is not capable of surviving in this environment
and is for all intents and purposes now a strategically irrelevant
design, which is draining scarce funds away from programs which are
strategically much more important (Image US AIr Force).
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Abstract
Advanced
Russian technology exports present a major strategic risk for the US,
whether operated by China, or smaller players like Iran or Venezuela.
These systems will deny access to most US ISR and combat aircraft,
with only the B-2A, the “2018 bomber” and the F-22A
designed to penetrate such defences. Until the “2018 bomber” is
operational, the US will have only 200 aircraft with any capability to
deal with this emerging environment. With its compromised X-band
optimised stealth, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter will simply not
be survivable in this
environment. The
fallback position of standoff bombardment with cruise missiles is not
viable. Only a fraction will reach their targets through such
defences, and the economics of trading $500k cruise missiles for
$100k interceptors, or hundreds of dollars of laser propellant,
favour the defender. The
US will require a penetrating capability for ISR collection and for
lethal suppression of highly mobile SAM, laser and radio-frequency
Directed Energy Weapon batteries. This is over and above the need to
deliver saturation attacks with the Small Diameter Bomb against
actual targets of strategic or tactical interest. Current
planning for 180 F-22As and the legacy fleet of 20 B-2As is simply
not credible given the diversity of roles and missions, and sheer
sortie count required to deal with anything above a trivial opponent. If
the US is to maintain its pre-eminent global strategic position, its
force structure planning for the Air Force requires a fundamental
rethink. A starting point should be the cancellation of the 'Fulda
Gap optimised' F-35 JSF, investment of the freed funding into more
F-22s, and further enhancement of the already formidable penetrating
ISR and strike capabilites of the F-22. Further technological
innovation will also be required across the full spectrum of US air
capabilities. If
the US chooses to optimise its Air Force for the Global War On
Terror, it will only accelerate the relative decline of US global
power.
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- The Former Soviet
Defence Industrial Base
- The Russian Approach to
Defeating US Air Power
- Strategic
Implications for the United States
- References
Russian
high technology weapons are transforming the strategic landscape in
Asia, as the defence industries of the former Soviet Republics export
some of the most advanced weapons designed and built to date. This
strategic has important long term implications for US policy
makers, yet as the current debate over the future of the US Air Force
shows, the matter is neither well understood or indeed widely
understood in Washington circles.
The Former
Soviet Defence Industrial Base
The
end of the Cold War was a mixed blessing for the Soviet defense
industrial base, as the collapse of hitherto secure high volume
funding flows was balanced by unfettered access to a global market
for high technology weapons and the high technology required to
develop and manufacture them. Nearly two decades after the
disintegration of the USSR, the former Soviet industry, now based
across the independent nations of Russia, ByeloRussia, the Ukraine
and other former Soviet republics, has returned to the global stage
with considerable effect.
This
industry has provided China, India and smaller players in Asia with a
wide range and often large quantities of sophisticated weapons, many
of which challenge or simply outperform US and EU designs. The result
is an increasing in the strategic balance in Asia, wholly at
the expense of the US, and its closest regional allies, Japan and
Australia.
The
crown jewels of the Soviet military technology base appeared in the
export market after 1992. Earnings initially funded the survival of
the industry, and later financed the the development of derivative
weapons, and entirely new weapons. Other than energy, Russia's
principal exports are now weapons, military equipment spare parts,
services and consultancy.
The
range of high technology products spans the full spectrum, including
supercavitating torpedoes, laser, electro-optical, and satellite
guided smart bombs and missiles, anti-ship and land attack cruise
missiles, advanced surface to air, and air to air missiles, two metre
band 'counter-stealth' radars, passive radio frequency sensors,
active and passive phased array radars for fighter aircraft, high
power radio frequency beam weapons, and according to some sources,
high energy laser weapons technology. The single most successful export
has been the KnAAPO/Irkut Sukhoi Flanker fighter, with China
and India alone accounting for around 750 orders.
Whereas
Soviet weapons of the late Cold War were mostly built using analogue
and hardwired digital technology, contemporary products are mostly
digital, and more than often built using the same chips or
technologies used in US, EU and Israeli designs. An Agat 9B1348
missile seeker built around a Texas Instruments TMS-320 processor
chip compares closely to its Western counterparts. A Polyana or
Ranzhir mobile command post uses LCD display panels and other COTS
computer hardware, the basic COTS components likely sourced from the
same OEMs as US integrators do.
While
the US retains a lead in many key technologies, such as stealth
shaping, stealth materials, and X-band module technology for radars,
the globalised and commodified market has allowed Russian industry to
close the gap across most other basic technologies. An Su-35BM
Flanker now built at Komsomolsk na Amure will not only outperform an
F-15E built in St Louis, but it will have many systems built with
newer and more advanced basic technology, from cockpit displays to
electronic warfare equipment.
Unlike
the US industry which has to compete with Silicon Valley to retain
talent, in the former Soviet Union the defence industry is the only
high technology industry of substance. Abundant Russian language web
based job placement advertising shows exactly how good Russian talent
is.
Advanced
Russian weapons such as the supersonic air/sea/sub/land launched
3M-55 Yakhont / SS-N-26, 3M-54 Club / SS-N-27 Sizzler and 3M80/81/82
Moskit / SS-N-22 Sunburn present the most capable threat to date to
naval surface fleets, and land attack cruise missiles such as the
Kh-55 Granat (AS-15 Kent), Kh-65, and their Chinese clones, will
produce a Tomahawk class capability to any player with the budget.
However, the biggest strategic impact will arise from weapons built
to fight and win air wars.
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The Russian
Approach to Defeating US Air Power
The stunning success of the US Air Force in 1991, followed by the 1999,
2001 and 2003 air campaigns, has been a double edged sword. While it
validated the late Cold War paradigm developed by US Air Force
strategists, and proved a wide range of doctrinal ideas, strategy and
technology, it has also produced unintended and damaging consequences.
The first is that it stimulated a nearly two decade long effort by
Russian and Chinese industry to defeat advanced US technologies, an
effort now resulting in competitive products. The second consequence
has been an unwarranted sense of superiority and confidence in
Washington, and indeed elsewhere in Western defence departments. The
third consequence during this decade has been the large scale
downsizing of US technical intelligence gathering and analysis
capabilities, leaving US analysts more than often blind to
technological advancements in Russia and China.
During the Cold War era, Soviet technological strategy was driven
mostly by an overarching central plan, more than often crafted to meet
strategic agendas and counter specific US capabilities. The new
paradigm is entirely different, and driven by bottom up market
pressures rather than top down bureaucratic directives. The former
Soviet industry is now free to exercise its design creativity without
hindrance, driven by profit motive and competitive pressures. The
privatisation of much of the industry into Joint Stock Companies, and
incessant takeovers of smaller manufacturers, has created a commercial
hothouse environment in which new ideas and new markets thrive. The
nearest comparison is the US industry during the Reagan era, where
creative thinking was more than often handsomely rewarded with
contracts. In Russia today the primary market for the most advanced
products is the export market, not the Russian Armed Forces, who more
than often are equipped with variants predating the export product.
At the end of the Cold War the US possessed several key and decisive
capability advantages, and usually a monopoly on the technology
involved. These included stealth technology – the F-117A, with the B-2
entering production and the F-22 development, a diverse range of
sophisticated precision guided munitions including cruise missiles, and
a large fleet of standoff Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance
(ISR) platforms including the AWACS, JSTARS, Rivet Joint, and U-2.
It should come as no surprise that the strategic imperative for nations
not aligned with the US in the new multi-polar world is the defeat of
these capabilities, and as a result these have produced distinct foci
in Russian weapons development. Typically an equivalent product to the
US design is on offer, or where out of reach, a product designed to
asymmetrically deny use of the US capability is offered.
The issue of countering US ISR capabilities is a good example. The
industry has provided the Chinese with assistance on their KJ-2000
AWACS system, based on the Ilyushin Il-78 airframe.
Of much greater concern is however the asymmetric development of ultra
long range Air to Air and Surface to Air missiles specifically intended
to destroy ISR platforms or deny their use. These include the Fakel 200
nautical mile SAM developed for the S-400 Triumf / SA-21 Growler
system, and the 162 nautical mile Vympel R-37 and 200 nautical mile
Novator R-127/K-100 AAMs developed to arm the Flanker family of fighter
aircraft. A stated secondary role for these missiles is destroying US
aerial refuelling tankers and standoff jammers such as the EC-130,
EA-6B and EF-18G. By the middle of the coming decade all of these
weapons will be well established in the global market, presenting
interesting challenges for US forces.
In the domain of Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) and cruise missiles,
the former Soviet industry has become a major global player, competing
directly against the US, EU and Israeli industries. This presents
another symmetric response to US capabilities, and one which is clearly
having an impact. In guided bombs, the GNPP KAB-250, KAB-500 and
KAB-1500 occupy the same niche as the US GBU-10/12/16/24/27 Paveway
II/III, the GBU-15 and the GBU-31/32/35/38 JDAM series. The basic
KAB-500/1500 bomb airframes may be supplied with penetrating, general
purpose blast, thermobaric or gaseous Fuel Air Explosive warheads. No
less interesting is that the same airframes can be supplied with an
Electro-Optical (EO) correlation terminal seeker, modelled on the
Tomahawk DSMAC, a datalink supported EO or thermal imaging seeker
modelled on the GBU-15 or Walleye, a laser seeker very similar to the
Paveway II, or a satellite inertial guidance package modelled on the US
JDAM. The latter has twenty channels, capable of using both US GPS and
Russian Glonass satellites. Another hot seller has been the 3M-54/3M-14
Club / Sizzler family of cruise missiles, now deployed by China and
India on Kilo SSKs, and being marketed in an air launch configuration,
ship launch configuration and land mobile coastal defence
configuration. The land attack Sizzler variant, the 3M14E/AE, best
compares to the AGM-109H/L Tomahawk MRASM derivatives.
Of much greater interest is however the asymmetric technological
response to US dominance in smart munitions. Russian strategy is that
PGMs and cruise missiles should be shot down in flight, and this has
seen a large scale reorientation of development across a range of air
defence weapons. The basic idea is that a deluge of US smart weapons
will be countered with intensive missile and directed energy weapon
defensive fire against these weapons. Of interest is that the US AGM-88
HARM anti-radiation missile is a cited target type for every single
point defence weapon now on offer.
In 1991 the Soviets were producing the Tor / SA-15A/B Gauntlet SAM and
Tunguska / SA-19 Grison SAM/SPAAG system on tracked chassis, intended
to defend Red Army land manoeuver forces against pop up helicopter and
fighter threats. Both of these systems have evolved considerably since
then, and their replacements are tasked primarily with defeating smart
munitions, while protecting long range SAM batteries, early warning
radars and fixed infrastructure targets.
The new Tor M2E / SA-15D is road mobile on a hardened 6 x 6 MZKT6922
vehicle, and the new Pantsir S1E / SA-22 Greyhound is carried by an 8 x
8 KAMAZ-6560. Both systems have digital processing and a phased array
engagement radar, in the SA-22 it is directly derived from Phazotron's
Zhuk-MFE originally built for the MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter. There are no
direct Western equivalents to either the SA-15D or SA-22, either in
capabilities or mobility.
The drive to counter smart munitions has also seen the development of
the Fakel 9M96E1/E2 interceptor missiles for the Almaz-Antey S-400
Triumf / SA-21 Growler system, these weapons being equivalent to the
Patriot PAC-3 ERINT interceptor. Unlike the PAC-3, these designs were
built from the outset to also kill smart munitions targeting the
missile battery. While the S-400 is mostly designed to provide outer
layer long and medium range SAM and ABM capabilities, as demonstrated
by the inclusion of counter-ISR and point defence missiles, it is much
more than its predecessors, the S-300PS/PM/PMU / SA-10 Grumble and
S-300PMU1/2 Favorit / SA-20 Gargoyle. The latter SAM systems have been
exported to China in large numbers, and form the basis of the Chinese
HQ-12/15 SAM systems. The S-400 is a fully digital design, and has been
reintegrated on new MZKT, BAZ and KAMAZ vehicles for improved road
mobility. The system's 55K6 command post is designed to also control
legacy missile systems such as the S-200 / SA-5 Gammon.
Directed energy weapons are another capability which is seen by the
Russians and Chinese as critical to defeating massed attacks by US
smart munitions and cruise missiles. The Russians have been marketing
the 500 MegaWatt Ranets E pulsed microwave beam weapon, using a mobile
beam director dish on a 8 x 8 MZKT-7930 truck. This system will be
electrically lethal to aircraft avionics and guided munition
electronics at a range of 7 nautical miles or greater.
The status of High Energy Laser weapons is less clear at this time.
Almaz-Antey developed the Soviet 100 kiloWatt plus class carbon dioxide
chemical lasers, and built a system comparable to the US THEL/MTHEL,
but highly mobile on an 8 x 8 MAZ-7910 chassis.
This plethora of diverse and capable air defence weapons all share the
important attributes of high mobility and deployment and stow times of
minutes, to facilitate 'shoot and scoot' operations. Defeat of highly
mobile air defence weapons remains a problem, as demonstrated in 1999.
While 743 HARMs were fired, only 12 percent of Serbian mobile 9M9 /
SA-6 Gainful SAM systems were destroyed. Networked with digital radio
links, and equipped with low sidelobe agile beam phased array radars,
the current generation of Russian air defence weapons will be much
harder to kill than the 1970s SA-6B.
Countering US stealth capabilities has been a high priority for Russian
manufacturers. The symmetric response has been the development of a
range of radar absorbent coatings and laminates for use on legacy
aircraft. Russian sources claim the absorbent coating used in the
Su-35BM Flanker will reduce engine inlet tunnel signatures thirty-fold
in the X-band. We have yet to see the new PAK-FA stealth fighter, so
assessment of Russian progress in airframe shaping techniques is not
yet feasible.
The asymmetric aspect of Russia's counter stealth effort is far more
visible. It is centred on the use of two metre or VHF band radar
technology, and the networking and integration of other sensors,
including passive emitter locating systems.
Most recent Russian effort in the development of early warning and
surveillance radars has been in the two metre band. All of these new
radars, and upgrade packages for legacy Soviet era radars, are digital
and mostly solid state designs. Many include sophisticated adaptive
processing techniques for rejection of ground clutter and jamming, a
technology to date seen mostly in recent US radar designs.
The focus on the two metre radio band, used primarily for TV
broadcasting, is that it largely defeats stealth airframe shaping
techniques designed for the decimetre and centimetre band radar. The
Russians are adamant that US stealthy fighter aircraft will appear as
beachball sized radar targets in the VHF band, rather than marble sized
targets. Raleigh scattering regime physics support the Russian view.
A key development is the emergence of new technology VHF designs, built
for high mobility to support mobile SAM batteries. The NNIIRT 1L119
Nebo SVU is the first ever VHF band Active Electronically Steered Array
(AESA), and is accurate enough to provide midcourse guidance for a
missile. Russian thinking on counter-stealth technique is to fly the
missile close enough for its seeker to lock on despite the stealthiness
of the target, using datalinking from a stealth defeating sensor. This
radar can be deployed and stowed in 45 minutes. The new ByeloRussian
KBR Vostok E wins the mobility game with an 8 minute deploy and stow
time, using a hydraulically folded and elevated antenna. This new VHF
radar is also fully digital, solid state, and employs an innovative
"Kharchenko" square ring antenna element design. Defeat of US stealth
is a primary claim by its designers, who state the ability to track an
F-117A at 190 nautical mile range.
The effort in VHF radar is paralleled by developments in Emitter
Locating Systems, specifically the networked 85V6 Orion/Vega and Topaz
Kolchuga systems. Users of the earlier Tamara / Trash Can system
claimed the ability to track the position of US aircraft with emitting
JTIDS/Link-16 terminals. Other counter-stealth technology includes a
VHF band multistatic radar being developed by NNIIRT.
Other important developments include the 20 kiloWatt class N-035 Irbis
E hybrid phased array radar for the Su-35BM, which outperforms all US
legacy fighter radars, the APG-79 in the Super Hornet, and APG-81 in
the F-35. Russia's first AESA radar, the Zhuk AE, is being scaled up
for the Flanker, and promises performance in the class of the latest US
APG-77(V)2 and APG-63(V)3 AESAs.
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Contemporary Russian Weapons
The
new 3 dimensional NNIIRT
1L119 Nebo SVU AESA
is an improved new
technology VHF
band SAM battery acquisition radar, and with
20 minutes to deploy. Stated tracking accuracy is 200 metres in range, 0.5° in azimuth,
and 1.5° in elevation, making it suitable as an
acquisition radar for the S-300PMU-1/2 and S-400 systems.
The
ByeloRussian KB Radar (Agat) Vostok E is an entirely new 2D VHF radar
design, using
a
unique wideband "Kharchenko" square ring radiating element design, in a
diamond lattice pattern. It can stow or deploy in only 8 minutes.
S-400
Triumf 92N2 Grave Stone X-band high power-aperture engagement radar
deployed.
S-400
Triumf 5P85TE2 TEL deployed.
S-400 Triumf LEMZ 96L6E
Cheese Board L-band acquisition radar deployed. It replaces Cold War
era S-band radars such as the 76N6 Clam Shell and 36D6/ST-68U Tin
Shield series.
Agat Panorama TsM - Air Defence Area /
Sector Mobile Command Post. The advent of COTS technology computing
hardware and open
source software tools has seen explosive growth in the integration
capabilities available to Russian designers.
The Agat Panorama TsM Air Defence Area /
Sector Mobile Command Post (above, below) is a good
example of the highly integrated systems approach taken in the design
of contemporary IADS. It also illustrates the level of penetration
achieved by COTS computing technology in modern Russian designs. Note
that both legacy and contemporary missile batteries are supported, as
well as VHF band and microwave radars (Agat).
The latest
Pantsir S1 configuration at MAKS-2007, which incorporates a new
Phazotron designed agile beam
phased array engagement radar, derived from Phazotron's earlier effort
on the Zhuk MF PESA air intercept radar for the MiG-29 fighter. It is
intended to defend radars and missile batteries from attacks using
anti-radiation missiles or other weapons.
The Russian Tor M2E or
SA-15D
Gauntlet is used to defend against low flying
aircraft as well as cruise missiles and guided weapons like smart
bombs. It is available on a tracked chassis, and more recently, a
purpose designed semi-hardened MZKT-6922 6 x 6
all terrain vehicle. The acquistion and engagement radars are both PESA
technology (Kupol JSC).
The Ukrainian Topaz Kolchuga ESM system
has received considerable press over the last decade, mostly related to
alleged illegal sales to Saddam's regime preceding Operation Iraqi
Freedom (Image © Miroslav Gyűrösi).
The
MiG-35
Zhuk AE AESA multimode radar designed by Phazotron is
the first Russian
AESA design and
is
expected to spawn AESA upgrade packages for a number of regional
Flanker variants (RSK MiG).
Su-35BM/Su-35-1
cockpit. This new Flanker outperforms all US fighters other than the
F-22A Raptor.
Su-35 Flanker E (KnAAPO Image).
KAB-1500L
Laser Guided Bomb. This Russian weapon is a 3,000 lb class equivalent
to
the US Paveway II/III series weapons (GNPP image).
KAB-500SE
satellite aided inertially guided bomb.
Digital
upgrades to legacy Soviet era weapons such as this S-125/SA-3 Goa not
only render Cold War era electronic countermeasures ineffective, but
typically improve performance and reliability. During trials Tetraedr
achieved twice the maximum range with this 1970s technology missile,
simply by improving the midcourse guidance algorithm. Depcited the
Pechora 2M TEL is based on
a 6 x 6 MZKT chassis and the two round 5P71 launcher (Defence
Systems).
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The Northrop-Grumman B-2A 'Batwing'.
Current planning sees the US deploying only 20 B-2As and 183 F-22As
between now and 2020, prior to the deployment of the planned “2018
bomber”. New technology Russian weapons will
present an inpenetrable barrier to all other US types (US DoD).
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Strategic
Implications for the United States
Advanced
Russian technology exports present a major strategic risk for the US,
whether operated by China, or smaller players like Iran or Venezuela.
These systems will deny access to most US ISR and combat aircraft,
with only the B-2A, the “2018 bomber” and the F-22A
designed to penetrate such defences. With its compromised X-band
optimised stealth, the F-35 JSF will simply not be survivable in this
environment.
The
fallback position of standoff bombardment with cruise missiles is not
viable. Only a fraction will reach their targets through such
defences, and the economics of trading $500k cruise missiles for
$100k interceptors, or hundreds of dollars of laser propellant,
favour the defender. Time of flight is problematic given the high
mobility of air defence targets, and targeting the cruise missiles no
less problematic given denial of ISR coverage.
The
US will require a penetrating capability for ISR collection and for
lethal suppression of highly mobile SAM, laser and radio-frequency
Directed Energy Weapon batteries. This is over and above the need to
deliver saturation attacks with the Small Diameter Bomb against
actual targets of strategic or tactical interest.
Current
planning for 180 F-22As and the legacy fleet of 20 B-2As is simply
not credible given the diversity of roles and missions, and sheer
sortie count required to deal with anything above a trivial opponent.
If
the US is to maintain its pre-eminent global strategic position, its
force structure planning for the Air Force requires a fundamental
rethink. A starting point should be the cancellation of the 'Fulda
Gap optimised' F-35 JSF, investment of the freed funding into more
F-22s, and further enhancement of the already formidable penetrating
ISR and strike capabilites of the F-22. Further technological
innovation will also be required across the full spectrum of US air
capabilities.
If
the US chooses to optimise its Air Force for the Global War On
Terror, it will only accelerate the relative decline of US global
power.
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The inferior stealth shaping of the F-355
SDD design compared to other US stealth aircraft makes it nonviable in
the threat environment presented by contemporary and future Russian
high technology weapons (Imagery
via Air Force Link).
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Imagery
Sources: Author; www.jsf.mil, US DoD.
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Air Power Australia
Analyses ISSN 1832-2433
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![Australia's First Online Journal Covering Air Power Issues [ISSN 1832-2433]](APA-Title-Analyses.png "Australia's First Online Journal Covering Air Power Issues [ISSN 1832-2433]")
